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INTRODUCTION
Historical accountability and apology mark our current age. Nations all over the world
are taking steps to acknowledge the wrongs of the past and, when possible, act to correct them.
South Africa has actively improved race relations and strengthened democracy following the
ending of apartheid. To retroactively cope with the human rights abuses, Truth and
Reconciliation commissions have been established to investigate claims of brutality under
apartheid, while granting amnesty to perpetrators willing to admit they had erred. In South
America, Argentina and Chile have both instituted special truth-seeking commissions to
investigate tens of thousands of deaths and “disappearances” under brutal 1960s and 1970s
dictators. Just last year, Japan grudgingly apologized for its treatment of civilians who lived in
occupied areas during the Japanese conquests of Asia during World War II, and for forcing
thousands of women into prostitution for Japanese soldiers. In our own country, former
members of the confederacy, Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, and Alabama have issued
official apologies for the horrors of slavery. Even New Jersey has passed a legislative resolution
apologizing for its connections to the Atlantic slave trade, and it remains the only Northern state
to actually accept responsibility for participating in slave trafficking.
This trend has expanded from the geopolitical sphere into the corporate world as well.
With varying degrees of acceptance, many firms have admitted wrongdoing for their past
behaviors. In 2005, Wachovia Bank publicly accepted blame for promoting and profiting from
slavery, as one of the banks it acquired had earned revenues from the slave trade. Financial giant
J.P. Morgan did the same, and went even further by creating a special scholarship fund for
African-Americans from Louisiana, where one of its subsidiary firms owned slaves. In a similar
vein, some firms that did business with the Nazis have publicly pledged to contribute to a
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humanitarian fund designed to provide monetary compensation to individuals who worked as
forced laborers producing goods for the regime. These firms include Opel, owned by General
Motors, and Ford-Werke AG, the German subsidiary of Ford Motor Company.
Ford Motor Company enters the picture under this lens in 1998, when the British
Broadcasting Corporation produced a documentary about the activities of Ford Motor Company’s
German subsidiary in the years immediately prior to, as well as during, World War II. Shortly
thereafter, the Washington Post published an article that levied accusations against Ford and its
subsidiary on the basis of their relationship to and support of the Nazi regime, the use of slave
labor during the war, and the financial gains achieved by the company as a result of its wartime
activities. Around the same time, a class-action lawsuit was implemented against Ford by a former
forced laborer at the Cologne facility. She demanded compensation on behalf of herself and the
thousands of others who had been compelled to work under horrible conditions.
Ford executives agreed that damage control was desperately needed. Ford, after all, had
prided itself on its service to the nation as the “arsenal of democracy,” and the company had
worked hard to improve relations with the Jewish community which the company had alienated
in the past. These damning indictments that the entire Ford board of directors had approved of
doing business with the Nazis had serious implications for the company, both in terms of real
sales and in the courtroom. Ford wanted to guarantee that, should the class-action suit go to trial,
there would not be any unpleasant surprises. Thus, Ford chose to commission research not out of
a human interest but a financial one. Indeed, this was the worst kind of publicity for the
company, which had struggled for decades to overcome the anti-Semitism of its founder, Henry
Ford. It was still very easy for Ford executives to look back on the times when Henry Ford
publicly made his outlandish anti-Semitic claims in the United States. Following Ford’s
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outbursts, business usually suffered tremendously as he literally drove Jewish customers to the
cars of other manufacturers.
Ford executives feared that the accusations raised by the BBC and the Washington Post
could have similarly devastating effects on Ford’s bottom line seventy years later, by
resurrecting the faded memory of Henry Ford’s despicable behavior. Ford decided to conduct an
internal audit of its records as well as government archives, ignoring calls to have an independent
corporate watchdog group supervise the research. The resulting study, entitled Research
Findings About Ford-Werke under the Nazi Regime, took three years to complete, and
researchers in the United States and Europe catalogued and reviewed over 98,000 pieces of paper
which in some way could be connected back to the story. To add an air of legitimacy, Ford hired
Simon Reich, a professor of political science at the University of Pittsburgh, to lead the research
team. Reich had previously published a book about how the postwar prosperity of European
automobile companies could directly be traced to their experiences during World War II.
Included in his analysis was a discussion about Ford’s pre-war and wartime activities in
Germany and this made Reich a viable candidate for the position. Ford Motor Company agreed
to make the entirety of the findings and archival resources available to the public despite their
disposition, in the interest of transparency. The report was made public on December 6, 2001,
but media coverage was quite limited. The resulting report, as characterized by lead researcher
Simon Reich, was meant to “be purely descriptive” in addressing these claims. Reich would not
interpret or even offer a historical narrative. Interested readers could draw their own conclusions
by looking at the facts as they were presented.1 The closest he came to providing any kind of
conclusion was in his own “analysis” of the findings, which Ford attached to the document

1

Ford Motor Company, Research Findings About Ford-Werke under the Nazi Regime, prepared by Ford Motor
Company Archives, December, 2001, p. 6.
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afterwards. Almost eighty years after connections between Henry Ford and Adolf Hitler were
first alleged, Ford hoped that it could finally lay the claims of collusion, anti-Semitism, and
wrongdoing to rest.
In December 1922 a reporter from the New York Times requested an interview with a
relatively unknown German politician, Adolf Hitler. The reporter was invited to Hitler’s
headquarters in Berlin and was granted an audience with the future dictator. The resulting article
intimated a relationship between the automotive manufacturing giant Henry Ford and Hitler, but
it did not provide more than a “grounds for suspicion” that a large part of Hitler’s financial
backing came from abroad. However, the article provides several clues that this relationship was
more than a passing rumor: “The wall beside his desk in Hitler’s private office is decorated with
a large picture of Henry Ford.” The Times article continues: “In the antechamber there is a large
table covered with books, nearly all of which are a translation of a book written and published by
Henry Ford.2 If you ask one of the underlings for the reason of Ford’s popularity in these circles
he will smile knowingly but say nothing.”3 It hardly seems to be the case that “Hitler's
admiration mainly had to do with Ford's innovative production techniques” as the Ford Motor
Company publicly maintained in its 2001 report.4
Throughout his time as Germany’s head of state, Hitler would speak of Ford and his
industrial methods with affinity. Ford’s virulent anti-Semitism was legendary, and he became a
de facto spokesman for anti-Jewish sentiments during the third and fourth decades of the 20th
century. On July 30, 1938, which happened to be Henry Ford’s 75th birthday, Ford was awarded
the Grand Cross of the German Iron Eagle, the highest honor bestowed upon non-German
2

The book being referred to was Henry Ford’s world-famous anti-Semitic publication, The International Jew, which
had been disseminated around the world and translated into dozens of languages.
3
“Berlin Hears Ford is Backing Hitler,” New York Times, December 20, 1922, p. 2.
4
“Ford Says Study of German Subsidiary during World War II Shows Ford Didn't Profit from Slave Labor,” The
Associated Press State & Local Wire, December 6, 2001.
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citizens by the German government. A personal note from Hitler accompanied the award, which
read that Ford was given the award because of German popular admiration for Ford’s
“humanitarian ideals and his devotion to the cause of peace, like their Fuhrer and Chancellor had
done.”5 Following widespread public outcry, Ford curiously refused to return the award and the
accompanying money gift– even when it started to affect the company’s bottom line as Jews and
other patriotic Americans refused to purchase Ford products. Ford employees in Dearborn noted
Ford’s keen interest in German affairs, specifically his inquiries as to “how the Jews were faring
over there,” and Ford’s admiration of Hitler was well documented.6
This connection is what originally piqued my curiosity about Ford’s activities before
World War II. Within this thesis, I will focus on Henry Ford’s legacies - his sharp business
sense, his bringing of the automobile to the masses, and his revolutionizing of industrial
methods, and how these endeared the company to Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime. I will
evaluate how Ford company policies were influenced by Henry’s distorted world view, and how
Ford’s new way of doing business and manufacturing products had real consequences on the
world stage.
The Research Findings About Ford-Werke under the Nazi Regime report (hereafter just
Research Findings) was a noteworthy attempt to exculpate Ford Motor Company for its actions.
As will become apparent, however, the report fails to achieve its primary objective. Ford has
missed a crucial opportunity to come clean about its past, choosing to minimize or deny actions
and decisions of the past out of fear of the repercussions. Rather than use this report as a
stepping stone towards acknowledging the wrongs of the past, Ford Motor Company has chosen
5

Max Wallace, The American Axis: Henry Ford, Charles Lindbergh, and the Rise of the Third Reich (New York: St.
Martin’s, 2003), p. 147. For original text of the award, see Henry Ford Museum and Greenfield Village Archives,
Acc. 285, Box 2149, Fritz Hailer – Grand Cross of the German Eagle. Hereafter this source will be abbreviated as
HFM.
6
HFM, Acc. 880, Box 1, Mira Wilkins Papers re: V.Y. Tallberg reminiscences.
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instead to produce a vague and often deceiving document that raises more questions than it
actually answers. Even if all of the documents are now available for public view, the real issue
of transparency revolves around accepting blame for past actions, not materials access. Ford
probably assumed correctly that the press coverage would take the claims made within the report
as true. After all, reporters certainly do not have the kind of time it would take to properly
evaluate all of the assembled documents.

The report is definitely not a “benchmark of

accountability,” as Reich told reporters at a press conference.7 Of note to the reader: for the
remainder of this thesis, I will be referring to Ford’s German subsidiary as “Ford-Werke,” even
though the name would not officially be changed to “Ford-Werke” until 1939. I have done this
for the sake of consistency and simplicity, and also because most of the literature, including
internal company documents and secondary sources, uses this name in referring to pre-1939 Ford
operations in Germany.
In response to the allegations made against Ford by the Washington Post, the BBC, and
class-action lawsuits, the report appears to provide answers to many of the most devastating
claims. Even though the report itself does not come to any explicit conclusions, lead researcher
Simon Reich cites some broad findings in his accompanying analysis. The first major argument
Reich makes is that Ford-Werke management acted with increasing autonomy from the
American parent company and that American executives were not well informed about activities
in Germany. Ford’s German management courted the Nazis extensively for government
contracts but “foundered in this regard.” Because of this failure, Ford “remained a marginal
producer in terms of both volume and strategic significance to the German war effort.”8

7

“Ford Says Study of German Subsidiary during World War II Shows Ford Didn't Profit from Slave Labor,” The
Associated Press State & Local Wire, December 6, 2001.
8
Research Findings, p. 7.
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Next, Reich claims that Ford Motor Company had no options when dealing with its
German subsidiary. Short of divestment, he argues, Ford’s hands were tied in helping the Nazis.
Moreover, as commercial vehicle production was slowly phased out, working on government
orders was the only way to continue business in Nazi Germany. Without filling German
government truck orders, “Ford would have lost all of its German investment as the subsidiary
withered due to lack of a market.”9
Third, Reich shows that communication between Ford and Ford-Werke had ceased by
November of 1941, immediately before the United States entrance into the war. Long before
this, however, he claims that regular communication with the German company was strained
because of the increased difficulty of transmitting information. There was no evidence of other
European Ford subsidiaries acting as intermediaries with the German company. This claim is
put in the context of slave labor, namely, that the American firm would have had no way of
knowing or controlling the use of forced labor at the Ford factory in Germany. Fourth, Reich
claims that Ford did not realize any profits from the business of supplying the Nazis. At the
report’s release in Dearborn, Ford Chief of Staff John Rintamaki remarked that “the statements
that we profited, that Ford U.S. profited, from Ford Germany are just not true.”10 Any profits
accrued in the first few years of the war, the report finds, were wiped out by devastating losses in
the final two years of conflict. The most significant claim made by Reich, however, is the final
one: “The evidence provided by the data suggests that there was no complicity on the part of
Ford’s Dearborn management in assisting the Nazi government’s wartime effort.” This is indeed
a bold statement, and will constitute the heart of what this thesis seeks to examine.

9

Research Findings, p. 7.
“Ford Says Study of German Subsidiary during World War II Shows Ford Didn't Profit from Slave Labor,” The
Associated Press State & Local Wire, December 6, 2001.
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8
This thesis does not take issue with certain aspects of Research Findings, most notably
the accusations that Ford Motor Company knowingly employed slave labor. The labor market
and military requirements in wartime Germany meant that all firms, foreign or domestic, were
essentially forced by the authorities to accept slave labor in the production of goods. While it is
unfortunate that such labor was used by the Ford subsidiary, this is not conduct for which Ford
Motor Company should be held accountable. In fact, Ford’s commitment to contribute
financially to former slave laborers in its German factories shows a willingness to take
responsibility and attempt to right the wrongs of the past in this one respect. Unfortunately,
Research Findings is much less persuasive when it comes to other issues, and there are some
qualifications needed for the report’s account of events.
The first major fault with Research Findings is with respect to its characterization of
Ford-Werke’s firm-state relations with the Nazi party and Ford-Werke’s relative status under the
regime. Ford’s small size did not relieve it from strategic significance in the eyes of the German
authorities. While it was true that the German managers of the firm actively lobbied for
government contracts, the opposite was also true. The Nazis extensively courted Ford and Ford
management for the use of its facilities to produce war materials. The Nazis blatantly exploited
Ford’s strong ties abroad for the furthering of their own war plans. Ford-Werke was the only
auto company in Germany to be granted special exemptions from certain laws, hardly an
indicator that the Nazis tried to run the company out of the country. Additionally, it is doubtful
that Ford’s claims about the loss of markets for the German firm are correct, because FordWerke contributed to a thriving export economy. Ford-Werke faced extraordinary pressures
from the regime, and that discrimination and constant harassment were the order of the day.
Unlike Simon Reich and the Ford researchers, however, I do not see this harassment as sufficient
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evidence that Ford’s operations were strategically unimportant to the regime. Despite the
seemingly insurmountable hurdles placed before it, Ford-Werke was ultimately a valuable and
vital cog in the Nazis’ war machine well before 1941, so much so that the regime went out of its
way to accommodate the company.
Research Findings states that “Ford-Werke’s linkages with the Dearborn headquarters
became increasingly attenuated during the course of the decade of the 1930s – and nonexistent
by the outbreak of the war in the Pacific Theater in 1941.” I concur that the relationship did
become stressed, but not to the point of nonexistent communication. In fact, the evidence seems
to prove quite the opposite. Although Ford-Werke may have acted with increasing autonomy as
the 1930s progressed, Ford Dearborn remained fully informed about European activities. FordWerke internal documents paint a picture of a pro-Nazi company actively supporting Hitler, and
as late as 1941 Ford Dearborn was providing material and technical assistance to its subsidiary, a
policy over which it had full control. Following the fall of France in 1940, Dearborn was in
regular communication with its French subsidiary, which had transitioned its business into
supplying and repairing the vehicles of the occupying Germans. Executives in Dearborn lauded
Ford’s French subsidiary’s efforts in making the best of a “difficult situation.”
The claims made in Research Findings about how Ford Motor Company did not profit as
a result of wartime operations are also questionable. While it might be the case that within
Germany alone profits were not realized, the Research Findings report explicitly avoids any
reference to the other Ford organizations that prospered by supplying the Nazi regime, confining
itself to evaluating communication with these subsidiaries, not their financial data. Ford’s
ambiguously-worded report may not be wrong, but Ford Chief of Staff John Rintamaki’s
statement to reporters is absolutely false. Official company histories acknowledge that such
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profiteering happened, yet the commissioned study conveniently chooses to ignore these facts.
Perhaps even more crucial to this point is the fact that Dearborn was aware of how its companies
in Europe were supplying Hitler and took no action to stop them. Ford’s decision to claim
dividends from its German subsidiary after the war strongly challenges the claim that the
company did not benefit from wartime production.
On its most basic level, Research Findings seems to fall short with regard to the question
of assigning blame for Ford’s actions. It is altogether unclear how, in preparing this report, the
researchers defined “complicity”; this is a crucial shortcoming in the report and seriously
undermines the credibility of its findings. Without a definition of complicity firmly in place, it is
hard to let Ford off the hook so easily. There were, in fact, many instances of Dearborn directly
aiding Hitler’s war preparation, by providing material assistance as well as direct military
equipment to the Nazi regime. This would meet most common definitions of “complicity.”
Ford Motor Company’s history in Europe mirrors that of many other American
corporations that were becoming transnational entities at the time, except for one crucial detail:
doing business in Germany, especially after 1933, presented a unique set of circumstances that
could not be replicated anywhere else in the world. At this time, the automobile industry in
Germany was still a niche industry that Ford was trying to crack. Despite a number of Ford
operations across Europe, breaking into the industry was not an easy task. Foreign corporations
were consistently targeted with high tariffs, increased operating costs, and product
discrimination. Local ordinances and laws affected how Ford’s foreign subsidiaries could
operate, and these laws in turn shaped the relationships between foreign operations and the
parent company. Inevitably, politics entered the fray, and the forces of nationalism exerted
pressure on Ford to conform. One of the major tasks of this thesis is to clarify these relationships
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and place them within a framework of corporate accountability and complicity, and Ford
provides a perfect subject of study to embark on such a project. Many of the major themes of
post-World War I Europe – economic stagnation, nationalism, coping with the aftermath of a
devastating conflict, and, eventually, the rise of authoritarian states – are all present in Ford’s
German story, and their consequences resonate not only within the field of business history but
also within the realm of corporate accountability.
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CHAPTER
CHAPTER 1
INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION:
EXPANSION: NATIONALIST
GERMANY AND FORDFORD-WERKE AG (1925(1925-1933)
Versailles, Economic Reform, and Banking Crisis under Weimar
Before any analysis about the establishment of Ford-Werke AG in Germany can proceed,
it is necessary to provide some context. This chapter will primarily seek to provide the necessary
background for the rest of this thesis. What defined the German economy during the interwar
years? What factors contributed to one of the worst economic crises in Germany’s history?
When considering these questions, the overarching issue that this chapter will seek to address is
why Ford remained in Germany, even though, as Ford historian Allan Nevins writes, “After the
financial collapse of 1931…and still more after the Nazi revolution, the efforts of Ford of
Germany to conduct a business justifying its great outlay at Cologne became a prolonged
torture.”1 The economics of the interwar period not only raise important questions about
industry and economic policy in general, but also have much explanatory power in understanding
Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime’s dramatic entrance into German politics. Indeed, this unique
set of circumstances is vital to understanding not only the position of Ford-Werke but also the
entire German automotive industry. It is with these considerations in mind that a brief foray into
German economic history is necessary.
June 28, 1919 is a crucial date in world history. With the signing of the Treaty of
Versailles, Germany was forced to accept its defeat at the hands of the victorious allies. The
agreement, while far-reaching in its scope, was problematic in practice. The framers of the

1

Allan Nevins, Ford: Expansion and Challenge 1915-1933 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1957), p. 559.
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Treaty, perhaps most notably the French, who were eager to avenge the humiliation of the peace
agreement concluding the Franco-Prussian war, included the pivotal Section VIII, which dealt
solely with the issue of reparations for the war. The section opened with Article 231, or the
infamous “War Guilt Clause”:
“The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany
accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all
the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated
Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a
consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of
Germany and her allies.”2
The rest of Section VIII outlines the responsibilities of Germany from a financial
standpoint. Under the agreement, Germany had to pay hefty reparations to the allies, which at
the time were unquestionably harsh. Indeed, this section and perhaps most directly the War
Guilt Clause is what stoked the rhetoric of the nationalists in Germany, among them Adolf Hitler
and the Nazis, who saw this large-scale embarrassment for Germany as an inexcusable mistake
on behalf of a few weak politicians who signed it. Hitler made no secret of his disdain for
Versailles in his defining work, Mein Kampf:
“The Peace Treaty of Versailles, was taken as an attack on the
Republic and a sign of a reactionary if not monarchistic
attitude…They did not want to hear or understand that Versailles
was a shame and a disgrace, and not even that this dictated peace
was an unprecedented pillaging of our people. The destructive
work of the Marxists and the poison of enemy propaganda had
deprived the people of any sense. And yet we had not even the
right to complain!”3
The burden of the reparations payments weighed heavy on post-World War I Germany.
It not only hobbled German economic development but also fostered deep resentment of the
Treaty among the general population. Germany was powerless to stop such actions as the French
2

Yale Law School Avalon Project: Versailles Treaty June 28, 1919, last updated March 19, 2008, accessed January
21, 2008 [http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/partviii.htm].
3
Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (translated by Ralph Manheim) (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), p. 465.
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occupation of the Ruhr Valley, a vital industrial and economic center of the country; one
historian sees this as the “climax of the 1918-1923 agony.”4 Following the crisis, German ultranationalism became a mainstay of German politics. Even though it was initially confined to the
periphery, nationalism slowly began to seep into the rhetoric and policies of the democratic
Weimar government and provided the necessary fuel for the development of radical groups such
as the Nazi Party. However, this new worldview also had an unintended side-effect: an
alternative foreign policy based not on “nationalist militancy” but instead on a prioritization of
the economy as Germany’s conduit towards reestablishing world influence.5 Of course, this
would all change under Adolf Hitler, but in the decade or so prior to his rise to power, economic
vitality, not military might, was seen as Germany’s avenue to greatness and return to glory
among the world powers. While this focus on economics was important for a number of reasons,
perhaps most important was the fact that this policy entailed a further development of financial
and industrial ties with the United States.
Under the leadership of Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann, Weimar Germany achieved
one of its first major policy victories with the Dawes Plan in 1924, which directly established a
formal relationship between the United States and Germany. The Dawes Plan reduced
immediate reparations payments for Germany to more manageable levels and established
safeguards for Germany such as the creation of the Reparations Agent, an office with the allimportant power to halt reparations payments should they threaten the German currency’s
stability.6 The Dawes Plan fit well with Stresemann’s plans to see to it that the United States had
a vested interest in German economic recovery, and indeed he correctly assumed that this

4

Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (New York: Viking
Press, 2006), p. 2.
5
Tooze, p. 2.
6
Tooze, p. 6.
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interest existed. Because of the Dawes Plan, many Germans began to put faith in America to
guarantee a successful revival of their economy. This group of Germans came to be known as
“Atlanticists,” and they pinned their hopes on growing American influence in Europe. As a
means to this end, Atlanticists supported American involvement in the German economy and
were led at this time by Hjalmar Schacht, then-president of the Reichsbank. A strong American
presence in Europe coupled with a strong interest in German economic strength, they argued,
would help bring about a U.S.-led reevaluation of the German war reparations as mandated by
the Treaty of Versailles.7 Schacht and Stresemann had similar goals and ideas about American
involvement in the German economy throughout the 1920s, and until Stresemann’s death in
1929, the two men saw eye to eye on many of the most crucial issues facing Germany.
As the domestic political climate changed in the United States because of the Great
Depression, however, the Atlanticist strategy began to fall apart. The passage of the HawleySmoot Tariff in 1930 and the lack of political will for reducing reparations in the Hoover
administration signaled that the United States would become less involved in European politics.8
The Dawes Plan’s successor, the Young Plan, was altogether unsuccessful. While it had its
merits, the plan fell victim to the stock market crash of October 1929. Many of its provisions
became impossible to fulfill. The plan was a severe blow to the credibility of the so-called
Atlanticist group. The Young Plan failed miserably to fulfill the hopes of Atlanticists such as
Schacht, who were looking for generosity and found none. The 2.5 billion mark reparation
payment was only reduced to just over 2 billion, far less than what was desired. The
“Reparations Agent” was removed, and with it the ability of a “neutral” agency to determine
when was acceptable for the Germans to halt payments. Finally, the decision-making power
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formerly conferred on the Reparations Agent was transferred directly to the German government.
This provision was of great concern to investors, especially those with funds tied up in Germany.
In theory, the Young Plan’s issuance of bonds to reduce the reparations debt was a good idea. In
practice, however, after the crash in October 1929 and the subsequent withdrawal of American
credit from Germany, it became quite clear that these debts would not be repaid any time soon.
There was simply no market for the bonds. This sparked concern among foreign investors and
contributed to even more withdrawals from German banks.
Along with the Dawes Plan, between 1924 and 1929, the German Reichsbank had
implemented a series of policies that both fostered a short-term recovery of the ailing banks and
set the stage for the spectacular failure that would befall the banks in 1931. The “Kreditstopp” of
April 7, 1924 effectively put a ceiling on the value of the central bank’s portfolio. This signaled
a German commitment to exchange rate stability.9 It also assuaged international fears that
inflationary policy would be pursued again, as it had been in the early 1920s. In conjunction
with this, a high interest rate was maintained by the bank. These interest rates attracted much
foreign investment in Germany, and in turn many businesses seeking to expand their operations
(including Ford) saw this time as apt to move into Germany on a more permanent basis. This
emphasis on foreign investment would be the Achilles heel of the entire system.
Foreign investment had two unique aspects that created a particularly dangerous situation
for the German economy. The first was its short-term nature. Banks used these short-term
deposits to bolster their own liabilities that had been wiped out by the inflation. By 1928, over
43 percent of all deposits in German banks were foreign and short term.10 Banks then proceeded
to make long term loans with this money to cities and other sectors. With the Great Depression,
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and the growing inability to repay their debts, banks had to pay out matured short-term foreign
loans, but the capital to do so had effectively been lost. The second problem was that so much of
this investment came from outside of Germany. Almost half of the money in German banks at
this time was foreign, so if (and when) that money was removed, bank supplies of currency
would rapidly decline. If German domestic withdrawals accompanied this foreign withdrawal
even in small amounts, the entire system could easily become destabilized.
Following the stock market crash of October 29, 1929 and the collapse of world financial
markets, capital flight from Germany became a real problem. One historian posits that 50 to 60
percent of the total deposit contractions from mid-1930 to July 1931 came from foreign
withdrawals: this amounted to almost 5 billion RM.11 This rapid outflow would prove
problematic in two respects. First, the banking climate in Germany during the late 1920s was
increasingly competitive. Smaller banks, in order to avoid mergers or takeovers, had to relax
their borrowing restrictions in order to remain competitive, as they were losing money when the
foreign withdrawals began. Especially following the deflationary policies of Heinrich Bruening,
who came into office in 1930, the smaller supply of money in circulation compounded this
problem by undermining banks’ basic positions of liquidity. The second aspect was the
speculative nature of many banks’ lending practices. The Darmstadter and Dresdner banks, two
of the banks that would spearhead the banking crisis, loaned large sums of money to the risky
textile and municipal sectors. They used the influx of foreign, short-term money to finance highrisk, long-term investments. Once the foreign withdrawals began, they could not compensate for
that huge loss of capital.
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Towards the end of the 1920s when it became clear that the United States could not fulfill
the role Schacht and Stresemann hoped it would, both men grew impatient with the United
States’ lack of commitment to Europe and Germany. Stresemann began to stray from his initial
policy of making Germany a key U.S. ally and economic partner. Schacht, disillusioned and
frustrated, resigned from German politics in March 1930, and would not make his return until
Adolf Hitler’s rapid rise to power. A new course of unilateral German assertion and selfpromotion – against U.S. interests where necessary – would be taken by the later governments of
Franz von Papen, Kurt von Schleicher, and even Adolf Hitler.

Setting the Stage for Nazism
With the Great Depression came even more problems for the German economic recovery.
1930 saw the election of Heinrich Bruening, a nationalist Catholic candidate who inherited a
complicated and difficult financial situation. Bruening implemented a series of deflationary
measures from 1930 to 1932, and accompanying these were extreme hardships for the German
population. He sought to roll back wages, prices, and rents to their January 1927 levels, but his
initiatives failed almost entirely. In his account of the German economic recovery in the early
1930s, historian Richard Overy provides an accurate picture of the economic woes facing
Germany at the time. The indices of current prices stood at 62 percent for national income, 61
percent for total industrial production, and 78 percent for consumer goods production as
compared with the levels in 1928. German exports halved in the same amount of time, with 12.3
billion RM in 1928 to 5.7 billion RM in 1932. Unemployment in Germany was high, with 5.6
million Germans unemployed in 1932 as opposed to 1.4 million in 1928. German gross national
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product (GNP) dropped from 91 billion marks in 1928 to 72 billion marks in 1932.12 These
figures show a struggling and desperate economy in the midst of serious contraction; how much
of this can be directly attributed to Bruening’s deflationary policies is unclear. Even though, as
economic historian Adam Tooze indicates, this “brutal process of adjustment” was a normal
feature of adjustment to the gold standard for Germany’s currency, it remains unclear what the
situation would have been without these policies.13 As unemployment and poverty spread across
all sectors, major industries such as insurance and engineering faced “spectacular failures” and
currency controls came into effect, mandating that all foreign currency be turned into
Reichmarks.14 The situation was bleak, but at this point, not hopeless.
When Bruening asserted German nationalism, further strain was added to an already
limping financial system. By turning his rhetoric against the French in particular, and by
subsequently issuing a demand for the end of reparations on June 6, 1931, Bruening panicked
foreign investors. There was great anxiety that Germany was about to announce a unilateral
moratorium on its reparations payments – which, ironically, was a right afforded to the German
government under the new Young Plan. Bruening’s provocative statement triggered a run on the
Reichsbank’s reserves, which saw 2.6 billion RM fall to only 1.9 billion in a few weeks,
dangerously close to the minimum required for gold-exchange banking.15 Because of the heavy
bias towards foreign investment, this rapid outflow of currency depleted banking stocks to
dangerous levels.
The combination of all of these factors produced a severe banking crisis that came about
in mid-July, 1931. The failure of the Young Plan, foreign investment withdrawals and some
12
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domestic withdrawals, deflationary financial policies, and nationalist rhetoric all worked to push
the German banking system to its limits. The largest commercial bank in Austria, the Vienna
Creditanstalt, closed on May 11,1931 – a month before the opening of Ford’s new factory in
Cologne – and further destabilized the German economic situation.16 Many Germans saw the
collapse of the Creditanstalt as the first real signals of impending trouble in Germany, and it
created a “panic” of sorts and induced substantial domestic withdrawals from German banks.17
Correspondingly, the difficulties already faced by German domestic banks came to a head, as
evidenced by trouble at Dresdner and DANAT (Darmstadter und Nationalbank), two major
national banks, that emerged as early as June 7.18

DANAT declared insolvency on July 13,

1931, and by late summer 1931, all of the major state banks were under national control. The
situation did not improve under either of Bruening’s successors, despite a large-scale work
initiative program initiated under General Kurt von Schleicher. However, Schleicher’s plan had
as its main goal the rebuilding of crucial infrastructure needed to sustain a military rearmament
campaign, not an economic recovery. While it is noteworthy that Schleicher’s plan failed to
solve the German economic problems, perhaps more directly relevant here is the fact that, as
early as 1932, German rearmament had already started on a limited scale. American
corporations did not seem to notice.
The Establishment of Ford Motor Company and Ford-Werke AG
The Ford Motor Company entered an economically unstable Germany in 1925, two
decades after the company had emerged as a pioneer and most successful car manufacturer in the
United States. The company was the brain child of Henry Ford. The son of an Irish farmer, Ford
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went against the wishes of his father and instead sought a career in engineering. Ford had been
fascinated with mechanics since a very young age. In his youth, Ford enjoyed repairing broken
watches for fun and challenged himself to fashion his own toys out of washers, bolts, and metal
trinkets. Indeed, the defining moment of his childhood was encountering an agricultural road
engine when he was twelve: “It was that engine which took me into automotive transportation,”
Ford wrote in his autobiography.19 When he got older, Henry Ford was notorious for tinkering in
his shed late into the night, trying to perfect his “horseless carriage.” In May 1896, at the age of
40, Ford built his first “quadricycle.”20 The Ford Motor Company was eventually founded in
1903 as an extension of Henry Ford’s design and small-scale production of motor vehicles. The
company began in a humble converted factory in Detroit with an initial investment of $28,000
cash from twelve investors, Ford included.21 The first production vehicle was the Ford Model A,
which had “great merits of simplicity, lightness, and efficiency…its main features certainly
conformed to principles that Ford had always championed.”22 Model designations would change
until 1909, when the first Model T was introduced.
The Model T was single-handedly responsible for Ford’s resounding success throughout
the second and third decades of the 20th century. It was originally produced at the Piquette Road
Manufacturing Plant, the first company-owned factory.23 The company soon outgrew the small
facility, however, and moved to a new plant in Highland Park, near Detroit. As demand for his
cars began to skyrocket, especially from the upwardly mobile middle class, Henry Ford tried to
capitalize on the new technologies available to provide more cars for this market. The new
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Highland Park plant boasted all of the newest assembly line and mass production technology,
much of which had been developed by Ford himself. The successes of production soon became
tangible. In 1911, the first full year of Model T production at the new factory, the company sold
34,528 vehicles. By 1917, this number had jumped to 730,041.24 By 1925, Ford sat atop the
American automobile industry, commanding an astonishing 45 percent of the market.25 These
new technologies established Henry Ford as a leading innovator for all of industry.
In order to cope with the rigors of this new and intense production schedule, Ford
introduced a sweeping series of labor reforms in his business. The mechanized nature of
production increased worker turnover tremendously. Whether he sought to prevent unionization
or simply because he had a genuine concern for his employees, Ford announced on January 14,
1914 that the new minimum wage for Ford workers would be $5 per day, instead of the thencurrent $2.34 per day.26 Splashed across the headlines of the nation’s newspapers were loud
proclamations of Ford’s generosity. Overnight, he became a national celebrity. “Even the boy
who sweeps the floors will get that much,” exclaimed the New York Times.27 Ford had, with this
proclamation, changed the industrial and consumer landscapes forever. He empowered a whole
new group to participate in the mass consumption culture that was sweeping across America.
Ford told his critics that the higher wages would provide for a more efficient work force and
would thus increase profits. Despite worried claims from the rest of industry that this was little
better than socialism, Ford’s business philosophy proved fruitful, and Henry Ford became a
billionaire as sales surged and productivity increased exponentially.
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The Ford Motor Company’s first foray into the European market was through
distributors; that is to say, whole components were manufactured completely in the United States
and reassembled by one of Ford’s distributors in mainland Europe. Ford advertised in local
newspapers in France, Germany, and elsewhere in Europe to promote its product. This gave the
company an opportunity to break the negative stereotypes about American cars that had been in
place since the early 1900’s, namely, that they were cheap and poorly constructed. In these early
years, Ford established itself as a reputable company with a competitively priced product, and as
early as 1907, Ford sold forty-one cars in Germany.28 Until the mid-20’s, entire cars were
produced in America, broken down and crated, and simply reassembled by the foreign
subsidiary. The assembly plants of Ford subsidiaries were not manufacturing plants which
produced their own parts using local supplies and materials. In fact, the German plant was the
only foreign Ford subsidiary that engaged in assembly of vehicles, as the rest in Europe were
relegated to sales and service of Ford products.29 This system worked to Ford’s advantage, as it
allowed the company to avoid investing much capital in its European infrastructure and instead
merely provide its dealers and distributors with a product to sell.
With the Dawes plan and the easing of the post war economic uncertainty, many
American companies welcomed the opportunity to invest in Germany, Ford included. In 1924,
Ford’s subsidiary in Denmark sent four employees to Germany to find new dealers and resume
the operations that had been interrupted because of the war. It was in this fashion the German
branch of the Ford Motor Company was born, in a three room office with ten employees and
twenty dealers. On January 5, 1925, Ford Motor Company Aktiengesellschaft (AG) was
established in Berlin. At first, vehicle parts were shipped in from Denmark to be assembled in
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Germany. In early 1926, a warehouse was rented in Plotzensee, a suburb of Berlin, and this site
became the main assembly plant, as well as corporate headquarters, of Ford Motor Company
AG. Truck assembly began in April 1926, and Model T’s followed in June of that same year.30
Along with General Motors and Chrysler, German operations for American automobile
manufacturers were firmly in place in the Berlin area, although the German Opel was still far and
away the best-selling car in Germany.31
This arrangement would not last, however, as the political situation changed in Germany.
Ford had to cope with the lasting legacy of Schacht’s economic reform program, namely, the
refocusing on German industry. Schacht hoped to reinvigorate native businesses through a
policy of raising tariffs on foreign-produced goods, including automobiles. Barely in its second
year of operations at this point, Ford’s manufacturing operation in Germany was dealt a severe
blow. In 1927, a drastic increase in tariffs required that companies not only assemble but also
produce the parts of their vehicles in Germany. The New York Times characterized this new
tariff as disastrous: “In the declared view of the heads of the factories concerned, the death knell
of American automobile assembly plants operating in Germany was sounded this afternoon when
the Reichstag passed…the bill raising the tariff duties on automobile parts to the same rate
charged for finished cars.”32 This among other factors induced a reexamination of Ford’s
position in Germany and in Europe as a whole, and the subsequent 1928 restructuring plan called
for the establishment of an actual company (not just a manufacturing facility) in Germany.
Through the new 1928 plan, Ford England (Ford Motor Company Ltd.) would control 60 percent
of the shares of each of the nine European affiliates, with the remaining 40 percent of shares
being offered to the public in each respective company. In a similar arrangement, Ford Motor
30
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Company (United States) held a 60 percent share in the British firm, with the remaining stock
going to the British public.
It is worth noting here that Henry Ford’s well-known practice of paying American
factory workers high wages to help them afford his product (mass consumption) was not well
received in Europe. Ford paid much higher wages than was average not only in European
industry as a whole but also in the automotive industry, and this had especially reverberant
effects in places where there was a high sense of nationalist sentiment, including France and
Germany. These countries (France especially) were starved for labor, and Ford’s high wage
policy placed extraordinary pressure on his competitors. French critics at the time had “gone so
far to say that in his wage policy Ford intends to drive his rivals to the wall because he has
sufficient resources to make profit a negligible consideration…”33
Henry Ford was cognizant of the nationalist grumblings over his wage policies, and he
took steps to encourage European acceptance of his company and policies, such as distributing
stock to the European public. Ford structured his foreign subsidiaries in this way largely because
he hoped that national participation in ownership would quell nationalist sentiments that were
becoming all too powerful in Europe. In theory, he calculated that partial ownership might cause
Europeans to embrace Ford not as a foreign operator but as one of their own.34 Ford stock was
distributed to the major corporations in each host country, and in Germany a 15 percent block of
the stock went to I.G. Farbenindustrie, one of Germany’s biggest industrial corporations. Ford’s
plan was moderately fruitful, and all of the Ford companies established in Europe successfully
stamped their own national character onto the process of producing automobiles in some way.
With this company policy in mind, and with an understanding that a more permanent base of
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operations would be necessary in Germany to ensure the company’s longevity, it was decided
that a permanent facility was needed in Germany. Against this backdrop, it was decided to
construct Ford’s first factory on the continent.
In addition to distributing ownership to foreign nationals, Ford sought to implement these
procedures in staffing as well. Company directors were hand-chosen from the most eminent
citizens of each country. When the German company was founded, Henry Ford asked the
director of Ford of Britain, Sir Percival Perry, to find “the best lawyer, the best farmer, and the
best industrialist” to head the German company’s board. Perry filled all three roles without too
much trouble. For the farmer, Perry picked prominent German agriculturist Alwin Schurig. Dr.
Carl Bosch, general manager of German industrial giant I.G. Farbenindustrie, was asked to sit on
the board as industrialist.35 Ford’s German operations were thus directly linked with the most
important industrial firm in Germany.
For the lawyer, Perry found Dr. Heinrich Albert, an attorney who often represented
American interests in Germany and had served as Germany’s ambassador to the United States
immediately after World War One.36 Albert had the trust of the Americans, and Ford historians
Mira Wilkins and Frank Hill write about him that “writing and speaking English with ease,
widely traveled…and familiar with the automobile industry, he had unusual talents for shaping
company policy.”37 Albert would turn out to be a truly controversial personality. He would stay
with the company through the war, and from very early on, Albert would also be the most vocal
proponent from within the Ford organization of working with the authorities. Other board
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members included Robert Schmidt, purchasing director, whose importance in the plant and status
would grow with the arrival of the Nazis, and Edmund Heine, a German-born American citizen.
At this juncture, it is necessary to raise an important question. As the German economy
was uncertain at best, why did Ford choose this time to build these brand new facilities in
Germany? The answer, of course, is not simple, but much of it can be explained in terms of
Ford’s growing profitability. Ford Germany brought in a profit of 2,219,000 RM ($528,333) in
1929, and there was no indication at the time of an impending banking crisis.38 Indeed, the
factors were all in motion for the banking crisis to occur, but few could have predicted if and
when it would occur. In 1930, the German Ford Company was the second largest manufacturer
of automobiles in the country; 11,500 of the new cars distributed in the German market were
Fords (out of a total 79,140 total distributed in that market) – and of all the total cars already on
the road and registered in Germany, 20 percent of them were Fords.39 1930 saw a continued
swelling, with Ford reaching its highest market share that it ever had reached thus far in
Germany (and would ever reach), with a total 13,216 vehicles produced out of a total 66,500
produced in Germany.40 With these numbers, Ford clearly had Opel in its sights and it saw a
bright future in Germany. Charles Sorensen, Ford’s global head of production and the German
company’s main contact in Dearborn, lamented in the fall of 1930 how “the way the other
makers, including Americans, have beat us there is shameful,” implying a firm belief that real
progress was not only desirable but absolutely possible.41 The new factory at Cologne, with its
150-car a day capacity would be the perfect jumping-off point for such a venture, and clearly
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Ford saw itself as a major competitor in the German auto industry. Profitability can be seen not
only in Germany but throughout the entire European market; in 1929 and 1930, Ford companies
in Europe all paid dividends on their shares of 10 percent or more, even after subtracting reserves
and extra costs. Total earnings from the European division were up 6.3 percent between 1929
and 1930, from a healthy $10,281,000 in 1929 to $10,931,000 in 1930.42 Even though FordWerke was relatively small as compared with the other European subsidiaries, the company’s
profits jumped 50.8 percent between 1929 and 1930. Such remarkable gains, when other
industries in Germany were languishing, made it seem like Germany was a fertile ground for
profits.
October 2, 1930 was a milestone date for Ford in Germany, as this was when work began
on the new manufacturing facility in Cologne, on the Rhine River. Henry Ford strategically
chose this site, despite its proximity to the Western front and France. Access to major water
transportation routes was certainly a consideration, not only to receive parts and supplies from
the British company but also for distribution purposes– this new plant would produce certain
parts for shipment to much of Eastern and Central Europe.43 The land was cheap enough, and a
large and unemployed labor force was available in the city. Perhaps more importantly, the
mayor of Cologne, Konrad Adenauer (much later, President of West Germany) guaranteed vast
tax concessions for six years, should the company agree to “take your workmen and office
employees, as far as possible, from the district of the city of Cologne.”44 The company agreed,
and the fifty-two acre site was purchased.
In the midst of economic difficulties in Germany, Henry Ford himself laid the
cornerstone in a rare visit to Europe. Within seven months, the first unit rolled off the line in
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May 1931.45 Shortly thereafter, with the Depression at its peak in Germany, production would
grind to a halt. German management looked to the prospect of a war debt payment moratorium
as good news, a sign that the recovery would surely begin shortly thereafter, but their enthusiasm
would be short-lived. The plant, at this time only operating at 13 percent capacity, closed on
July 13 for the national bank holiday, and as Percival Perry, head of Ford Motor Company Ltd,
wrote to Charles Sorensen,“Everything is at a standstill in Germany…our business is completely
stopped.”46 With the tough economic times came a slump in sales. The balance sheets were
reporting losses in the millions of marks. In May and June of 1932, Ford commanded 1.9 and
1.3 percent of the market, respectively (compared to first place Opel, which had close to 20
percent), and Ford fell from second to ninth among German auto manufacturers for the entire
year.47 The German operation had lost over $500,000 in the first six months of 1932 alone.48
These were indeed the worst of times for the company, and the future did not look any brighter.
This situation raises two important questions. First of all, how did Ford fall so far, so
fast? Total production in 1931 was only 6,021 units (down from 13,216), but it still held a
respectable 9 percent of the market. For the entire year, 1932 was the low point for Ford,
producing only 1,968 units out of a total 53,257 produced in Germany – a depressing 3.7 percent
of the new car market for the year.49 The banking crisis and the collapse of German credit meant
that the normal means available to a corporation for raising funds were not available.
Consequently, Ford Germany was forced to pay for materials using notes, and owed over
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6,000,000 RM ($1,500,000) to the American and British companies.50 There is no doubt that
once the banking crisis hit, and the general economy succumbed to the depression, there was
little consumer purchasing power left for cars. This, however, is only part of the story. The
financial situation in Germany amplified all of the nationalist criticism and harassment that the
company had already been subject to, albeit in a more muted form. Now, Ford faced an assault
on all fronts. German motor interests began to loudly denounce Ford for its “foreign” status.
The implications of this will be discussed in more detail below and in subsequent chapters, but it
is important to note that this intense pressure placed on the German public not to buy “foreign”
products had very real impacts for the company’s sales figures. The prospects certainly looked
dark, yet Ford Dearborn made a decision to stay – a decision largely inexplicable on economic
grounds.
The second major question that must be asked here once again is why Ford did not leave
following the 1931 banking crisis. Even considering the rosy outlook in 1930, it is still a wonder
how after seeing the realities of the post-crisis world with their dwindling market share and an
expensive factory producing products for a shrinking economy company, executives decided to
stay in Germany. Or is it? First, Ford had just completed its expensive and state-of-the-art
factory. Leaving such a facility, with its high production capacity and brand new machinery,
would have cost the company at least $4 million dollars, the value of the facilities alone at
Cologne. The Ford Germany Balance Sheet for 1931 shows a loss of over 1.6 million
Reichsmarks ($400,000), and in 1932 more than 6 million Reichsmarks ($1,500,000).51 Despite
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losses in Germany in 1931, the entire European operation brought in more than $3,500,000 that
year.52 Ford was a privately owned company, so it was not compelled to release balance sheets.
However, a conservative estimate of Ford’s total assets worldwide in April 1931 amounted to
$781,000,000.53 In comparison to such a staggering number, it seems all the more likely that
Ford Germany’s losses were considered merely a drop in the bucket. Maybe this was why the
losses in Germany were not taken more seriously, or used to justify leaving the country
altogether.
Additionally, uncertainty over market conditions dissuaded any drastic decisions, such as
a total withdrawal from Germany. In a letter to Charles Sorensen, Percival Perry perhaps
summed up the situation best: “Just at the present time international business is awful and no one
can tell from one day to the other what is likely to happen.”54 Perry had resigned himself to the
German troubles, and he had extensive American financial support helping to absorb the German
losses. Perhaps he did not think seriously about closing the operations, hoping merely to ride out
the impending storm. The very uncertainty of the future coupled with the very recent memory of
sales success both likely contributed to a hesitancy to take any significant action.

An Unlikely Role Model for German Industry
Perhaps another explanation for why Ford chose to stay in Germany, even when the
situation seemed desperate, is that it felt that its strong reputation would be sufficient to buoy the
company during the tough economic times, at least until the outlook improved. Even before it
had an official subsidiary in Germany, Ford Motor Company was well-respected in Germany for
its revolutionary methods of production (if not for its cars). Nationalist diatribes against its
52
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foreign status aside, Ford Motor Company’s mastery of production line techniques attracted
much praise within German political and industrial circles. Moreover, the technology itself
significantly helped Ford carve into the German automobile market once operations had been
established, as Ford could undercut its much less modern German competitors with regard to
vehicle production costs.
In 1924, while the economic situation in Germany was languishing, discussion about the
American economic “miracle” and the revolutionary ideas of Fordism was already widespread
throughout German industrial and economic circles. The wild success of American industries,
attributed largely to assembly-line techniques and the utilization of the latest technologies,
fascinated many Germans with an interest in improving their own economy. As historian Mary
Nolan explains, Germans saw America as the “success story” of the 1920s, and that success was
“attained by means of rationalization – to use the German term – or efficiency – to employ the
American one.”55 Germans saw this success as something attainable, and as former masters of
efficient production techniques themselves, they admired the American ingenuity that had
allowed for this rapid expansion through productivity. In addition, Germans had the luxury of
picking and choosing from the American system what aspects they would try to emulate as they
sought to rewrite their own futures. America provided not only the context but also a live casestudy to evaluate when determining how Germany should move forward following the chaos of
the post-war period.56
As the discussion of how Germany should seek to modernize itself through the
utilization of these new techniques intensified, there was a growing practical relationship
between German corporations and American economic interests. Major firms of all types looked
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to America and American methods with an increasing degree of seriousness. Over fifty books
were published on American production techniques, technology, and mass consumption, and the
topic was examined by publications from academic journals to popular newspapers. They all
used America as fodder for their speculation and exploration.57 Individuals of different
professions, including journalists, engineers, businessmen, and even labor leaders traveled to the
United States and reported on their findings. These “pilgrimages” became synonymous with
progress in German industry at the time. Weimar industrialists went to America in increasing
numbers, and as one professor at the Berlin Technische Hochschule who was on one of these
trips observed, “at first a few leading personalities came individually…soon the passenger lists
of the beautiful ships of the Hamburg-Amerika line and the North German Lloyd looked like a
register of the leading industrial firms in Germany.”58 To this end, German-American academic
exchanges started in 1924, and through the program German students were invited to work at
American firms for two years following their graduation.59 Clearly, America was a role model
for Germany, but the question remains: why?
This growing fascination with America and its industries was part of a larger trend of
growing cooperation between the two nations at this time. However, cooperation aside, America
seemed to be the only logical model for the fledgling industrial sector in Germany, which had
gone from being an innovative leader to a stagnant and reactionary industrial behemoth.
Inflation in the German economy was rampant at this time, yet even the investment that was
encouraged because of this inflation did not solve the efficiency crisis. Capital investment went
to outdated plants employing old methods of production, and productivity stagnated as Germany
struggled to come to terms with smaller markets for German goods both at home and abroad. In
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short, Germany was in the midst of what one observer called a “crisis of competitiveness and a
crisis of industrial backwardness.”60 Almost by default, the Germans looked to Ford and the
American auto industry as the pinnacle of American success. German engineer Paul
Riebensahm noted that “Henry Ford was not identical to America, but a great deal of what one
found at Ford was to be found elsewhere in America.”61 This statement stemmed from the
widely held conviction of the Frankfurter Zeitung – namely that Fordism was a valuable tool to
be utilized in the reformulation of modern German economic life.62 Henry Ford’s methods and
the American auto industry as a whole were crucial components in understanding America at this
time, as it so profoundly shaped all aspects of life there. Yet, despite this fascination with the
operations of American car manufacturers, the German auto industry remained plagued by
inefficiency.

Economic Nationalism and the Rise of Nazism
In 1932, the National Socialists swept into power on a tide of nationalist sentiment. The
German population, weary of hard economic times, voted for the party which promised them a
better life. The Nazis gained the majority in Parliament, and on January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler
was appointed the Chancellor of Germany. The Reichstag fire followed a month later, and
provided the new chancellor with the grounds to consolidate his power. The Reichstag
proceeded to pass laws granting Hitler ultimate authority in matters of state. Political parties
were outlawed, as were trade unions. Following the death of President Hindenburg in August,
there was no longer anyone in the government to challenge Hitler’s dictatorial tendencies. The
Nazi state had begun its reign of terror.
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With the rise of Hitler and the Nazis the most drastic economic changes would be
instituted in Germany. While it is very easy to simply write off the improving economy under
Hitler as a result of rearmament, this is an overly simplistic account of the multi-faceted
recovery. A full-scale economic recovery would not come until later in 1933. A closer look at
the policies of the Nazis shows quite clearly that many of the massive worker mobilization
efforts and other reforms, while excellent fodder for the propaganda reels, actually had little
impact on the economy. As historian Richard Overy posits, there was no one factor responsible
for the recovery of the Germany economy. The aforementioned labor mobilizations, natural
movement in the business cycle, an increased demand for consumer goods, and new government
interventions all played a role in the recovery.63 For our purposes here, however, the government
intervention component is worth a second look. Understanding corporate responses to both
Weimar and Nazi policies illuminates much of the behavior of our subjects of study, namely
Ford-Werke AG and the auto companies in Germany.
As I have described above, Weimar Germany was characterized by instability and
unpredictability, on both the geopolitical and national levels. And much to the chagrin of
nationalist elements in Germany, including the Nazis, this was largely a result of Germany’s
dependence on foreign markets and economic factors outside of their control. The economic
nationalists made a primary goal of changing this fact, and by means of widespread intervention
and autarky, sought to assert government control over the economy. The Nazis and their antiliberalism suited this venture perfectly, and in this matter the interests of the Nazis coincided
with those of major German corporations. As Hitler wrote in The Secret Book, economic
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institutions should primarily serve the needs of the state, especially as they pertained to the
military.64
The Nazis brought a much desired stability to Germany, as Hitler announced that he did
not want to pursue any radical economics but instead develop and strengthen Germany’s
industrial core. In truth, this stability was only superficial, as the economy was now the hostage
of Adolf Hitler and Nazi politicians rather than market forces. Still, this semblance of stability,
especially when compared with the last turbulent years of Weimar, was welcomed in Germany.
No longer did ordinary Germans have to bring suitcases full of bills to buy bread, and the trains
were finally running on schedule. Hitler pleased business interests and common citizens alike
when he solemnly explained at a party gathering in July 1933 that “the economy…must be
treated with extraordinary cautiousness.”65 Moreover, the destruction of trade unions and the
freeze on wages satisfied businesses and encouraged confidence.66 If the Depression had proven
one thing to Hitler and German citizens alike, it was that economic self sufficiency was
necessary to German survival. A large part of this quest for self sufficiency stemmed from an
even deeper racist ideology obsessed with the purification of the Aryan race, but that is beyond
the scope of this study. Hitler’s policies with respect to industry would have a profound impact
in the years following his rise to power, and these would have direct implications for the
American companies doing business in his country.

New Challenges: The Regime’s “New” Economic Plans
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Accompanying Hitler’s plans for reinforcing German industry were far reaching new
laws regarding international trade, and behind them all was Hjalmar Schacht, former Atlanticist
and Weimar politician. When Hans Luther, the Weimar carryover president of the Reichsbank,
refused to give Hitler more than 100 million marks for military spending in 1933, Schacht was
tapped to replace Luther in that position.67 Not only did Schacht give Hitler almost unlimited
funds for rearmament during his four year tenure as president of the Reichsbank, but his theories
on mobilization would guide Nazi economic policymaking for years. Schacht saw Nazism as a
third way between capitalism and communism. He wrote that “the essence of my task…is to
move step by step to a new but practical form of national economy in which private initiative and
public control are brought into a working synthesis.”68 Schacht’s “New Plan” focused largely on
trade regulation. Imports had to be brought in under license, capital could not be freely
transferred abroad, and perhaps most important for American corporations, all earnings in
Germany were kept in special blocked accounts. Moreover, the withdrawal of funds from these
accounts was heavily penalized and subject to unfair exchange rates to a point that made the
removal of profits impossible – effectively forcing these earnings to be reinvested in the German
economy through the purchase of German goods and services.69 As the decade progressed, Ford
and General Motors (which acquired the German automobile firm Opel in 1929) found
themselves extremely profitable with the upswing in the German economy and auto industry, but
this new money was out of reach for them. Hoping that eventually they could access this money,
they used it exactly as Hitler expected by expanding facilities – facilities that would prove
crucial to Hitler’s rearmament efforts.

67

Carr, p. 24.
Amos Simpson, Hjalmar Schacht in Perspective (Paris: Moulton, 1969), p. 120.
69
Overy, Nazi Economic Recovery, p. 26.
68

38
In concert with the Nazis’ attempts to assert control over the economy, especially heavy
industry, the Nazi government gave a much needed boost to the German auto industry. While
Hitler himself had a personal interest in automobiles – indeed, the Volkswagen was his pet
project and he was a regular attendee of the Berlin Motor Show – automobiles played a vital role
in Hitler’s propaganda and economic recovery plans. The policy of Motorisierung, or the
application of motor vehicles to the German economy, has been stressed as one of the key
sectors of economic growth without which recovery would have been impossible.70 While this
essay will not go into a lengthy analysis of the implications of this mass motorization policy, it is
important to understand that without it, the responses of the American auto companies might
have been much different when Hitler came to power. Perhaps it is even feasible to suggest that
if the auto industry was not booming to the degree that it was – and this boom came not only
because of a better economy but because of the economy’s direct emphasis on automobiles – the
companies would have written off their losses as misguided investments and pulled out of
Germany altogether.
The German government under Hitler played a crucial role in creating the environment
friendly to the auto industry. First and foremost, it made car ownership easier. On April 20,
1933, a crucial new law was passed, and read as follows: “Personal motorcycles and motor
vehicles, and general omnibuses driven by internal combustion engines, which come into
operation for the first time after March 31, 1933, are freed from tax.”71 What this effectively
meant was that the heavy burden of automobile ownership taxes that had previously kept many
of those in the working and middle classes from ownership was eliminated. A 1933 study prior
to this new law calculated that a car costing 2800 RM would cost about that much to run and
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repair each year because of those taxes.72 A similar law passed in May opened up the used car
market as well, by allowing all taxes to be paid up front in one lump sum.73 Industries could
now deduct the purchase of new vehicles. The effect was immediate, and as car and truck sales
boomed, by 1935 auto plant productivity was running at 93 percent of capacity, which was far
ahead of the rest of German industry as a whole.74 By using a combination of subsidies, tax
breaks, and direct investment, the Nazi government spurred the sector to unprecedented levels of
profitability and production; in 1934, production was already 50 percent higher than the previous
peak which had been reached in 1929, and infrastructure expenditures (roads) were 100 percent
higher than in the peak years of the 1920s.75 Indeed, as part of the motorization initiative, 7,000
kilometers of new superhighways were to be built, and thousands were put to work. In 1934, at
the height of the unemployment crisis, road construction employed over a hundred thousand
men.
As profit extraction became increasingly difficult, Ford managers inexplicably chose to
stay in Germany. The solidification of Hitler’s power and the Nazis’ grasp on Germany certainly
represents one final opportunity where Ford might have pulled out of Germany altogether. There
is little doubt that executives on both sides of the Atlantic realized that in the first years of the
regime, the company was floundering and costing Dearborn thousands of dollars in carrying
costs. Ford had lost not only its promising market position but the very advantages that had
propelled it to the top of the auto market in the late 1920s. While the Depression presented
difficulties for everyone, for Ford, it became a political question. This was a debate that would
play out over the course of several years, during which specific events would all converge to not
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only solve the profitability crisis but greatly enhance Ford Germany’s operations and position in
Germany. Ford’s decision-making was much more long-term than short-term in nature, as they
were willing to ignore huge losses in the short term. Ford ended up staying largely because
management came down on the side of hoping that the regime would warm up to their
operations. Additionally, with over $4 million dollars invested in the facilities at Cologne, the
prospect of pulling out completely would mean the loss of that initial investment, and even with
losses, the value of the facilities alone was worth a substantial amount.
Moreover, the losses seen at Ford in 1931 and 1932 were not unique to Ford. The entire
sector, even market-leading Opel, faced difficulties during this time. Ford managers, in their
long-term mode of planning, accepted the state of affairs as a low point in the economic cycle.
However, considering this, it is hard to fathom what possible success they saw on the horizon, as
nationalist sentiments swirled around Germany and the new factory in Cologne operated at a
fraction of its peak capacity. Certainly Dearborn saw no signs of a friendly German government.
In May 1931, Barron’s commented that “taxes bleed the German company more severely than
for any other Ford unit in Europe,” and the German firm paid an astounding 41 percent tax rate
(the next closest was Finland, where Ford paid a 29 percent tax rate).76 Such high taxes further
call into question the judgment of Ford executives, who were barely keeping more than half of
the revenue earned in Germany. In this instance, Ford Dearborn was willing to gamble on the
fortunes of its German subsidiary and the odds were decidedly against success. Eventually,
under Hitler, Ford became a profitable entity again as the regime rearmed, although Ford
executives certainly could not have foreseen this in 1931 and 1932 when they hesitated to cut
their losses and leave Germany altogether. The conscious choice to accept government orders in
later years was preceded by a major managerial shakeup, and by 1935 the company was on the
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path towards profitability again.

The decision to stay in Germany during these troubled years

cannot be explained by economics alone; there must be other forces at work.
If the first years of Hitler’s regime were characterized by the restoration of confidence in
the German economy, the later years (especially after 1935) marked the beginning of a trend
towards war and rearmament. Hitler made no secret of his intentions, and by the middle of the
1930s, a series of correct guesses made about the Allied responses to his efforts confirmed his
suspicions that he could rearm with negligible consequences. In fact, the German government
was now able to impose its own rules on the world community, especially with regard to trade,
and thus the stage was set for unchecked Nazi aggression. Spearheading the way into the
Sudetenland and Poland would be Ford trucks – some of them made in the United States of
America.
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Chapter 2
Enter Hitler and the Nazis: Implications
for the German Auto Industry and
FordFord-Werke AG (1933
(19331933-1936)
1936)
The Nazi party rose to prominence on a nationalist agenda. Even though strong German
nationalism was evident long before Adolf Hitler, it became a centerpiece of Nazi politics. ProGerman slogans pervaded Nazi rhetoric and policy positions. In practical terms, this would have
several implications for foreign-owned business in Germany, especially in the automotive
industry. As a keystone of the German economic recovery and crucial cog in Hitler’s war
machine, the sector’s importance within Germany is undeniable. Moreover, Hitler’s personal
interest in automobiles complicated matters, and the auto industry’s strategic position warranted
extra scrutiny from the officials. A plethora of regulations, laws, and procedures governed
everything from the composition of Boards of Directors to the shape of fender liners. For FordWerke AG, this translated into a harsh business environment. Throughout the early and mid1930s, Ford faced an assault on all fronts, not only from outside but from within as well.
The responses of the auto industry to the new regime varied markedly. Daimler-Benz,
the German auto company with perhaps the most visible connection to the Nazi party, welcomed
the new government with open arms. Not only did Nazism solve its ongoing problem with labor
unions disrupting production in its factories, but also it is quite clear Daimler-Benz managers
willingly accepted the regime’s new racial ideology as well, as evidenced by several non-Aryan
trustees leaving the board in 1933-1934.1 The fledgling company which had been at 23 percent
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capacity in 1932 suddenly found itself with not only a new order for tanks and armored vehicles,
but also contracts for aircraft engines, and an infusion of government money for new factories
and expansion of existing ones.2 Under Nazi classifications, Daimler-Benz secured the title of
“armaments factories” for many of its facilities, which further guaranteed the company’s stability
in the form of raw materials supplies in Nazi Germany. Daimler-Benz’s experience was largely
emblematic of the auto industry as a whole under Hitler – quick turnarounds from disaster were
followed by huge profits and the gradual transition to arms and military production. As a native
German corporation, Daimler-Benz enjoyed the maximum benefits afforded to corporations
under the Third Reich, and with close confidantes of Hitler on the board, the company cemented
its place in history as a subservient producer for the Nazi regime.
The responses of the American-owned Ford and Opel were certainly less positive. While
there is no official record of a response at General Motors, which owned the majority stake of
Opel, it is quite certain that the future looked ominous. Opel had been the subject of nationalist
diatribes against foreign business in Germany ever since General Motors entered the picture in
1929, and was perhaps targeted directly by the Nazis when the National Socialist Car Corps, a
Nazi organization dedicated to automotive concerns, discouraged the purchase of foreign cars
(this affected Ford as well). Additionally, Opel had refused Hitler the use of its racetrack and
grandstands during a campaign rally, and because of this the company became the subject of
Nazi hostility.3 Moreover, Opel’s contribution to the war effort in World War I made it an
attractive target to Nazi officials bent on rearmament. With its modern factories and dominant
position in the German auto industry, Opel certainly represented a lucrative entity for the
government to take over. In 1932, Hermann Goering bluntly told an American embassy official
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in Berlin that there would be no way that Opel would remain under American control following
the Nazi attainment of power.4
Interestingly, on the ground level, Opel factory management displayed some initial
resistance to the Nazis and their policies. As the racial politics of the regime escalated, Opel at
first resisted, hiding their one Jewish employee from official government surveys and directly
avoiding confronting the subject. As pressure mounted, however, they dismissed him – but
helped him secure a position in Britain with GM subsidiary Vauxhall, thus saving him and his
family from certain death.5 They also delayed to the extent it was possible the implementation of
Nazi workplace regulations, such as propaganda dissemination. Whereas Daimler-Benz
enthusiastically welcomed the new regime, Opel’s reaction (via GM) showed hesitancy to
conform to the new situation. However, Opel too would realize the benefit of working with the
Nazis, and any initial hesitation disappeared as profits and market shares increased with the
boom in the economy.
Ford was like GM inasmuch as it was an American company with operations in
Germany. Curiously, however, it was spared the brunt of the pressure placed on other foreign
companies like Opel. There are several explanations for this, including the fact that Adolf Hitler
was a great admirer of Henry Ford, but more importantly, the establishment of Ford-Werke AG
had not involved an outside takeover of a German firm.6 This did not mean that Ford had been
free from discrimination as nationalism increased in Germany – in fact, quite the opposite was
true. The League of German Auto Manufacturers had issued an order against Ford from
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advertising its new car, the “Baby Ford,” as a true German product in 1932.7 The difficulties
faced under the ultra-nationalist Nazis intensified considerably, and Ford was faced with tough
decisions about their operations abroad. The German company wanted to call their new model in
1934 the “Volkswagen.” This was met by a strict rebuke from German automobile industry
representatives, who wrote in a letter that “You know how important this name is to us, after the
Fuhrer’s speech.”8 These were just a few of the challenges faced with regards to the “Germanness” of Ford products, and as will be explored in subsequent chapters, proving the German
nature of their cars would be one of Ford-Werke AG’s biggest problem in later years.
In much the same way Opel management tried to subvert the Nazis, so was the case at
Ford. Right up until the war, Ford-Werke was somewhat successful in dodging Nazi pressures to
conform to national automotive standards and production of war material. Percival Perry, Ford
of Britain’s director and chairman of Ford-Werke’s board, was ardently against Hitler, and
whenever he could, he instructed company officials to not comply with the Nazis if possible.
Ford was partially able to circumvent Nazi auto part standardization laws and compulsory labor
practices, claiming that they would severely hobble its industrial capacities. When business
pressures mounted, however, it became clear to both American and German Ford managers alike
that cooperation with the authorities was necessary, and by the end of the decade, Ford-Werke
AG was hard at work filling Nazi orders for nonmilitary goods, namely, trucks. As an already
small company and one that was still a relative outsider in the German automotive production
scene, it depended on government orders for its economic health. This is a perfect example of
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business interests and the promise of profitability trumping neutrality, and indeed Ford would
become a crucial link in the German rearmament chain.

Ford Falls Out with the Nazis
The situation for Ford in the early 1930s was complicated. A slumping German economy
and nationalist outcry against purchasing foreign vehicles weighed heavily on Ford sales
numbers, but the sales in Continental Europe were doing very well. Discrimination against the
company, both official and unofficial, was rampant because of the firm’s foreign ownership.
This led to several clashes between the Nazis and Ford-Werke. One prominent incident was
when Ford refused to open a new factory in Hamburg, as desired by Nazi economic officials bent
on moving vital industries away from Germany’s vulnerable western border. After careful
deliberations, the Dearborn management decided in August 1934 that the Cologne factory was
“ideal” and that a factory in Hamburg would not be constructed.9 Even though Ford was still a
relatively small company inside Germany, the Cologne plant was, aside from the Opel
Rüsselheim factory, “the most important and best-equipped single motor vehicle plant in
Continental Europe.”10 After Ford’s initial outlay of capital to construct it, building another one
was simply out of the question. But it was policy decisions such as this one that raised suspicion
among Nazi officials of Ford’s American ownership. Actions such as the Hamburg refusal
demonstrated the extent to which the German Ford subsidiary was subject to direction from nonGermans.
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As a product of a wider xenophobic and nationalist ideology, the Nazis were especially
wary of foreign-owned corporations with American staff members visibly in charge. Ford’s
actions prompted a close examination of its business operations, as the German government felt
that Ford was actively subverting its agenda. While not unique to Ford, policies implemented by
the Nazis sought to control foreign influence at foreign-owned corporations. The Nazis
hampered communication, censorship was employed, and vital information could not legally be
transmitted back to parent companies abroad. German Ford staff members could not discuss
certain “sensitive” matters with the Americans, such as military vehicle designs. In some
instances, non-German board members and employees were denied access to certain facilities.11
This meant that, especially drawing nearer to the outbreak of war, more decisions fell directly
onto the German Ford management, and in order to run the business, they had to interpret brief,
semi-coded cablegrams from America as to how they were to proceed with certain transactions.
The penalties for foreign meddling in how a German subsidiary operated were quite
steep. If the Nazis deemed an American company’s intervention in affairs of its German
counterpart to be too extreme, they could levy sanctions against both the American and German
operations. In a 1935 letter to Charles Sorensen, Dr. Heinrich Albert advised Dearborn that
because of a change in German tax law, foreign involvement in company policy could mean
additional taxation for the German company. The tax code allowed the Nazis to decrease a
corporation’s profit if it had direct or indirect economic relations with a foreign business
organization.12 In addition, Albert recommended that Dearborn should not order any changes to
management structure or salaries, and that “in the future such things are exclusively done
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through the intermediary of a German member.”13 To this end, he concluded, Ford Motor
Company Dearborn should not give instructions but only advice. This course should be
followed, he recommended, to avoid upsetting the authorities. Dearborn hesitated to relinquish
so much control, however, and Albert’s advice fell on deaf ears.

A German Enterprise from Assembly Line to Board Room
Under the Nazis, the key to profitability for foreign companies like Ford was convincing
not only the authorities but also the German people that a given product was sufficiently German
in origin. In March 1933, even before the forthcoming elections that would sweep Hitler into
power, internal documents showed that Ford managers were attuned to the changing winds of
nationalism in Germany: “It was the principal pursuit of our advertising to propagate Ford cars in
Germany as ‘German products.’”14 Following the election, another manager’s report stressed
that it became a top priority for Ford-Werke to appear fully German: “The general election of
March 5 of the Bundestag resulted in a clear majority to the nationalist parties…this makes it
absolutely essential to use in Cologne production local material to the greatest amount to
overcome obstacles arising out of national feeling.”15 Ironically, only a few years later, FordWerke was absolutely dependent on its American parent company for foreign-sourced raw
materials, including rubber and certain metals.
The major hurdle to success faced by Ford in Germany was being recognized as a
German operation. Earning the label of “German” would prove to be the defining struggle for
Ford-Werke throughout the 1930s. Despite a massive effort to appear German, Ford-Werke was
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still labeled as a foreign firm both officially and unofficially. Undoubtedly, official circles held
Ford’s operations in low esteem. Upon coming to power, the Nazis issued corporations
“Certificates of German Origin,” which essentially signaled that the goods being produced met
German labor and raw materials standards. As early as 1932, the Nazis established that materials
used in the production of vehicles had to be 90-95 percent of German origin.16 By mid-1933, the
German Ford operation merited official certification, but the government withheld it.17 By 1934,
it was suggested that the name be changed from Ford Motor Company AG to Ford-Werke AG.18
The definition of what a “German” product meant changed countless times, with each
definitional alteration forcing Ford to play catch-up with the rest of the industry.
Ford Dearborn was concerned about these trends. Charles Sorensen feared that the
German government’s plans “will regulate makers and give quotas to each manufacturer…Prices
will be determined by them, and they are even talking about design. I am not sure that Mr. Ford
would accept this plan anywhere in the world.”19 Sorensen was referring to Henry Ford’s very
simple business model that Dearborn should control the design and approve all final plans for
vehicles manufactured under the Ford name. Henry Ford was adamant about maintaining control
of this aspect of his business. In his view, no government had the right to control how or to what
specification his vehicles were produced. Sorensen’s keen observation would turn out to be the
case only a couple of years later, when the German government introduced strict standardization
requirements for automotive manufacturers. At the time, however, Ford-Werke still enjoyed

16

HFM, Acc. 38, Box 14, Ford-AG Manager’s Report, March 1933.
Hill and Wilkins, p. 272.
18
National Archives and Research Administration, Record Group 407, Entry 368B, Box 1032, “Report on FordWerke Aktiengesellschaft,” Exhibit 38, Board Meeting Minutes August 31, 1934. Hereafter within this chapter,
footnotes from this source will be abbreviated as NARA and referred to as the Schneider Report. The name would
not officially be changed until 1939.
19
Hill and Wilkins, p. 274.
17

50
enough freedom in their operations that Sorensen and the Ford Motor Company failed to act on
these concerns.
By 1935, the definition of what made a car German had predictably changed again. The
German Automobile Association now proclaimed that a car could not be called truly German
unless it “had a German origin of the motor and the firm was controlled by German capital,
German norms, and German personnel.”20 Ford tried to meet these standards, and each year used
more products from local suppliers instead of importing them from England or America as it had
before. By May of 1935, Ford had produced an all-German car with a four-cylinder engine
called the Köln; the more popular V-8 model was still in the process of being transformed over
to German manufacture.21 In early 1936, Ford announced that foreign materials in its Eifel and
V-8 models had been reduced to .4 percent.22 Still, this was not enough.
In addition to the material “German-ness” of their product, Germanization of the
corporate structure became increasingly important for Ford Germany in the mid-1930s. Heinrich
Albert wrote a letter to Percival Perry in 1935 that it would be advisable for the company to take
on the appearance of a German-controlled business. In May 1935, Dr. C.W. Hauss of Berlin
joined the Board.23 This small step was not sufficient to placate the Nazis, and stronger action
was encouraged by Albert. To that end, Ford should go “the whole length and create a German
majority on the board,” with Albert himself as chairman.24 In a letter to Charles Sorensen,
Albert repeated this idea: “As you will remember my advice for some time now has been to raise
the number of German members (on the Board) to five forming a German majority.”25 On June
20
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11, 1937, Perry retired from the Chairman position and Albert replaced him, the first German to
hold that position.26 Interestingly, despite the German majority on the Board, immediately
before and during World War II, the company remained 52 percent American-owned. The Nazis
and the Ford-Werke employees saw inherent benefits for the company as well as the regime to
American majority ownership of the corporation.
Nazi officials based much (but certainly not all) of their hostility towards Ford on
problems with Ford’s management. The first manager of Ford-Werke, Edmund Heine, was
German-born but a naturalized American citizen. The Nazis saw him as haughty and disliked his
seeming lack of effort to ingratiate himself and the company with Nazi officials. As the situation
at Ford-Werke deteriorated and huge losses mounted, he was fired. Replacing him in 1935 was
Erich Diestel. Diestel was respected for his managerial abilities and had recently been the mayor
of a Hamburg suburb, Altona.27 He was highly recommended by Heinrich Albert, who had
worked with him at Holland-America shipping. Valentine Tallberg, an American supervisor at
the Ford Cologne factory, did not share Albert’s enthusiasm. Diestel, he remarked, knew
nothing of cars or the automobile business. He “couldn’t drive a car; he never even owned
one…He wouldn’t know a blueprint from a piece of steel.” Despite a general ignorance of
company policies and unfamiliarity with the industry, he was confirmed as manager on May
28.28 Following Diestel’s appointment, the Nazis continued to complain about incompetent
foreigners controlling the company, and Ford’s standing with the Nazis remained low.
Under Diestel, the company began a slow turnaround. Production numbers improved and
profits began to increase. Concurrently, however, a personal antagonism developed between
Diestel and Albert. This came to a head when Albert discovered that Diestel was of Jewish
26
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ancestry; he appealed to Dearborn for his dismissal. Albert wrote in a letter to Edsel Ford in
1935 that “only recently I was taxed once more by a government department with the
composition of our leading staff: a half-Jew at the head…the next two men foreigners [referring
to E. Vitger and R. Sorensen (no relation to Charles), both Danes] and only the head of
purchasing [R. Schmidt]…a full blooded citizen.”29 The Nazis did not hesitate to interfere with
the Diestel affair, and took action of their own to deal with it. Three months after Diestel’s
appointment, a Ford employee was sent to Cologne from Dearborn to help with sales. This
employee, E.J. Diefenbach, became aware that Diestel was of Jewish ancestry from a former
associate of Diestel’s in Hamburg. Apparently, Diestel’s mother’s paternal grandfather was
described as a “Jewish merchant,” and Diestel had been forced to resign his job at the Berlin
Electrical Works when it was discovered that he had claimed Aryan descent in his application for
membership in the Nazi party.30
Around the same time as this became publicly known within Ford circles, several Nazi
officials came to Diefenbach “in an attempt to open a direct line of communication with
Dearborn.”31 Diefenbach took it upon himself to become an intermediary of sorts between the
Nazis and Ford Dearborn. Diefenbach proceeded to write a long letter to Dearborn, in which he
elaborated on the Nazis’ concerns about Ford, their disapproval of Diestel as a manager and their
distrust of Albert.32 Diefenbach wrote that apparently Albert had promised the German
commerce minister that in choosing a new manager for the company, the Nazis would be pleased
with the selection. The selection of Diestel, with his inexperience and (by definition) Jewish
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heritage, infuriated the minister, who reported directly to Hitler.33 While embarrassing for
Albert, the letter held little sway in Dearborn. Charles Sorensen remarked in a letter back to
Albert that Diefenbach was a “fool” for going over his (Albert’s) head when he had specific
instructions not to do so. In his reply back to Sorensen, Albert assured him that he would “fight
every effort…to interfere with our private business.”34 He observed that the “Jewish question”
could turn into real sales resistance, even it is without merit, but that Ford had to take such things
seriously in Germany “according to the present mentality of the people.”35
This raises the question why Ford chose to hire such a controversial person to be its
leading manager in Germany during this time, and following the pressure placed on the firm by
the authorities, why they retained him. The recently revived German economy at this time was
booming, and the automotive industry was a major beneficiary of this newfound prosperity.
Ford-Werke, however, was still classified as a foreign company, so finding a native German
industry insider to leave a German firm for Ford-Werke was impossible. Diestel’s industry
outsider status was seen as a major plus for his candidacy. He could learn Detroit methods and
would be less apt to try and run the business his own way.
Diestel is an interesting character in the saga of Ford-Werke. Into the later 1930s before
his dismissal by Ford, he actively courted German military officials for contracts. Diestel
represented the company at many government meetings, and served as liaison with high-ranking
officials. As he settled in to his post, however, he became the object of Heinrich Albert’s scorn.
It is probably the case that the objections raised by the Nazis as communicated by Diefenbach
were overstated, and represented more of an attempt by Albert to push Diestel out. Dearborn’s
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anger over Diefenbach’s overstepping his role in Cologne cast another layer of doubt on the
claims levied against Diestel. Diestel’s managerial abilities were quite good, and throughout the
war the Nazi officials used his efforts elsewhere in the war planning economy.36 Robert Schmidt
recalled that during the war, Diestel was appointed by the Nazis to supervise a Dutch firm
operating in Germany. His official appointments call into question the degree to which Diestel’s
Jewish heritage actually mattered with the authorities. The reality was that Diestel turned against
the man who brought him in and began to run the company as he saw fit. Ford documents fail to
elaborate on the nature of the personal conflict that developed between the two men. One
account cites Diestel’s recommendation that Albert receive a lesser salary for his work from
Dearborn.37 However, it can be intimated from the limited information that Albert became
frustrated with Diestel’s boldness and a perceived lack of respect for Ford company policy.
While German Ford managers pushed for Diestel’s removal from his post, Dearborn
stood firm and insisted on retaining him. The Americans refused to allow what they believed to
be a racially-based and irrational German policy to determine who led their company, and this
was magnified by the fact that under Diestel, the company had thus far enjoyed growing profits
and better standing in the German automobile market. Total sales in 1935 were over 42,000,000
RM, a 50 percent improvement over the previous year. 1936 saw another 50 percent jump in
total sales, to almost 65,000,00 RM. Production numbers were similarly promising. Between
1935 and 1936, Ford-Werke almost doubled its total production of motor vehicles, from 12,768
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in 1935 to 20,289 in 1936.38 For the Americans, who made decisions based on profit margins,
Diestel was doing a good job.
Once again, Dearborn miscalculated by putting its faith in Diestel. Diestel’s management
of the plant became more and more unacceptable to Dearborn and Cologne alike. His tendency
to be “dictatorial” and act like he knew everything (despite having absolutely no knowledge only
a short time earlier) earned the enmity of his colleagues. Diestel was pushing the company in an
unfavorable direction. This was epitomized when in June 1938 he applied for Ford-Werke to be
a member of the Reich Automotive Association (it was not a member at this time) without the
approval of the board of directors.39 In July, he crossed Dearborn as well. In a move that greatly
infuriated Sorensen, Diestel violated a Ford directive when he chose to revive a wood fuel
generator program for the German government that Sorensen had ordered shut down.40
In November of 1938, Diestel was fired. It is unclear, however, whether this newfound
success was because of or in spite of Diestel’s presence at the company. Much of the
profitability that had been realized under Diestel was more a direct result of the financial
restructuring of Ford-Werke operations before his arrival as well as internal production
improvements; in Dearborn, however, isolating the exact cause of the German success was
difficult. Dearborn saw a stronger bottom line and associated it with Diestel rather than these
other factors, which in hindsight, seem to be a more reasonable explanation of Ford-Werke’s
new success in the middle to late 1930s. Diestel was the company Chairman, and thus the most
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visible figure associated with the company both within Germany and the United States. He was
the man who could claim the credit for success, and take the blame for failure.
The Diestel affair was one of the first cases of a split between the two Ford
managements. The German managers, led by Albert, sought to accommodate the Nazis’ wishes.
The Americans, however, were adamant in maintaining their control over Ford-Werke’s affairs,
and to that end, sought to separate business and politics. While the Diestel matter had relatively
little fallout for the company, it demonstrates two key points about the realities of conducting
business in Germany. First, there was now a rift between German and American management,
which would only widen as years would go by. Albert seemingly had two personalities, and they
showed themselves in the Diestel affair. When dealing with the Americans, he was a champion
of company interests, the man who would stand up to the Nazis and defend the basic rights of
Ford-Werke. Albert played a dangerous double game, however, and sought to ingratiate himself
and the company with the regime as much as he could within the bounds of Ford policy and
without upsetting Dearborn. Albert was not a Nazi but a pragmatist, and he realized that the
future of business in the Third Reich would require working with the authorities and meeting
their demands. Second, escaping the political situation in Germany was becoming increasingly
difficult for Ford as the Nazis wove ideology into every sphere of life – not even business was
immune. It had already been decided years earlier in Dearborn that leaving Germany was not an
option, and leaving now that the company was profitable was ruled out altogether. As would
soon become apparent, however, continuing operations presented a whole new host of demands.
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Corporate Cooperation
Another way that corporations, including Ford, sought to combat discrimination was
through strategic alliances and partnerships with already established German firms. A 1934
article in Business Week explained that this kind of commercial cooperation was becoming more
common for American companies doing business in Germany: “Branch operations are seeking
refuge in an alliance with powerful German companies…Ford was the first to inaugurate this
practice when he offered a substantial share of his new Cologne plant to I.G. Farben.”41
Cooperation could be accomplished in a number of different ways. The first was taking
over a pre-existing German enterprise. This was the course taken by General Motors, which
purchased Adam Opel AG, a well-respected German automobile manufacturing company, in
1929. GM was involved in the day to day running of Opel and sent staff members from Detroit
to assist the company. By taking over a firm with a solid German reputation while outwardly
maintaining the company’s autonomy (even if behind the scenes they were very much involved
in running the business) a good relationship with the German people was maintained.
Furthermore, from the very beginning of the Nazi regime, Opel sought to fulfill the wishes of the
Nazis, guaranteeing a steady flow of government contracts. It was able to do so because of
GM’s corporate model of brand decentralization, which differed significantly from Ford’s, which
called for top-down control. Whether it was complying with standardization regulations,
providing cheap transportation to the German public, or constructing a new truck factory in
central Germany (at Rüsselheim) according to the authorities’ demands, Opel was the darling of
the regime. By allowing the government a considerable amount of influence in company policy,
General Motors curried favor within the regime, and Opel was spared much (but certainly not
all) of the harassment faced by Ford in the early and mid 1930s.
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Ford, on the other hand, took a different course. Ford was susceptible to widespread
official and unofficial discrimination because of its policy decisions that were at odds with the
goals of the regime. Whether those decisions actually were at odds with the regime is debatable,
but what mattered was the perception that Ford was subverting Nazi wishes. Henry Ford’s
ambition to produce a product for the world market, and not specifically for the German one,
upset the German public and government alike. However, Ford sought to rectify the situation
from a very early stage through inter-corporation cooperation. Ford’s philosophy on his foreign
subsidiaries was that while the majority stake should always be held by Dearborn, the minority
shares should be controlled by the populations of the country where the subsidiary was
domiciled. In much the same way that good wages could help his workers in America afford his
product, so he hoped the situation would unfold in foreign countries. Especially in Germany,
this policy earned the enmity of Ford’s native German competitors, who felt that Ford’s lofty
wages and ability to absorb larger losses would drive them out of business. Even before the
Nazis came to power, the German government was wary of these concerns, and often acting
through unofficial channels such as automobile associations, discouraged the purchase of Ford’s
products.
In 1929, Percival Perry decided that selling a large block of shares to the German
industrial giant I.G. Farbenindustrie would help the company gain traction in their new German
market, while remaining true to the philosophies espoused by Henry Ford. Dr. Carl Bosch,
chairman of Farben, sat on Ford-Werke’s Board of directors; upon his death in 1940, he was
replaced by Carl Krauch, who had become chair of the corporation.42 Edsel Ford was awarded a
reciprocal position on the board of General Aniline and Film, I.G. Farben’s American subsidiary,
although he never attended any board meetings and resigned from the position following the
42
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outbreak of war in 1941.43 Farben was the second largest shareholder of Ford-Werke. At its
height, the industrial giant owned a 15 percent stake in Ford-Werke. In an interview with Ford
company historians Allan Nevins and Frank Hill in 1952, Perry explained that
“When you come to Germany, you do it very differently. The best
way to get in to the German public, as a public, is to issue not all
the shares but a big block of them [to] I.G. Farben … the biggest
industrial undertaking in Germany. …We did issue a big block of
shares to I.G. Farben. That was the shortest way I knew of getting
into the German public. … The German public were very heavy
shareholders in I.G. Farben.”44
Even though this protective measure taken by Ford had some initial success, with the rise
of the Nazis came even more intense pressure to Germanize. The alliance with I.G. Farben was
no longer a sufficient corporate tie to shield Ford from the worst of the prejudice. At this point,
company executives began to explore the possibility of merging with or acquiring another
German firm. The shield of having another corporation’s interests tied up with those of FordWerke was no longer sufficient to protect Ford-Werke from harassment. Moreover, it was not
enough to have another German firm (Farben) as a shadowy owner of stock, relegated to the
background. A more perceptible joint operation with a German firm was required.
Company executives, especially on the German side, hoped that a highly visible union
with an established German company would alleviate much of the pressure that was being placed
on Ford at the time. The firm that presented itself for the venture was Stoewer-Werke AG, an
outside automobile manufacturer based in Stettin. Stoewer management approached Heinrich
Albert in 1935 to discuss the possibility of a merger with Ford-Werke. Stoewer had many
government contracts with the Nazis, but because of cash flow issues, was having difficulty
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filling those orders. The merger even caught the attention of Adolf Hitler himself, as Wilhelm
Keppler, Hitler’s economic advisor, communicated to Ford executives that Hitler had taken a
personal interest in the merger discussions.
Managers on both sides of the Atlantic were excited about the prospect of this merger, for
it represented a valuable opportunity to solve many of the problems Ford-Werke had been
facing. Albert concisely observed of the merger that “the individual advantages (Germanization
of the name, solution of the location problem, etc. etc.) would support this…We should have
access to…buyers. Orders would be placed with us by the authorities.”45 This merger would
sufficiently ingratiate the company with the government, whose approval and official recognition
had still not been bestowed on the German Ford operations. By doing something both the
officials and Party desired, he wrote, opposition to Ford on the grounds of its foreign ownership
could disappear; the merger would be a meaningful service to the “Government and all
Ministries concerned, the Fuhrer and Chancellor himself taking a personal interest in the
matter.”46 American executives liked the fact that Stoewer had an auto body factory, which
would make Ford-Werke less dependent on other suppliers. In addition, they noted, Stoewer had
valuable government contracts that Ford-Werke had been unable to access thus far.47 Approving
the merger in principle, Ford Dearborn went ahead and made a loan of 500,000 RM to the ailing
Stoewer, pending a further investigation of the company and its financial situation.
While these discussions were taking place, Ford’s fortunes in Germany improved
substantially. Irrational behavior from Hitler, usually Ford-Werke’s biggest obstacle to success
in Germany, worked in favor of the company and helped jump-start sales. In February 1936,
Hitler visited the Ford display at the Berlin International Automobile Exhibition and posed for
45
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pictures with Erich Diestel. In his opening speech at the show, Hitler went on to praise Henry
Ford as an industrial pioneer and whose methods should be followed by the German auto
industry.48 Shortly thereafter, Hermann Goering purchased a new Ford car, and dealers took
orders for 2,000 units in March 1936 – an unprecedented figure for the company.49 Albert
remarked during this time that during the time of the pending merger, “nobody dared attack
us.”50
Unfortunately for Ford, further investigation of Stoewer-Werke revealed that Stoewer
was a deeply troubled company. A report compiled by Erhard Vitger of Ford-Werke in July
1936 revealed that the company was all but bankrupt. It had operated at a loss for years, had
large debts, and the 500,000 RM loan had been largely used up only in a matter of months.
Upon learning this, the American executives firmly refused to pour more money into the venture.
With the growing restrictions on the flow of money in and out of Germany, Ford Dearborn
reasoned that the chances of recovering the investment necessary to make Stoewer into a
profitable enterprise were too low to warrant additional funding, and did not complete the
merger. Even though the merger fell through, Ford Germany was still realizing a number of
tangible benefits from the talks of it alone. In the interim, sales of trucks had doubled and the
company held the second place position (behind GM-owned Opel) in truck registrations. In
passenger cars, the company held a respectable fifth place.51 Much of the prejudice had receded
into the background, and while still present, was interfering less with the sales of Ford products.
In this way, Ford was able to achieve many of the benefits of a full merger without assuming the
heavy burden of Stoewer’s debt.

48

Hill and Wilkins, p. 278.
Wilkins, p. 278.
50
HFM, Acc. 6,Box 97,File:1935 - Cologne, Albert to Edsel Ford, August 17, 1936.
51
Hill and Wilkins, p. 278.
49

62
However, behind the scenes, the respite from official discrimination was brief, and the
authorities slowly began ramping up pressure on the company once more. Ford was still not
officially recognized as a German operation, and in the increasingly government contractdominated automotive market in Germany, this was a very large area of the market that FordWerke was unable to access. Government regulations began to come down from above
regarding what kinds of cars could legally be driven on German roads. The lack of official
certification began to impact sales numbers for Ford, especially after the merger fell through.
Following the collapse of merger talks, it looked as though Ford would be completely shut out of
government contracts forever. And despite (or perhaps in spite of) its corporate relationships,
Ford was still not reaching its full potential in Germany. The final hurdle it needed to clear was
meeting the new standardization regulations, and finding its footing within a regime bent on
rearmament.

Standardization Woes
At the Berlin Motor Show on March 9, 1934, Adolf Hitler fired what came to be regarded
as the opening salvo against the German auto industry. In a characteristically nationalist speech,
he called for the entire German auto industry to standardize parts: “all the chief parts of any
manufacturer’s car should be interchangeable with those of all other makes.”52 Following
Hitler’s lead, the German automotive trade association issued a subsequent decree in 1935 that
all automobile parts sold in Germany be made in Germany of German raw materials.53
Additional decrees would call for German labor to have produced the parts, and that they fit
other vehicles with only minor alterations to their design. The entire German auto industry
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rallied to Hitler’s call, and at least in principle, subjected itself to the standards established by the
government – with the glaring exception of Ford. Even though at this time Ford was producing
an all-German 4-cylinder car, it would be Ford’s attitude – characterized by the Nazis as a
disdain for meeting standardization requirements – that would be the biggest obstacle to the
acknowledgement of Ford as a genuine German product.
“Standardization” meant that a number of criteria had to be met by the auto
manufacturers. In addition to the requisite amount of German materials and origin of designs, all
parts had to become interchangeable. Measurements had to be uniform, in metric dimensions.
Essentially, whether a wheel, driveshaft, or speedometer was produced by Ford, Opel, Benz, or
any of the other manufacturers, it should be able to fit other models with only minor
modifications. Meeting this new “German Industrial Standard,” or DIN standard, became a
necessary element for getting government contracts, which were becoming increasingly valuable
as Germany began its rearmament program. The significance of standardization at this early
stage was less about military expediency than political propaganda. At least initially,
compliance was a demonstration of submission to the Nazis above all else. Ford historian Mira
Wilkins explains that “no German firm applied it [standardization] fully; the important thing was
to accept it in principle and practice it within reason.”54 The military aspect of standardization
would not be pushed by the authorities until later.
Why did German authorities care so much about standardized parts? At least officially, it
was a matter of bringing the industry under the influence of the regime. Hitler was passionate
about automobiles, and as a product of his enthusiasm, looked upon the German auto industry in
its then-current state with great disappointment. He wanted to turn an annual production of
500,000 units to 3,000,000; the best way to do this was to standardize parts and eliminate much
54
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of the waste that plagued the industry.55 Behind the grandiose rhetoric was a much larger plan.
V.Y. Tallberg, a Ford employee at Cologne, contended at the time that these new regulations
were an early clue of Hitler’s military and political intentions:
“I don’t think there is any question at all that Hitler was thinking of
military matters…the very fact that they were so persistent in following
what they called the DIN norm, indicated that they were thinking that later
on that would be an interchangeability affair…with a few modifications,
you could make the parts interchangeable. I have no doubt that the
German Government had that in mind and that is why they were so
persistent…that we keep to the standards.”56
Tallberg’s suspicions about the military nature of the Nazis’ automotive regulatory policy would
prove to be warranted, and standardization became a centerpiece of the Nazi regime’s
automotive regulatory policy.57
Standardization regulations were particularly tough for Ford to meet. During 1935 and
1936, Ford-Werke faced mounting difficulties because of its failure to meet standards established
by the government and German automotive trade association. The trade association published a
report in 1935, in which it spelled out a list of traits that made a company distinctly non-German,
and on that list was failure to comply with standardization regulations. Ford company policy at
this time required that the parts produced for any vehicle, no matter where in the world it was
produced, be usable on Ford vehicles elsewhere. This meant that they could not produce parts
unique to the German market, what the regulations required. As recent as 1928, in the massive
restructuring of his European organization, Henry Ford had made it clear that his goal was to
bring the “Ford Dream” to Europe, in much the same way as he had done in America. Adapting
Ford cars to the particulars of the German market certainly did not fit within this business model.
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Ford’s opposition, therefore, was not to the concept of standardizing per se. Rather,
standardization had to be done within the Ford organization, not to German standards.
This translated into a semi-paternalistic relationship in which Dearborn supplied the
designs and foreign subsidiaries (Cologne included) built vehicles to those specifications. FordWerke manager Robert Schmidt remarked that “We did nothing but copy during the early years
at Cologne.” He added that even Ford’s German suppliers copied American designs.58 Dearborn
preferred to keep its subsidiaries on a fairly tight leash with regards to the design of Ford
products.
Aside from its philosophical opposition to standardizing to the German criteria, Ford
faced a multitude of practical difficulties to conform to them. Tallberg remembered how much
of a hardship meeting standards, even on a basic level, was for the company: “(Our) German
company had to hire a large Engineering staff to cope with this [standardization]…We had to
practically take all the drawings that were normally sent to the vendors and rework them into
millimeters…which, of course, was expensive and took a lot of manpower.”59 In an appeal to
avoid these costs, Albert wrote to the Vehicles Industry Trade Group that the “complete adoption
of German standards would involve for our company a radical technical reorganization and the
expenditure of very large sums.”60 Ford management in Dearborn was unsure if the investment
in the necessary retooling was even worth it. Percival Perry wrote to Charles Sorensen soon
after the initial standardization speech given by Hitler: “The real problem is whether to take
action to line up with political conditions now existing, or struggle with them under the belief
that they will be only temporary and that reconstruction when it comes will be influenced by old
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industrialists…”61 This uncertainly fueled Dearborn’s hesitancy to approve cooperation with
government authorities, which in turn angered the authorities further. It was a vicious cycle for
the struggling Ford-Werke, which was trapped between a hesitating Dearborn and an insisting
Nazi government.
Meanwhile, the German management under Albert was heavily in favor of cooperating
with the authorities and standardizing the parts as per German regulations. This was a growing
tension point between the two managements, but the Germans, bound by the decisions of
Dearborn, could not act on their own. As early as June 1934, Albert was pushing cooperation
with the authorities and urging early parts standardization.62 In a lengthy letter dated January 20,
1936, Albert wrote Sorensen in Dearborn of the complexities surrounding the standardization
question. Referring to the official prejudice against Ford-Werke products, “the discontinuance of
the discrimination is conditional on our introduction of standardization.” He described a meeting
he had with Wilhelm Keppler, Hitler’s economic advisor, who bluntly informed Albert that
“Ford was handling the matter in a wrong way. We [Ford] only came to demand something;
never were we prepared to do anything which the government desired.”63 This letter was at least
partially responsible for prompting the Stoewer merger explorations. Albert closed the letter by
informing Sorensen of the state of affairs in Germany at the time: “In the meanwhile,
conscription has been introduced in Germany; thus Germany is under the rule of principles of
military economy; consequently the question of standardization has now an importance such as it
never has before and which we could not expect.”64 There is little doubt that Ford executives,
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both in Germany and in Dearborn, clearly suspected the military purposes of standardization.
Yet, they seemed totally unfazed by the repercussions of going along with German demands.
Despite the obstinate management in Dearborn, Albert appealed to the Nazis to
understand the difficulties imposed on the German subsidiary of the Ford Motor Company.
Writing to the Reich Economic Minister, Albert addressed what he (and Ford) felt to be unfair
treatment of Ford’s operations. He described the standardization of parts as a “vicious circle” for
the company. Official harassment hurt sales, and poor sales made raising the huge amount of
capital needed to re-tool the factory impossible.65 Nazi officials consistently referred back to the
case of Opel, which willingly submitted to German standards as soon as they were announced
despite their American ownership. Opel, unlike Ford, produced models that GM did not sell
elsewhere, and having German-specific parts did not affect their global market. At first, this was
not a compelling argument with the Nazi authorities. With every month that passed, it appeared
as though standardization would be the only escape from the discrimination. After much
haranguing, Albert’s appeal was successful, as the loss of Ford’s automotive markets abroad was
an unpleasant reality for the Nazis who were desperate for foreign exchange.66
No matter how urgent Albert made his letters sound, Ford officials in Dearborn remained
hesitant. They needed hard evidence that there would be a real problem for the sales numbers
before they agreed to the huge task and investment of standardizing. Albert reminded Dearborn
that not only were the authorities placing their orders with other car manufacturers, but new laws
meant that public officials could not even use Ford cars: “No one who is in the public service or
on the staff of a Party department or any semi-official department…no member of an
undertaking financed by the Government or of any of the industries with which Government
65
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orders are placed…would dare to use a Ford car.”67 The Ministry of the Interior forbade sales of
non-standardized vehicles to post office personnel and court bailiffs. This amounted to an
official ban on Ford products, and threatened to spill over to the private sector. In a letter to
Edsel Ford, Albert voiced a concern that private citizens might not continue purchasing Ford
products considering the plethora of regulations against driving non-standardized vehicles.68
There was even the widespread perception (it is unclear if it was actually law) that it was illegal
to park a Ford car in a public place during these years.69 With the “public mind against them,”
Ford executives on both sides of the Atlantic were forced to critically evaluate their position on
the standardization issue.
After a long and drawn out process of wrangling and back and forth negotiating, a
compromise was reached between the accommodating German management and the hesitating
Americans. A partial standardization was agreed upon. The official Ford policy would be that
the “company should follow the German standards with the exception of motors or other
important parts where it cannot be done without changing the designs.”70 In functional terms,
this meant that certain parts could easily be standardized; for example, nuts, bolts, and screws,
sizes of holes, wheels, tires, etc. Some parts, however, especially in the engines, could not be,
including pistons, crankshafts, and connecting rods.71 In addition, Ford changed its blueprints
and tools into metric measurements wherever it was possible. This amounted to meeting about
two thirds of the standards, and by May 1936, the standardization of Ford-Werke’s signature
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product, the V-8 engine, had begun.72 This was sufficient to please both the managers in
Dearborn seeking to retain control over design and production, as well as the Nazis.
Standardization was taken one step further in 1937, when a General Commissary for the
auto industry was established. The Economic Group Vehicles Industry, or Wirtschaftsgruppe
Fahrzeugindustrie (WiGruFa) had at the core of its mission the reduction of the total number of
types of vehicles on sale in Germany. In the short term, vehicle standardization was a response
to raw materials shortages, but in the long term, military efficiency and preparing the auto
industry for an eventual war.73 For example, prior to 1937 there were 150 different types of
motorcycles being produced in Germany; following the introduction of the WiGruFa, that
number was reduced to 30. Similar reductions could be seen in the truck segment, which
reduced 113 different models to 19, and in passenger cars, which went from 54 to 30 models.74
Moreover, new models had to be approved by the regime before they could be produced. This
meant that managements of all auto companies (Ford included) were restricted as they had never
been before. Staying in business meant filling orders to the Nazis’ specifications, and Ford’s
management gladly accepted the request.
Ford’s experience with standardization was defining. The experience comments on the
value of Ford to the Nazis. Ford was never forced to fully comply with the regulations, and
compromise was reached with government officials as to the degree of standardization
necessary. Ford’s value to the regime became apparent during this time, because the company
could not simply be written off. If that were the case, full compliance would have been enforced
and Ford-Werke would have been pushed right out of the country. The Nazis had no reason to
do Ford any favors unless they saw value in the company. The fact that Ford was the only
72
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automotive company whose restrictions were relaxed speaks volumes about the firm’s status,
even if outwardly it faced much criticism from the regime. The whole ordeal also showed how
susceptible the firm was to the decrees issued by the Nazi regime. It was the first time that the
company was compelled to conform to German standards, or for that matter, any standards other
than its own. This unconsciously removed a major practical and psychological barrier to
working with the regime, and consequently, Ford-Werke would become increasingly passive as
time passed. What was in it for Ford Dearborn? Ford’s own historians perhaps state it best:
“The only road it (Ford-Werke) could take to success…was one of teaming up with the National
Socialists….The iron hand gripped Cologne firmly, although the velvet glove of approbation and
profits (which eventually might be taken) made it fairly acceptable.”75 When the Nazis stepped
up their demands on Ford-Werke, first to procure raw materials and then to produce actual war
material, it was much easier to simply capitulate rather than resist.
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Chapter
Chapter 3
AIDING AND ABETTING:
ABETTING: HOW DEARBORN AND
COLOGNE SUPPLIED THE NAZI WAR EFFORT
(1936(1936-1939)
Ford managers on both sides of the Atlantic breathed a deep sigh of relief in January
1937. Compromises had been reached with the authorities on the question of standardization,
and all parties involved were pleased with the results. The crucial Ford parts were still nonstandardized, so they could be sent around the world and used in many markets. Finally, the
German Ford operation had been recognized as a German operation, as the propaganda office of
the Reich Ministry of Economics publicly recognized Ford-Werke’s compliance with German
standards. Subsequent declarations were issued on June 18 by the Army and on September 1 by
the Traffic Ministry.1 Even though this certification was a token gesture, its significance lies in
the fact that after years of harassment and marginalization by the German authorities, FordWerke was finally eligible to compete for lucrative government contracts – and it would leap at
the opportunity. Even though funds were still locked in Germany, the prospect of working hand
in hand with the authorities was attractive. It seemed as though the difficulties of the past few
years, including targeted regulation and discrimination, would cease.
Before proceeding, however, another look at the German economy is in order. Especially
relevant for the story of Ford-Werke is the concept of foreign exchange and the German export
economy. By mid-1934, foreign exchange reserves at the Reichsbank reached critical levels, and
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new measures created by the Nazis directly limited how much currency could leave the country
on a month-by-month basis. Allotments of foreign exchange were controlled by a central office
in Berlin, and even everyday German citizens leaving the country on holiday were restricted to
50 RM cash and 150 RM in travelers checks; agreements were reached with certain countries
that raised that amount to 500 RM.2 However, the restrictions extended beyond ordinary
citizens. Corporations were affected as well, and the new laws directly limited how much profit
could be extracted from Germany by foreign corporations. As early as 1934, the Nazis
implemented a series of tight controls on German currency and how it could be spent abroad.
The importance of foreign exchange cannot be underscored enough. Without foreign
exchange, business between individuals and corporations – especially those that do business in
multiple countries (and thus multiple currencies) –is impossible, and the economic value of
international transactions cannot be calculated.3 Foreign exchange, according to one historian, is
“like the circulatory system…transactions serve the medium by which vital elements of the
international economic system are brought from where they are produced to where they can be
used or disposed of.”4 The foreign exchange clampdown should have raised several red flags for
all foreign-owned companies in Germany in the early 1930s, Ford-Werke included. State
controls in economic affairs were not a new phenomenon in Germany or even Europe; many of
the neo-mercantilist European rulers of previous centuries concentrated on economic control as
they established their regimes. Policies exactly like the one implemented by the Nazis have
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empirically opened the floodgates for a government to widen its control over society. The
dangerous acquiescence to these early controls would prove to be fateful for Ford-Werke.
Concurrent with these new regulations, the power of the Reich Minister of Economics (at
this time Hjalmar Schacht) was enhanced. Among his new powers was the ability to ration the
imports of certain raw materials that could be produced domestically.5 The ultimate goal of
these controls was promoting German self-sufficiency in raw materials and preparation for
military production. Synthetic industries especially were pushed in this climate. Imports were
still allowed from abroad, but they were monitored and rationed much more carefully. For
example, textiles were mandated to have only certain percentages of natural fibers, the rest being
synthetics. The German government stopped using foreign currencies to procure raw materials
that could either be produced domestically (synthetically or naturally) or obtained through other
means (especially corporations with ties abroad). The Minister could create control boards for
specific materials. The boards would then issue permits to purchase raw materials directly to
each German manufacturer, regardless of its product. There was some international concern
over these new restrictions, and one diplomat observed that “Germany is virtually isolating itself
from the rest of the world, or at least attempting to do so.”6 It is true that Germany was isolating
itself, but only relatively. It still relied on foreign trade to earn its valuable foreign exchange,
which had to be used on items that absolutely could not be procured in Germany.
American diplomats were keenly aware that these new stipulations had particular
implications for the United States, as Germany had a largely unfavorable balance of trade with
the United States. German politicians were outspoken in their criticism of U.S. trade policy
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towards Germany – delivering an intimated ultimatum that German markets would be lost to
American firms if the U.S. either did not extend export credits to Germany or agree to accept
more German exports and raw materials.7 Anger over trade policy added even more layers to the
already rampant hostility displayed towards American enterprises in Germany. Meanwhile,
diplomats worried that Germany might not be bluffing. German officials emphasized their tight
control over imports and loudly proclaimed that they could do without American products in
their country. German officials touted the “loyalty of the German people and their willingness to
make sacrifices,” which meant that despite the economic hardship such a drastic move would
impose on the population, the Nazis were ready to embark on such a course should it become
necessary.8
The German government’s assertion of power over corporations meant that businesses in
Germany needed the regime for their own success, and to that end, businessmen in all industries
tried to ally themselves with the regime. Under this lens, it becomes exceedingly clear why
Heinrich Albert was, from a very early stage in his leadership tenure at Ford-Werke, predisposed
to and vocal about cooperating with the authorities.

Exporting Rearmament
While these early regulations certainly had fallout for Ford-Werke as a business in
Germany, it was not until 1936 that Ford Dearborn would be pulled into the situation as well. In
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October 1936, Hermann Goering established the first of the Four Year Plans, which were little
more than thinly-cloaked war preparation goals and objectives for industry. The Four Year
Plan’s provisions were not new. It merely re-codified and made coherent piecemeal legislation
that had existed in the months leading up to its declaration. These far-reaching plans were
designed to regulate heavy industries that would be necessary for military rearmament, and
called for increased domestic production of strategic materials such as iron ore, synthetic rubber,
and synthetic petroleum.9 To this end, wherever possible, German native industries were
reinvigorated to preserve foreign exchange. The German synthetic rubber industry and iron ore
industry both developed rapidly as natural rubber was imported less and foreign ore eliminated
almost entirely. The Nazis also used the Four Year Plan to pressure firms with foreign ties to
procure raw materials from abroad, in a complicated scheme that would bring in the requisite
products without further straining Germany’s tenuous foreign exchange position.10 The German
government and Ford-Werke, (by default, Ford Motor Company Dearborn), entered into a series
of agreements which called for the German subsidiary to export parts and vehicles in exchange
for raw materials from Dearborn (and other Ford subsidiaries).11 These actions directly
strengthened Germany’s foreign exchange position in the years leading up to World War II.
For a company to prosper under this new set of economic stipulations, exports had to be
ramped up dramatically. The Nazis put pressure on all German firms to send their products
abroad in an effort to improve the deleterious German foreign exchange imbalance. The
facilitation of import and export trade became intertwined with a company’s identification as a
German enterprise. Companies failing to comply sufficiently were ostracized or pushed out of
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the country altogether.12 Utilizing a classic “carrot and stick” approach, German authorities
encouraged compliance by granting extra raw materials rations as well as giving companies
which did business abroad a favorable exchange rate. With regards to the auto industry, export
was stressed even more than other industries, and cars, trucks, and spare parts were exported
around the world as a result of this new program. Ford-Werke did its part by exporting parts that
could be used abroad, even in standardized form. These included speedometers and other
gauges, engine electrical components, and wheels. The most marked difference in export
numbers can be seen between 1936 and 1937. In 1936, 12.4 percent of passenger cars (or about
29,825 units) and 9.5 percent of trucks (6,654 units) produced in Germany were exported. By
contrast, in 1937, these numbers almost doubled, with 21.6 percent of passenger cars (57,868
units) and 17.8 percent of trucks (14,085) sent to markets abroad.13 Most of these vehicles went
to the rest of continental Europe, with a small fraction going to Africa and the Middle East.
The demands placed on companies by the Nazis could only be met if the regime was
willing to be flexible in its policymaking. For Ford-Werke, fulfilling the export quotas dictated
from the authorities meant that it could not meet the standardization regulations imposed on the
auto industry by the Nazis, as the parts would not fit Ford vehicles in other countries. In a
disturbing memorandum to the Nazis that envisioned German world economic power, Albert
assured the authorities that there were other benefits to allowing Ford a limited degree of
production autonomy: “Ford’s international network would be invaluable in resuming German
export sales…and new American models would be made available for production by Ford12
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Werke at no development cost.”14 Desperate for foreign exchange and access to foreign markets
that Ford-Werke provided the country, the Nazis accepted this argument from Ford-Werke as to
why the company should not have to comply with standardization to the same degree as other
manufacturers.15 If Ford-Werke was so inconsequential, as Research Findings claims, it does
not make sense that the Germans would relax their stringently enforced production regulations
for the company, and it would have been driven out unceremoniously. Rather, it seems as
though the loss of Ford business for Germany would have been costly enough to warrant special
treatment from the regime. Ford, conversely, appeared set on staying in Germany.
In another unexpected accommodating move, the German government even went so far
as to offer Ford-Werke a secret export subsidy that it could not reveal to either Dearborn or
Dagenham, which allowed the company to reduce its billing prices on exported goods.16 FordWerke manager Robert Schmidt remembered after the war that “the government invented all
sorts of means to push export, both financially and otherwise.”17 The net result of these policies
can be seen in Ford-Werke’s healthy export numbers. 1936 was a year of record exports for the
company, with a substantial increase over the previous year – 554 cars and trucks were exported
as compared with 225 the year before.18 1937 was even better following the official recognition
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by the government, and 7,325 vehicles were sent abroad by Ford-Werke.19 While no numbers
were kept on the total volume of spare parts sent abroad, these also contributed substantially to
Ford-Werke’s newfound prosperity.
Dearborn did not hesitate to provide assistance to Ford-Werke with its export program.
In 1936, the company attempted to placate the authorities’ demands by granting Cologne new
territory for export markets. Official Ford Motor Company policy called for each center of
production (e.g., Cologne, Dagenham, Dearborn, etc.) to have its own “sphere of influence,” or
markets where that Ford subsidiary had the legal right to supply and distribute vehicles and parts.
Dearborn hoped to transfer the markets of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Denmark to Ford-Werke from
Ford England.20 This was not by any means a quick or easy business decision. The semiindependence of each subsidiary – a direct result of the restructuring of European operations in
1928 – meant that Dearborn had to “strongly encourage” the British company to give Cologne
these areas, which had been the British company’s traditional domain. Sorensen conceded in a
letter to Percival Perry that “this will cut into your market considerably” but urged the English
company to make the sacrifice.21 In a letter back to Sorensen two weeks later, Percival Perry
responded that he would not “keep off the grass entirely with the Dagenham product, so as to
permit Germany to build up a monopoly for Cologne cars…”22 In March 1937, Perry finally
gave in to Dearborn’s requests as a result of heavy campaigning from Dearborn management. In
a letter to Sorensen, Perry indicated that he understood Dagenham’s role in helping Cologne:
“the whole world-wide Ford organization…has been trying to help the problems of Ford Motor
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Co A/G; by buying and by assisting in the disposal of Ford products into territories which, in the
ordinary course of business, are closed to Germany.”23
Thereafter, both Dearborn and Dagenham bought parts from the German subsidiary. For
example, Dagenham ordered $250,000 worth of magnetos and other parts from Cologne in 1936,
which is just one example of how the other Ford operations collaborated in keeping Ford-Werke
alive.24 Russell Roberge, a Ford Dearborn executive who handled foreign business, was
probably correct in his estimation of the situation at the time. The choice was either close the
German operation altogether or help it realize more sales from within the Ford organization;
more sales were preferred.25 As profits were stuck in escrow accounts, the best Ford Dearborn
could hope for was to purchase parts from Cologne, and then re-use those parts in the delivery of
vehicles elsewhere under the Ford family of companies. It was certainly a roundabout way of
doing business, especially considering that Dearborn probably could have produced the items
itself and cheaper. Yet, the health of the German company remained the top priority for Ford, so
the American company did what it could.
Echoing this sentiment, Ford-Werke chairman Erich Diestel emphasized that exports
were directly tied to a company’s profitability in Germany: “According to present German ideas,
an enterprise in Germany is only justified to exist in so far as it submits to the general political
and economical requirements of the state.”26 By transferring these areas away from Ford
England, Ford Dearborn hoped to soften some of the harsh criticisms being levied at its German
subsidiary at this time, and the policy was mildly successful in achieving this goal. Ford-Werke
manager Robert Schmidt referred to these new areas as “the most important part of the globe” for
23
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Ford-Werke’s business.27 This policy made opposing Nazi domination even more difficult later
on.
Beneath the veil of economics, there was also a more sinister motive to the rigorous
export program advanced by the Nazis. At first glance, it might seem counterintuitive that a
regime bent on rearmament would be sending valuable vehicles away. However, a closer look
reveals that this was, in fact, perfectly consistent with the aims of the Nazi state. Many of these
exported vehicles came with large rebates, amounting to almost 60 percent of the domestic
German price. Vehicles were thus sent – very cheaply – to all of the countries the Nazis
ultimately invaded, including Poland, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Sweden, and even
England.28 Pricing protections existed within each market for Ford-Werke as a member of the
Ford family, so each individual German vehicle had a higher profit margin than its British,
Dutch, or other comparable domestically-produced Ford counterpart. Ford-Werke was thus able
to realize additional profits the other Ford subsidiaries could not, which pleased everyone. This
meant that even with a large rebate, the German government still obtained substantial amounts of
foreign exchange from the sale, and profited as Ford-Werke exported and sold its vehicles
abroad.
Accompanying infrastructure also followed these cheap cars into the rest of Europe.
Service stations, stocked with supplies of spare parts and equipment, were constructed in all of
these countries, and the skills needed to repair German vehicles were disseminated among the
population. Before the war, the Polish government “played into the hands of the Nazis” when it
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gave tax credits to citizens buying cheap cars or constructing service facilities.29 When the
Germans invaded Poland in 1939, many areas were already equipped with service stations that
could repair German vehicles, and the same would hold true in other areas including the Low
Countries and France. Not only was there a huge stock of vehicles being sent to these countries
that could be requisitioned by the invading German army almost immediately, but a support
infrastructure already existed to ease the toll of the campaigns on the vehicles.
While there is no evidence that this was a deliberate effort on behalf of the Nazis to
prepare for their invasions, there is no doubt that the abundance of cheap vehicles being sold to
the civilian population of Europe, both within Germany and abroad, ultimately aided the German
military campaigns. It was a direct by-product of the export economy that such an infrastructure
would be established. Civilian vehicles, including trucks, could be requisitioned at any time, as
explained by a 1942 Ministry of Economic Warfare Report: “many European governments prior
to the war embarked on a policy of building up a reserve of vehicles…these vehicles being
allowed to remain in private ownership…Germany was undoubtedly a leader in this direction.”30
This was the case when Germany invaded Austria in 1938, when a majority of the trucks used
were simply requisitioned overnight from civilian owners in Bavaria.31 Over 15,000 trucks were
captured from Poland and Czechoslovakia following the invasion, and in total, the army had the
capacity to requisition over 120,000 vehicles from civilian use.32 The German army disguised to
the world the motorization of its forces, and the true scale of the level of German force
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mobilization was successfully downplayed. The bulk of German exported vehicles took on a
seemingly legitimate place in private ownership.

Raw Materials
The export economy pushed by the Nazi regime, especially in the case of Ford-Werke,
also had a third, more indirect goal: the acquisition of increasingly difficult to obtain strategic
raw materials, namely, rubber and metals. As early as 1934, with the establishment of control
boards and import rationing of rubber and other supplies, the new German government had the
twin goals of reducing German dependence on foreign supplies and preserving valuable foreign
exchange at the top of its priorities list. In order to obtain the needed materials, the Nazis leaned
heavily on firms with foreign connections such as Ford-Werke and Opel. Production quotas, set
by the authorities, were directly linked to a firm’s ability to bring in raw materials and use its
exported goods to pay for them.33 Ford-Werke’s ties to Ford Motor Company would prove to be
invaluable for the Nazi regime in this respect.
The first agreement reached between Ford Motor Company, Ford-Werke, and the
German government came in June 1936. To ensure that Ford-Werke could deliver vehicles
equipped with tires, Ford Dearborn agreed to accept responsibility for fulfilling Ford-Werke’s
needs with regards to rubber, a scarce and valuable resource. Ford accepted this deal with little
consideration given to the economics of the deal, and Ford Dearborn’s actions hardly befit those
of a profit-making enterprise, but seem more appropriate to those of a charity. To the authorities
in Berlin, it seemed like a natural matter of course for the parent company to participate in this
process, and contribute to its subsidiary’s well being inside Germany.
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The system was quite complicated, as German manager Erhard Vitger elucidated this complex
barter system:
“They (the German government) suggested that, since Ford was an
international company, it should not be too difficult for Ford-Germany to
make arrangements with their mother-company to supply Ford-America
with certain parts, and in return earn foreign currency – American dollars
– which could then be used for the importation of raw materials.”34
In addition to Dearborn receiving finished parts from Ford-Werke, new markets formerly held by
other Ford subsidiaries were opened to Ford-Werke within which it could export finished
products to help pay for the materials. In essence, the changes in export markets discussed in the
previous section came as a direct result of the new raw material situation, as finished goods (in
this case vehicle parts) were exchanged for raw materials (in this case rubber). The crude rubber
obtained as a result of the exchange would be handed over to Ford-Werke’s dedicated German
tire suppliers for use on Ford-Werke vehicles. The glaring caveat, however, was that 30 percent
of the tires that were manufactured using these supplies went directly to the German government
for “official use.”35 With full knowledge that it was essentially supplying tires for the German
government through this agreement, Dearborn raised no qualms. Only a few years earlier,
Dearborn had stood up to the regime on the standardization issue, in which much less was at
stake. Now, when Ford Motor Company was called upon to give supplies to the German
government without compensation, not even a faint whisper of resistance came from Dearborn.
Once again, a chance at resisting the Nazis passed by without little more than a seal of approval.
This circular exchange system raises a serious question: why would Dearborn go along
with such a plan? Ford Dearborn had the largest and arguably the most advanced automobile
factory in the world at its Rouge plant, yet from this agreement, Dearborn was basically
34
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compelled to accept minor parts that they certainly could have produced more cost-effectively in
their own facilities. At a bare minimum, even if the production costs were identical, they had to
shoulder the shipping cost, which from an economic standpoint seems like an unnecessary waste
of resources. This is especially true considering that most of these parts were used on vehicles
that were re-exported by Dearborn to Latin America.36 This decision was not made for its
economic merits, but rather it was specifically designed to keep its subsidiary profitable in
Germany. Concurrent with its decision to open up new export markets for the company, Ford
Dearborn’s initial rubber agreement with Ford-Werke demonstrated an outright desire to placate
authorities in Berlin. Rather than see their subsidiary closed and absorb the losses, Ford
Dearborn explicitly chose a path that would lead to more sales, regardless of the consequences of
supplying Hitler’s regime with supplies. Schmidt conceded after the war that “Germany’s
foreign exchange position was further strengthened by American Ford’s practice of placing
orders with German Ford…”37
If there ever were documents proving the financial benefit to the company, they either
have been destroyed or lost forever. The archival record provides no explicit explanation as to
what Dearborn expected to gain other than the hopes of eventually collecting their profits. Given
the economic irrationality of their decisions, there are two possible explanations for Ford’s
behavior. The first possibility is that Ford Dearborn received some form of secret kickback from
the German government, which would have made it worthwhile to supply the raw materials. The
second, and perhaps more persuasive explanation, is that Henry Ford’s affinity for Hitler must
have played some role.
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The ink had barely dried on this new agreement when a panicked telegram arrived in
Sorensen’s office on August 27th, 1936; the new rubber deal would not be sufficient to cover
Ford-Werke’s needs after all. New regulations had been handed down from the Ministry of
Economics, and all German automotive firms could expect cuts in their official allotments of
rubber from the government. “Tire situation catastrophic,” began the cable, “purchase of tires in
Germany has already been restricted by quota for some time and is now entirely impossible. The
only chance left is to import raw material ourselves and have this manufactured into tires
(period) if no further compensation business can be soon arranged plant must shut down October
1st (period)…”38 There is no information about whether a contingency plan existed in Cologne,
should Dearborn fail to accept the new terms of the agreement. The logical explanation,
however, was that Cologne managers operated under the assumption that Dearborn would step
up once more, if their past behavior was any indication.
Dearborn cabled back about a month later, and responded that the “export program has
been approved in principle.”39 The final agreement called for Ford-Werke to supply truck
wheels, wheel bearings, frame extensions, automobile glass, automobile parts, and tools in
exchange for the materials needed to produce tires, including rubber, soot, and cotton.40 It was
finalized on November 26, 1936; conveniently, Ford-Werke was dropped completely from
government tire consignments two weeks later on December 10, leaving Ford-Werke 100
percent dependent on its parent company for tires.41 Under the new agreement, Ford Dearborn
also had to supply 5,000 tons of pig iron for use in Germany, since “suddenly the section of the
38
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ministry aforementioned simply had forgotten to include this amount in the plan for
distribution.”42 It becomes increasingly clear that the regime was taking advantage of FordWerke for the furthering of its own goals, but Ford Motor Company did not seem to mind.
This new agreement essentially marked a turning point in Dearborn-Cologne relations.
From the time that this new agreement was reached with the authorities through the outbreak of
war, Dearborn would never again say “no” to its subsidiary. As war drew nearer, Ford’s
business decisions in Germany made less and less sense. Was it a naïve and misplaced hope that
Hitler would suddenly change his mind and allow foreign profits to leave the country? Was
Henry Ford willing to take the financial loss of supplying his German subsidiary with no
financial benefit to himself or his company because he approved of Hitler’s politics? Research
Findings is, unsurprisingly, silent on this issue. It offers absolutely no explanation why Ford
would continually submit to this exploitation, and its silence suggests that ideology was at least
partially, if not entirely, responsible for the strange behavior.
Similar agreements were extended to Ford-Werke from Dearborn in subsequent years as
well. In 1938, strategic materials such as non-ferrous metals and pig iron were expressly built
into the agreement. The stipulation that 30 percent of tires produced with Ford-supplied rubber
would be given back to the German government was continued, but the new agreements also
called for 20 percent of the pig iron supplied by Dearborn to go directly to the authorities, again
for “official use.”43 These stipulations did not deter Dearborn, now comfortable making
economically questionable decisions. Albert once again dramatically appealed for continued
support from America: “If you leave Cologne in the lurch, the effort of an increased program
breaks down – not only for 1937, but also for 1938 as the negotiations with the authorities about
42
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the again increased program for 1938 are based on your readiness to provide us with pig iron.”44
“This shows,” remembered Schmidt in a post-war interview, “how with some sort of
blackmailing the manufacturers were forced to push exports by all means regardless of losses.”45
The assistance did not stop with raw materials. Ford Dearborn was consistently in a
position to provide technology and high-value machines for its German subsidiary, and it did so
regularly. The latest automotive production techniques and methods were impressed on German
managers who visited Dearborn several times a year, and this free source of information
undoubtedly helped the regime. Under German law, production methods were no longer
considered trade secrets, so oftentimes this new information would be disseminated to other
German firms with which Ford-Werke was in direct competition. Robert Schmidt told post-war
investigators that it was a common occurrence for German manufactures to collect information
from American sources.46 In fact, this technology made Ford-Werke’s plant at Cologne the
second most advanced auto plant in Continental Europe, with the exception of Opel’s
Brandenburg facility.47 As late as 1941, Ford Dearborn sent machines such as metal mills and
placed orders with other American firms on Ford-Werke’s behalf.48 Arguably, this is the most
bizarre and outlandish action Ford Dearborn had taken thus far. Why would they ever accept a
state of affairs under which Ford’s competitors, including General Motors, would now have
access to their most secret production techniques? Perhaps Dearborn managers did not
understand the scale of how open trade secrets were in Germany, in which case it is excusable
that they continued to send that knowledge and technology to Germany. This is highly unlikely,
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however, and it is more plausible that Dearborn merely wanted to avoid upsetting the German
authorities, especially as Ford-Werke’s sales were at such high levels.
Schmidt recalled that these new agreements placed Ford-Werke in a tight bind. “If we
exported vehicles with tires they would have to be procured under the raw material agreement.”49
This meant that it would cost Ford more to export such vehicles because they received no
assistance with the tires from the government, as they were no longer on official consignment.
Schmidt continued: “The relation to export one vehicle out of four was included and an average
export price fixed. That was especially bad since it forced us to export trucks which meant a
considerable loss.”50 Schmidt conveniently ignores the large export subsidy that allowed
exporting at a loss to still remain profitable. Moreover, domestic sales more than made up for
whatever losses were incurred by exporting trucks.
Ford’s ability to access profits existed at the whim of the Nazi authorities, who
determined exactly how many vehicles Ford-Werke could produce, based on export numbers.
For 1937, the negotiated amount was 24,000 vehicles for domestic sale and 8,000 for export.51
Again, the question of why Ford tolerated this deserves to be asked here – and the answer,
unsurprisingly, rests in the balance sheet. The increased production lowered expenses, which
when combined with Ford-Werke’s sales allowed Ford Dearborn to write off this dictatorial
intervention in their business. Profits can explain why Ford Dearborn allowed not only the
requisition of its raw materials but also the mandating of its German subsidiary’s production
schedule. The outlook for Ford-Werke could not have been better by the end of the 1930s.
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The numbers in the later part of the 1930s were outstanding. Ford’s profits soared
between 1935 and 1939, each successive year bringing in more money than before. 1935’s
profits had been limited to 62,779 RM ($25,112); 1936 saw that amount increase almost 6 times,
to 368,900 RM ($147,560). By 1939, the firm’s net profit was 1,287,877 RM ($515,151).52 This
almost 400 percent increase in revenues delighted executives on both sides of the Atlantic, and
despite corporate regulations limiting how much of that profit could be extracted from Germany,
it was widely hoped that it would become possible to do so within a matter of years. Again,
however, these numbers demonstrate the utter lack of economic merit in continuing to do
business in Germany. Even considering 1939’s record profits, these were only 60 percent of the
profits of 1930, what had been Ford’s peak year in Germany. In comparison to its best years,
Ford Germany’s profit figures for the mid-1930s seem almost trifling. Why would Ford
Dearborn go through all of this trouble for a paltry profit, which at its height reached just over a
half million dollars, that it could not even extract from Germany?
A similar increase could be seen in the number of vehicles sold. In 1934, the company
sold just over 10,000 vehicles; by 1938, the company had sold 36,582.53 These numbers,
however, are unimpressive as compared with Ford’s sales in the United States, which in 1938
were an estimated 598,160 vehicles.54 Again, this begs the question why Dearborn was willing
to go through all of this trouble, when Ford-Werke’s total production was just over 1/20 of what
it was in America. Ford-Werke’s 1938 performance placed it squarely in fourth place for the
sale of passenger vehicles, and a highly respectable second place behind Opel in truck sales.55
For the first time in its history, in 1938 Ford-Werke paid a dividend to its shareholders, and with
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25 percent of its business coming from government contracts, everyone was content with the
company’s success. An ambitious production program was announced for 1939, and FordWerke planned to sell 33,000 vehicles domestically and 9,000 for export.56

From Supplier to Collaborator: Building Special Trucks for Hitler
At its core, the Nazi system was a spoils system. Government contracts were decided on
the basis of contacts an organization had within the party. Some corporations, Ford-Werke
included, even went so far as to maintain these “representatives” on their company payrolls.
While the evidence is murky at best as to whether this particular individual was on the Ford
payroll, it is undisputed that Ford had such a contact. He was E.F. Podekel, a former army
officer, and his sole responsibility for the company was to “establish favorable relations with the
authorities competent for the placement of government orders.”57 Following the collapse of
merger discussions between Ford-Werke and Stoewer, Podekel played a crucial part in earning
government contracts for the company. Following the firm’s recognition in January 1937 as a
true German firm, and Dearborn’s willingness to assist its subsidiary with the raw materials
necessary for production, the first contract proposal was extended to Ford-Werke.
In June 1937, the German High Command approached Albert with a request that FordWerke begin producing trucks for the Wehrmacht.58 The official army orders (No. 689, sheet
19) were delivered and then forwarded to Dearborn for approval.59 The trucks would have a
three-ton payload, and would be produced with two overarching considerations: they would be
designed entirely by the German army, “clearly for military use”, and they would have to be
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produced at a location other than Cologne.”60 The authorities urged this production to take place
at a new facility that would be constructed in the “safe zone” near Berlin, in conjunction with the
automotive supplier Ambi-Budd.61 Albert urged Sorensen to accept this proposal, because
should the vehicles would be manufactured at the Cologne plant, the authorities would retract the
order.62 The vehicle would be called the E.B., or Einheitswagen, and would be designed for
cross-country use. Ford would have to procure parts from suppliers and assemble the unit, while
the government would provide the diesel motor for the vehicle.63 It is worth noting that this
vehicle would be completely standardized, and that Ford Motor Company would have no use for
the parts elsewhere in the world. Yet, the promise of more government work should this deal be
completed eventually induced Ford Motor Company to accept the terms of the deal.
Ford Dearborn did not approve the proposal immediately, and wavered in making a final
decision. A.M. Wibel, the Ford Dearborn Worldwide Purchasing Manager, became aware of this
plan and voiced his concerns to Albert by telephone: did this not constitute producing war
munitions for the German Army? Henry Ford’s official company policy was very clear about
providing war munitions, and while producing standard trucks of Ford design and selling them to
the government did not raise any conflicts, having the German Army design a truck and FordWerke produce it was quite a different scenario. Wibel’s anxiety prompted a cable from Albert
on December 23, 1937:
“Governmental orders do not concern war material but chassis
suitable for ambulances…they will not be used for military
purposes more than any other private car or truck
requisitioned…this governmental design standardized throughout
60
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is manufactured by all our competitors…it means enormous
progress that we are asked to participate refusal would greatly
antagonize our acceptance…”64
Wibel then delivered what a postwar investigator termed the “bombshell” cable in response:
“Ford representative helping you now would materially help
because policy not settled STOP All Ford executives thoroughly
familiar with plan…this plan NOT satisfactory STOP our people
may consider supplying technical help and financial aid to Budd
for truck unit but Ford would remain in background…If Budd were
to make this unit with our technical aid and our financial help it
seems to us that German government would obtain its
objective…Care should be exercised as to promises made
government because any final acceptable plan must be approved
here…”65
Albert was taken aback by this sudden assertion of American power. Frustrated and dejected, he
forwarded the cable to Diestel, and bemoaned the “lack of principle” in Dearborn’s decisions.66
Nevertheless, he continued to court the German High Command, inviting them to view the
proposed site and buildings in Berlin in December 1937. He was confident that he could
convince Dearborn to change its mind about the matter. The High Command approved the
cooperative venture proposed by Ford-Werke, and Albert proceeded to contact Sorensen for
approval.67 Albert asked for Sorensen’s approval in principle, and Sorensen was quick to
respond that Dearborn had no objection but wanted a definite plan in place, and that Ford-Werke
could count on Dearborn for assistance in filling orders for the government.68 It was decided that
final details for the plan could be deferred until April 1938, when Sorensen was scheduled to
visit Germany for the board meeting.
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Meanwhile, Robert Schmidt, who had been en route to Dearborn to discuss purchasing
matters (the trip was completely unrelated to the truck deal), was advised by Albert via
radiogram that he should not divulge details about the development of affairs at Cologne:

“Sor approves plan in principle for customer as well as for special
corporation. However has objections against product organization
not trained for manufacture and assembly…Believe any attempt
for further understandings concerning product would result only in
immediate restriction of principle approval…suggest for known
reasons care on your part concerning technical questions and to
avoid generally everything which might cause restrictions on
principle approval. Request address for confidential information.
Be double sure to destroy this cable.69
Schmidt followed the order, but of course the issue did not escape discussion while he was in
Dearborn. Sorensen inevitably brought up the matter at their meeting, and he proposed that they
use a slightly modified Ford chassis and build a body to government specifications. Sorensen
further communicated to Albert (through Schmidt) that he wanted to meet personally with the
German High Command during his time in Germany to finalize the plans. Sorensen also
informed Schmidt that Dearborn had no qualms with working with Ambi-Budd for completion
of the project, and went so far as to suggest a personal meeting with Ambi-Budd executives
while in Germany.
An unexpected turn of events in early 1938 would, once again, push Ford Dearborn into
the arms of the Nazis. Albert learned through his contacts in the military that a reshuffling was
taking place in the German High Command, both in terms of personnel and priorities for
manufacturers. Ford-Werke would not be compelled to provide a specially-designed crosscountry truck, as per the earlier agreement. Rather, the German Army now asked Ford-Werke to
build a command car and troop carrier, both equipped with Ford’s famous high-performance V-8
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motor.70 Burning with personal ambition and an intense desire to please the authorities, Albert
took the initiative and urged Sorensen that compliance with the new requests was a necessity for
the German business. Technically, a truck could not kill people, so Ford Dearborn was not
entirely opposed to its production, as they would have been with the production of, for example,
bullets or mines. Yet, Dearborn did have some lingering concerns about the project.
In a memorandum to Sorensen dated February 28, 1938, Albert tried to assuage
Dearborn’s concerns about the project. Going down the list of the concerns raised by Wibel and
Sorensen in the preceding months, Albert laid out the following points: “In Germany,” he wrote,
“the government completely designed its own vehicles and then had private automobile plants
produce them.” This was a response to the concern that Ford would not be able to participate in
the design process, a concern raised by Sorensen. Next, he reminded Dearborn that “According
to the official conception of the duties…of private industry, all German manufacturers are bound
to execute such orders.” With the extensive official discrimination and hardships of the mid1930s fresh on his mind, Albert hoped that Dearborn would see the wisdom of working with the
authorities: “When the authorities asked F.M.C. A.G. to do some work for them, they are doing
so on the theory that F.M.C. A.G. is a genuinely German company and has to follow suit.” Not
only was Ford-Werke obligated to fill these orders under its new status, but failing to do so
would have serious implications for the firm’s health in Germany: “A refusal…would mean
forfeiting the claim of being recognized as a German company. It would be considered as
having made this claim only in order to get all the advantages of a German company, but
refusing to shoulder the obligations.” The memo concluded by arguing that it was in the
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company’s best interests to fill the orders in a new facility in the center of the country, according
to the authorities’ wishes.71
Sorensen arrived in Germany in mid-April, 1938. During his time there, he visited the
proposed site for the joint venture with Ambi-Budd, and met with German managers from FordWerke and Budd. He was sufficiently impressed with the proposals that he decided to inform
Dearborn that they should approve the measure. He cabled to Edsel Ford on April 16 with the
positive message: “Tell EB that German plans are turning out very satisfactory [sic].”72 The
agenda for the April 20 Board Meeting of Ford-Werke had as item 5 the “Acceptance of
Governmental Orders,” and the board was to discuss it verbally at the meeting.73 A favorable
decision was reached, and it was further decided to construct the new facilities in Berlin as per
the request of the German government.74 By September of 1938, a formal lease had been signed
and cooperation with Ambi-Budd began. Ford-Werke leased the facilities and supplied
equipment, while Ambi-Budd was to provide labor and “technical assistance.”75 Following
completion of the agreement, the U.S. commercial attaché reported from Berlin that a voluntary
order had just been handed down from the German government to Ford-Werke for 3,550
trucks.76
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The factory itself would prove to be rather inconsequential for both Ford and the German
government. Production of the command car was started, but was soon changed to the Schwerer
Personenkraftwagen heavy personnel carrier, SPKW.77 Altogether, the plant ended up producing
about 1,800 of these vehicles for the Nazis: 1,072 in 1940 and 765 in the first half of 1941 before
the plant was closed permanently. The plant was also used to produce special items for the
Luftwaffe, including aircraft gears for the German firm Junkers in early 1940.78 On June 7,
1941, the plant closed for good and the lease expired, with most of the equipment being returned
to Cologne.79
Unsurprisingly, many of the details of what was being produced at the new plant were
kept from the Americans, because of the military nature of what was being produced there.
Albert and Schmidt had, unbeknownst to the Dearborn management, established a cloak firm
that produced munitions for the German army, called Arendt GmbH. Beginning in 1939 and
throughout the war, Arendt produced about 1.5 million RM worth of munitions for the
government per year. At least two Ford employees recalled facing difficulties when they tried to
establish the activities at the Berlin site. Russell Roberge remembered how “I had a good deal of
trouble getting into the place. When I did get in, I was not allowed to find out just what they
were doing there.”80 Valentine Tallberg, on assignment in Cologne from Dearborn, recalled in
his reminiscences that because he was an American and “too close to Sorensen and the people in
Dearborn,” he was not allowed access to the plant.81 As Ford Motor Company (Dearborn) was
not even consulted about the business, it cannot be held accountable for the production of these
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munitions. Whether Ford could have even done anything to stop production is questionable, but
did Dearborn know about it?
The experiences of Roberge and Tallberg raise the natural question why Ford Dearborn,
after so recently agonizing at great length over this new proposal, was willing to accept this new
state of affairs. Nowhere in the massive collection of documents established by Ford Motor
Company regarding Ford-Werke is there anything even hinting that Dearborn seemed to mind
that the German government was now dictating how they could do business in Germany.
Official claims that Ford managers in Dearborn did not know about the secret facility are called
into question by the fact that Tallberg, who worked directly under Sorensen and Edsel Ford, was
aware of it as early as 1939. Dearborn had not failed to protest the initial proposal to produce
vehicles for the regime; why their silence as they lost control over their subsidiary? Perhaps
even more importantly, where is the internal correspondence from Ford that shows how
executives felt about it? This is one of many questions that the archival record has yet to answer.

Dearborn Invades the Sudetenland
With profits spiraling and production booming, Ford-Werke was in a position to be a real
and meaningful contributor to Hitler’s war effort. A Ford-Werke manager’s report exclaimed in
late 1938 that business with the authorities had “developed extraordinarily.”82 Yet, even these
new heights for the firm did not prevent Albert from asking for help from Dearborn once more.
Demand for the Ford truck had become so insatiable that the only way to satisfy the orders from
the government would be to import trucks from America. Ford-Werke was approached by the
WiFo (Wirtchaftliche Forschungs GmbH) with a request for trucks; WiFo was a government
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purchasing company that made purchases of different vehicles and goods on behalf of the army
and other state agencies. The orders were finalized between Germany and Dearborn, and 1,000
truck cabs and platforms were delivered to Cologne.83 Ford Dearborn agreed to the deal, even
though they knew who they were for and for what they were to be used.84 Why they accepted
yet another open invitation to assist the Nazis escapes conventional explanation, and the
Research Findings report offers no answers about what was in the deal for Ford. It seems as
though by now it was almost a matter of course, and that appeasement now commanded Ford
decisions in Germany.
The arrangements were itemized in an internal Ford-Werke company memo, including
delivery schedules and suppliers who would build up the bodies. There was even a provision for
a battery exchange program so that the trucks’ American batteries (considered superior to the
German ones) could be properly charged before the trucks’ final delivery to the government.85 A
similar arrangement was brokered in late 1938 between Ford Dearborn and Ford-Werke for an
order of 1,000 trucks going to the Hungarian Defence Ministry, which by that time was a
German satellite. Those trucks were assembled and then sent to Hungary. Upon arrival, they
were converted to four-wheel drive military transport vehicles.
Schmidt recalled that there was no doubt of the final destination of these trucks: “I think
the trucks have been handed over to the army at a time when there was not enough transportation
and the Czechoslovakian crisis was just about.”86 Schmidt’s suspicions were confirmed when
the government asked them some months later for “spare parts to be shipped to places not in line
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with the original destination of the trucks, but near or for military parks.”87 Apparently, secrecy
surrounded the deal in its entirety. Deliveries were done at night and assembly was completed
by special night shifts; the normal workers at Cologne had no idea that this had happened.88
After the war, Albert told an investigator that he had not known that the trucks would be used in
the invasions, and that he felt “doublecrossed.”89 This seems doubtful, however, not only
considering Schmidt’s intuition about the final destination for these trucks, but also because
Albert would boast only a few years later how valuable these trucks had been in Hitler’s
invasions. In a 1941 letter to the Reich Commissioner for the Treatment of Enemy Property,
Albert and Schmidt reminded the Commissioner that Ford-Werke was an asset to the regime,
largely because it had successfully obtained U.S.-built Ford vehicles that had taken troops into
the Sudetenland.90
In July 1939, following the Germanization of Ford-Werke’s name, the stage was set for
Ford-Werke to supply Hitler’s war effort. Overall, Dearborn had largely acquiesced to the state
of affairs in Germany. Despite some scattered instances of protest, especially in the earlier years,
it became increasingly clear that success in Germany required teaming up with the Nazis. This
helps to explain Albert’s eagerness to placate the authorities and Dearborn’s support of Albert in
this endeavor. Once this became company policy, Ford-Werke prospered. Even though profits
could not be immediately extracted, it was widely held among all American businesses working
in Germany that it would only be a matter of time before this would be possible. Ford historian
Mira Wilkins offers the explanation that “The American companies (in Germany) acted
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irrespective of politics. Yet the political and economic life in Germany shaped their
operations.”91 In his account of the Norton Company’s activities in Germany before and during
World War II, historian Charles Cheape corroborates Wilkins’ findings, and explains why so
many businessmen felt this way:
“Leaders of American firms simply did not comprehend Hitler's
political program and largely ignored his attacks on Jews, but
many, like Thomas Watson of IBM, were “literally bewitched” by
Germany's economic possibilities. Henry Ford did not foresee war
as late as 1939. George Moffett of the Corn Products Refining
Company did not like the Reich's restrictions but admired its order
and certainty.”92
Hitler allowed the industry to realize profits, but only on his terms. In this way he crafted FordWerke and the entire industry to play a supporting role in war. Mira Wilkins’ assessment of
Ford-Werke’s status in Germany is perhaps more accurate than the Ford-Werke report published
almost 40 years later than her company history: “In the end it (Ford-Werke) became a favored
unit and, when the tocsin of war sounded, was a convenient instrument in his hands for the
prosecution of his ruthless policies.”93
Despite the assertions of Ford researcher Simon Reich, it seems as though Ford was quite
important to the Nazis in their war planning. Reich asserts that Ford was a relatively minor
operation in Germany; but if it was so minor, the Nazis surely could have exerted enough
pressure on Ford-Werke so that it would simply become unbearable to conduct business inside
the country. The reason they did not run Ford out of the country, which would have been the
logical conclusion of these discriminatory policies, was largely because of Ford’s contribution to
the German export economy. Exports were not only a vital part of Ford’s business in Germany
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but a critical lifeline of foreign exchange and raw materials for the shortage-plagued German
government. Faced with the threat of losing Ford’s international markets, the Nazis capitulated
on the export issue. Ford actually had a stronger international export market than General
Motors at the time. Even though GM exported vehicles throughout this period, Ford’s access to
dealers and marketplaces around the globe provided a valuable opportunity to collect foreign
exchange.
When Germany invaded its neighbors in late 1939 and 1940, Dearborn again did not
voice any concern. They continued business as usual, supplying Cologne with raw materials,
machinery, and vehicles as late as 1941. Even outlandish claims of a new economic order
coming out of Germany did not seem to concern anyone in the Ford organization. As Albert
wrote to Edsel Ford, “It is, of course, somewhat early to discuss what should be done after the
war…but the opinion prevails that a radical change will take place after the war economically
and the German sphere of interest will be greatly enlarged whatever the political settlement.”
His closing words were ominous: “Europe will economically form one unit and that import and
export will be possible only according to a uniform plan and that also in the motorcar business a
united program as mentioned before may have to be set up for the whole of Europe, Germany
taking the lead.”94
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Chapter 4
STRICT NEUTRALITY HAS ITS COSTS
(AND BENEFITS)
Following Germany’s invasion of Poland in 1939, Great Britain and France quickly
declared war in defense of their ally, and World War II had officially begun. The United States
was in an awkward position during the years immediately before its own entrance into the war in
late 1941. On the one hand, many Americans were isolationist in their policy views and
hesitated to become embroiled in yet another European conflict. Isolationist interest groups,
such as the America First Committee, could claim such prominent members as Charles
Lindbergh as well as Henry Ford. America Firsters and others bemoaned hostilities they saw as
fueled by business interests, and sought to create a legislative barrier preventing America’s entry
into yet another European conflict. These people firmly believed that if there even were a fullscale war (which they were adamant there would not be), it would be a quick and minor conflict.
However, it was becoming increasingly clear to President Roosevelt and the diplomatic
establishment that United States involvement in some form was inevitable. To that end,
Roosevelt encouraged American industry to produce goods to support American allies abroad,
including military material. Henry Ford despised Roosevelt on a personal level and maintained
that his company would not supply foreign governments with any kind of military aid.95
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Henry Ford was absolutely certain that there would be no war. On vacation in late
summer 1939, Ford was visiting Sudbury, Massachusetts, an outer suburb of Boston. A reporter
caught up with him, interested in Mr. Ford’s perspective on Hitler and his “threatening noises” in
Europe. “They’re all bluffing,” Ford quipped, “They don’t dare have a war and they know it.”
The aging Ford blamed the “munitions makers and profiteering financiers for the present war
clouds” and hoped that “if war does come, let them start by bombing munitions plants behind the
enemy’s lines.”96 Ford was never known for his foreign policy acumen, but he really missed the
mark on his analysis, because four days after his interview, Hitler’s tanks rolled into Poland.
When he got back to Detroit the next week, he confided to his personal friend, John Dykema,
that “there hasn’t been a shot fired, and the whole thing has just been made up by Jew
bankers.”97 Even a month into the conflict, Ford continued in his ranting diatribes against the
outbreak of conflict. He told an American Legion conference in Chicago that “if I were put on
the stand today, I’d say there isn’t any war. The whole idea is to get us into it and make it a
war.”98 Perhaps intentionally, Ford’s ramblings, and his consequent application of this
reactionary philosophy to company policy, would greatly benefit his European subsidiaries and
their business standing with the Nazis.

“A Feather in our Cap”
On May 28, 1940, President Roosevelt took a further step towards preparing the United
States for hostilities. Roosevelt appointed the president of General Motors, William S. Knudsen,
to be the Commissioner for Industrial Production.99 The purpose of this new position was
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mobilizing American business for the production of military materials for the American military,
to strengthen American core defenses which had been neglected in the inter-war years. Despite
his general disdain for Roosevelt, Henry Ford especially liked Knudsen and his idea of using
production-line methods to produce airplanes. Ford boldly proclaimed that his company could
produce 1,000 planes a day if properly equipped.100 The words reverberated across the country
and made headlines around the world. No one could even fathom such a number, but the general
reaction to Ford was that if the mass-production genius said he could do it, why not believe him?
After all, “miracles of manufacturing were his business.”101
Henry Ford’s outlandish claim delighted Knudsen and Roosevelt in Washington. Ford’s
extreme pacifism had raised doubt about his willingness to apply his company’s industrial might
to the task of producing military supplies, so they were relieved to learn that he was amenable to
cooperation. Edsel Ford was dispatched to Washington to meet with government
representatives, and it was tentatively agreed that Ford Motor Company would produce 9,000
Rolls-Royce Merlin engines for a government contract. 6,000 engines would be sold to the
British Royal Air Force for the modernization of its aging fleet, and 3,000 would be sold to the
U.S. Air Corps.102 Henry Ford agreed to the offer, and the British were informed.
The message was delivered to Lord Beaverbrook, who was Winston Churchill’s new
Minister of Aircraft production. He served a role like Knudsen’s in England, with a specific
emphasis on building up the Royal Air Force.103 Flawed intelligence that had been delivered to
the U.S. and Great Britain greatly exaggerated the size and capabilities of Hitler’s Luftwaffe, so
there was a sense of urgency in Beaverbrook’s task. Yet, despite impressive managerial skills,
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Beaverbrook lacked much in the way of tact. Without the slightest bit of hesitation, he proudly
told the British press that Ford had agreed to supply 6,000 engines directly to the British
government. For the record, Beaverbrook’s statement was factually incorrect. American defense
spending would pay for these engines, not the British, and the engines would be delivered via the
U.S. government; for technical purposes, Ford had been dealing entirely with Americans.104
Despite the inaccuracy, the damage had been done.
Two days later, Henry Ford changed his mind. He would not produce the engines for
Britain after all. He had not clearly understood the agreement. The ailing seventy-seven year
old was in a fragile state of health and mental capacity, and the stroke that he had suffered two
years earlier was taking its toll. He was constantly on edge, and his fear of America entering the
war at the hands of President Roosevelt (“an apostle of involvement,” he called him) bordered on
outright paranoia. Any mention of participation to Ford “upset him almost to incoherence.”105
Charles Sorensen later remarked that “The Beaver’s statement was different from the way he
[Ford] saw it and he made a public denial.”106
Ford announced publicly that “we are not doing business with the British or any other
foreign government. If we make 6,000 Rolls-Royce Merlin engines, it will be on an order from
the United States government.”107 Even Charles Sorensen, Ford’s “right-hand man,” was unable
to comprehend the sudden reversal, nor was he able to change Ford’s mind. Sorensen recalled a
meeting when Knudsen flew to Detroit for a meeting with Edsel and Henry Ford. Knudsen
reminded Ford that he had given his word to make the engines, and Ford stubbornly replied, “We
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won’t build the engine at all, withdraw the whole order. Take it to someone else. Let them build
the engine, we won’t.”108 Knudsen was at a loss as to why Ford had reneged, and he told
reporters that “I was assured by Mr. Edsel Ford, president, that this arrangement was
satisfactory.” He added that “it was made plain that 60 percent of the order for Rolls-Royce
engines was for the Allies and the rest for the United States government.”109
Ford came under a firestorm of criticism for his decision, both from the press as well as
members of the public eager to help American allies. Many letters are still retained today,
accusing Ford of being a “back-stabbing American” and a “pal of Hitler.”110 Eventually, Ford
would relent enough to allow his subsidiary firms to produce engines for the British. Using the
London Daily Mail as his mouthpiece, Ford published an editorial in which he granted his
subsidiaries the right to produce material for the British military, while stopping short of
apologizing for his own actions:
“Ford Motor Canada and England are using their facilities to the
utmost for production of military equipment for defense of the
British Empire and will continue to serve their countries as they
should do. While I am against war nevertheless I believe our
facilities in America should be preserved for American defense
when and if so required.”111
Strangely, neither the arrangement that sent Dearborn-produced trucks to Germany or FordWerke’s activities in filling orders for the German government were mentioned in this editorial.
Meanwhile, when German officials had caught wind of the agreement that Henry Ford
had purportedly reached with the British government, they immediately put pressure on FordWerke. An angry cable to Heinrich Albert at Ford-Werke demanded to know how Henry Ford, a
friend of the Nazis and an enemy of the Jews, could supply one of Germany’s foes. In an ironic
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twist of fate, Cologne was now being held responsible for the actions of Dearborn, its parent
company. Albert assured the Nazis that “These kinds of rumors always come up. We assume
that they originate with American competitors who are uncomfortable with Henry Ford’s stance.
They have always been proven wrong…the rumor is refuted in detail.”112 The Nazis were
concerned that Ford was playing both sides of the conflict, and needed more assurance that this
was not the case. Their piece of mind would come only a few weeks later.
In mid-July, Henry Ford received a special visit from a German Embassy commercial
attaché named Gerhart Alois Westrick. Such a meeting was not unusual in and of itself, but the
circumstances surrounding Westrick’s visit were quite suspicious. The FBI, which had been
watching Ford’s factory for years, thought it odd that Westrick came only two weeks after Henry
Ford’s very loud refusal to produce the Rolls-Royce engines. J. Edgar Hoover personally
forwarded the information to Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau:
“Information has been received that on or about July 11, 1940 Dr.
Gerhart Alois Westrick, Commercial attaché of the German
Embassy Washington D.C., conferred with Mr. Henry Ford of
Detroit, Michigan in an endeavor to persuade Mr. Ford to use his
influence in keeping the United States and the Government thereof
from furnishing any materials of war to Great Britain. Westrick
stated that if the source of Britain’s war supply were cut off,
particularly from the United States, the war would be over in
ninety days or by September, adding if the United States furnished
Great Britain with war supplies, it would only prolong the
inevitable, the defeat of England.”113
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What the FBI did not know about Westrick was that he was the legal partner of Heinrich Albert,
Chairman of Ford-Werke’s board. His firm handled Ford’s legal business in Germany, and
technically, that made Westrick Ford’s attorney.114
While official sources indicate that Ford simply dismissed Westrick and that their
meeting was inconsequential, there remains a lingering question about the real content of their
conversation. Is it possible that Westrick, in his capacity as Albert’s partner, informed Ford
about the fallout of Dearborn’s decisions for the German subsidiary? Could Westrick have told
Ford that as long as Dearborn refused to supply the allied forces, the military contracts would
continue for Ford-Werke in Germany? As it would turn out, Ford’s refusal to produce these
engines would prove to be a saving grace of sorts for the company. In a memo to Robert
Schmidt, Heinrich Albert commented that “it seems to me as a feather in our cap that the Ford
Corporation is not producing outright war material.”115 Later correspondence between Dearborn
and Ford France revealed that there was a direct economic benefit for the company in terms of
German government orders. Henry Ford’s “neutrality” earned the praise of German military and
civilian officials alike, and predisposed Nazi officials to place orders with Ford.
Indeed, the refusal to produce the engines was highly irrational; Henry Ford jeopardized
lucrative future U.S. government contracts and, by turning down the deal, denied his company
millions of dollars. From a business standpoint, this was not a sound decision. However, this
would not be the first time that, when dealing with the delicate issue of Dearborn-German
relations, such a questionable decision was made. One has only to look at the raw materials
agreements of the late 1930s to see other examples where political expediency trumped the
bottom line. Crossing the United States government, however, elevated Ford’s highly irrational
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behavior to an entirely different level. There was absolutely nothing for Ford to gain by going
back on the plane engine deal. Were Ford’s anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi sentiments behind his
quick change of heart? It is at least highly plausible, if not certain, that Henry Ford had the
Germans in mind when he refused to follow through with a deal that would have brought
guaranteed and direct profits that did not have to be extracted from a hostile foreign government
to the American firm. Henry Ford did not seem to care.

Loyal to Henry Ford and the Third Reich
As the orders from the Nazis poured in, Cologne reveled in growing profit margins and
higher production numbers. Ford-Werke produced 25,745 vehicles in 1939. An overall
slowdown in the industry halved total vehicle production in Germany in 1940, from 352,533
units in 1939 to 155,449. However, despite producing about 8,000 less vehicles in 1940, FordWerke’s market share jumped up over 4 percent, to 11.29 percent.116 In addition, Ford-Werke
had received contracts not only for more trucks but for other special equipment. In June 1940,
following Henry Ford’s refusal to produce engines for the British, Goering’s air office contacted
Ford-Werke about producing 8,000 V-8 motors for barges, presumably to be used in the invasion
of Great Britain.117 Ford-Werke accepted the deal without delay.
As Henry Ford preached about the value of isolationism in America, Ford-Werke and
Ford-Werke management were growing similarly bold in their own actions and rhetoric in
support of the regime. In April 1939, on the heels of renewed raw materials agreements and
Dearborn’s provision of trucks to the German government, Ford-Werke joined other German
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corporations in donating large sums of money to Hitler’s 50th Birthday Fund. A memo was
circulated to the entire Ford-Werke Board, which at this time still included Charles Sorensen and
Edsel Ford. Ford-Werke was thanked for its generous donation of 35,000 RM, or about
$14,000.118 This amount barely dented Ford-Werke’s net profit for 1939, at 1,287,877RM (or
about $515,150); however, why would Ford Motor Company permit the spending of its own
funds in this way?119 Of course, there were the overriding restrictions on profit extraction, but
this fails to explain why profits would be spent in this way (and not, for example, on plant
upgrades). A better response is that this action was totally consistent with Ford’s prior behavior
dealings with the Nazi regime. Throughout the 1930s, Ford-Werke was constantly seeking the
affection of a wholly unpredictable regime, a regime that could turn on it the very next day. It
was also in line with Ford-Werke’s (and Ford Motor Company’s) willingness to make monetary
sacrifices for the sake of the firm’s health and standing in Germany, in much the same spirit as
the raw material agreements – which raises even more puzzling questions.
A decidedly nationalist tone pervaded many speeches and internal documents at FordWerke during this time as well, marking a noticeable departure from the past for company
executives. Henry Ford had turned seventy-seven in July 1940. To commemorate this
achievement, the in-house newspaper of Ford-Werke published a long article praising Ford for
his achievements and personal character. Very subtly, however, the article hints at why Ford
was really admired in Germany. “In the excitement of the political hustle and bustle in North
America, one personality stands out who as an “Ur”-American cannot be accused of a hint of
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alien influence: Henry Ford.”120 This seems fairly innocuous, but a translator’s note calls
attention to such a characterization: “the prefix “ur” = archetype was used by Nazi propaganda to
indicate purity of race, e.g., without a trace of Jewish blood.” The article continued, praising the
way Henry Ford “understood how to control money and use it constructively.”121 During the
1920s, Henry Ford spent hundreds of thousands of his own money running his Dearborn
Independent newspaper (an anti-Semitic newspaper with weekly articles, features, and interviews
about Jewish control of society) and supporting the worldwide publishing of The International
Jew, a staple pamphlet of anti-Semitic propaganda. Did disseminating hate constitute a
“constructive” use of funds?
This 1940 Ford-Werke article also hailed Ford’s devotion to principles in line with those
in Germany at the time. “His principles touch upon one of the fundamental problems of human
society: not unlimited individualism, not brutal greed for profit can create wealth and
contentedness on a large and sustainable base, but rather the initiative of each individual. No one
is able to understand this viewpoint better than we Germans.”122 Ford’s own apprehension about
the direction of his country – one that created a “soulless, restless race” – was supposedly a
sentiment shared by the German population. German propaganda touted a return to prosperity
and emphasized the importance of shunning the “urban culture” that afflicted America. In this
company newspaper, Henry Ford’s life became a legitimizing force for Nazi racial politics!
Where was the resistance to German ideology that Albert had promised Dearborn years earlier?
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Albert’s assertion that “we have been loyal in both directions” demonstrates exactly how
business was then conducted in Germany.123
Ford executives began to noticeably change their personal behaviors as well. American
manager V.Y. Tallberg, who had been stationed at Cologne on behalf of Dearborn, recalled
noticing a change in the behavior of Robert Schmidt during these years after the outbreak of war.
“Schmidt had always appeared anti-Nazi before the war but now he changed.” Now, Schmidt
boasted of taking spare parts from France to Germany and of how, after the war was over, “they
would all be taking orders from us, including Dearborn.” 124 In a provocative speech entitled,
“We Follow the Call,” Schmidt attempted to inspire Ford-Werke employees to continue their
commitment to Hitler’s cause: “It is our task to provide a sufficient number of reliable
vehicles…our work is connected to the achievements of our soldiers and how we must dedicate
ourselves completely above our personal desires.” He continued: “The front and its supply with
all that it requires depends on our work. This is why we are subject to the same law as our
comrades at the front; we too are soldiers of our Fuhrer.”125
In order to insure that this message spread beyond the factory floor and into the general
population, Ford-Werke took out a large advertisement in the Frankfurt Zeitung newspaper.
Ford vehicles, the ad claimed, had been present during all of the recent major Army campaigns,
in Poland, Norway, Belgium, Holland, and France. “German Ford vehicles were the dependable
servants of the brave soldier,” announced the ad.126 This sentiment was echoed by Robert
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Schmidt as he addressed Ford-Werke workers in December 1941. Just days before the ruthless
bombing at Pearl Harbor, Schmidt extolled the accomplishments of Ford-Werke in the past year:
“At the beginning of this year, we vowed to give our best and
utmost for final victory, in unshakeable faithfulness to our Fuhrer.
Today we say with pride that we have succeeded…at the end of the
year let us vow our Fuhrer that in the plant community of Ford he
will find a group that is always willing and able to put all its efforts
into their part for final victory.”127

Special Treatment
By October 1940, the landscape had changed dramatically in Europe. Germany had
rolled into France only a few months earlier in Ford trucks, and France succumbed to the
German offensive in June. The Allies were devastated as a mass evacuation was needed to
rescue hundreds of thousands of French and British troops from the beaches at Dunkirk. Tens of
thousands of vehicles and countless amounts of supplies had to be left behind, all to be captured
by the advancing German army. Immediately following the fall of France, the Nazis decreed
that Ford-Werke would now control all of the Ford subsidiaries in the newly occupied zones –
factories that until weeks earlier had been producing vehicles for the defense of France, Belgium,
and the other fallen states. When the smoke finally cleared, Hitler controlled Western Europe’s
entire strategic industrial capacity, and he had every intention of utilizing it fully. All of Ford’s
subsidiaries came under the control of Ford-Werke, and Robert Schmidt was appointed
commissioner of the new combined industrial venture to the benefit of Hitler. Meanwhile, Ford
Dearborn continued to supply occupied Belgium, The Netherlands, and Denmark with spare
parts until 1941. Ford should have been neutral if its repudiation of the British engine contract
was sincerely based on company policy not to supply belligerents. Ford’s decision to supply its
subsidiaries for an entire year after the engine fiasco is demonstrative of its insincerity, and
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suggested other motives for turning down the contract. Those spare parts that were delivered
from Dearborn were then used in the assembly of vehicles being directly delivered to Hitler’s
armies.
Common practice in Germany following the quick defeat of its neighbors was to install a
Nazi or high-ranking German official to control industries and individual factories in foreign
countries. The Nazis reasoned that this was the best way to maintain a compliant industrial core
that was crucial to filling their war material demands. For Ford-Werke, however, a special
exemption was once again granted to the company. Robert Schmidt, an insider, was granted the
right to administer all of these Ford plants.128 Control of the foreign subsidiaries was crucial, lest
each firm “fight for its individual existence.”129 The Nazis conceded this point to Ford-Werke.
Once the United States entered the war, the question of custodianship re-surfaced once
more, although posed in slightly different terms. Now that America was at war with Germany,
Ford-Werke was technically classified as enemy property. Following the outbreak of war, over
250 American firms still had operations inside Germany, with total assets of about 450 million
dollars. Tiny Ford ranked only 16th in total investment, with 1.9 percent of total American assets
in Germany.130 Many of these firms had their factories absorbed into the huge governmentowned Hermann Goering Werke. Even Opel, long the darling of the regime, had its major
Rüsselheim and Brandenburg plants seized by the state, to be run by military officials, in order to
better integrate production with the needs of the German wartime economy.131 Ford-Werke was
somehow spared the brunt of the reorganization. How can this be explained, especially in light
of Ford Motor Company’s claims that Ford-Werke was inconsequential and disposable for the
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authorities? Firms much more meaningful to the German economy were taken over without a
second thought. Why this special treatment?
Albert wrote a compelling memorandum to the Nazi authorities, encouraging them to
allow Ford-Werke to retain its own management. He argued that, with Dearborn’s assistance,
Ford-Werke had helped the Nazi war machine tremendously. Raw materials were obtained for
the entire industry through Ford’s international connections, and at the outbreak of war, “FordWerke placed themselves immediately at the disposal of the military for armament purposes.”
The protection afforded Ford-Werke in global markets through brand association had opened up
export opportunities, and after the war the company would be “of inestimable value.”132 With
military victories coming every day for the emboldened German army, the Nazis were perhaps
especially swayed by the immediate timeframe of Albert’s final argument. If the war was won
soon, even before American involvement, burning the friendly bridge to the parent company
would be detrimental for German postwar industrial production. Retaining American majority
ownership at Ford-Werke, wrote Albert, “is essential for the – actually free – transmittal of the
newest American models was well as for the insight into American production and sales
methods. Since Americans are without a doubt particularly progressive in this field, maintaining
this connection is in the German interest.”133 Once more, Ford-Werke’s connections with
Dearborn worked to the advantage of the company with regard to state-firm relations.
As persuasive as he might have been, Albert was not the only reason that the firm was
spared the worst of the reorganization following the outbreak of war. Investigative journalist
Max Wallace isolates another key reason for Ford-Werke’s unique status in Germany, namely,
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its highly placed connections. Contrary to the claims of Simon Reich’s Research Findings, Ford
was not a second-rate automotive manufacturer but one with very powerful people advocating
for its interests. Replacing Carl Bosch on the Ford-Werke Board of Directors when he passed
away was Carl Krauch. He was the chairman of I.G. Farben and a board member of FordWerke. It is worth mentioning that he was appointed with the full knowledge and consent of
Dearborn. What he told American investigators after the war goes far in explaining why FordWerke maintained relative independence when other companies were unceremoniously
requisitioned. When testifying about his involvement with Ford-Werke, he remarked that
“I myself knew Henry Ford and admired him. I went to see
Goering personally about that. I told Goering that I myself knew
his son Edsel, too, and I told Goering that if we took Ford
independence away from them in Germany, it would aggrieve
friendly relations with American industry in the future. I counted
on a lot of success for the adaptation of American methods in
Germany’s industries, but that could be done only in friendly
cooperation. Goering listened to me and then he said, “I agree. I
shall see to it that the German Ford Company will not be
incorporated in the Hermann Goering Company.” So I participated
regularly in the supervisory board meetings to inform myself about
the business processes of Henry Ford, and, if possible, to take a
stand for the Henry Ford Works after the war had begun. Thus, we
succeeded in keeping the Ford Works working and operating
independently of our government’s seizure.”134
Krauch is just one example of a powerful member of Ford-Werke’s board who worked to protect
the company interests. But his experience is emblematic of not only the way business was
conducted in Germany – by way of personal favors – but also of the highly regard for Henry
Ford in German political circles. He would prove invaluable for the company’s health in
Germany.

Fully Informed
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Having been briefed by Gerhart Westrick in July and being an avid reader of newspapers,
Edsel Ford had at least a perfunctory understanding of the situation in Europe and of the grim
outlook for America’s allies. In September 1940, V.Y. Tallberg returned to Dearborn
permanently from Cologne, on the advice of the American Consul in Germany. Tallberg briefed
Charles Sorensen and Edsel Ford fully upon his return, and he subsequently briefed the FBI
about the situation as well: “When I left Germany, they told me to tell the people in Dearborn
how conditions were and what we were doing in the plant. There wasn’t anything unusual about
it. It was just a regular report telling what was going on.”135 With these facts in mind, and
knowing that he understood the geopolitical situation, it becomes even tougher to understand
Edsel Ford’s comments in a letter to Albert, dated October 10, 1940:
“We have a fairly complete impression of the present status of the
Ford Companies in Germany as well as the other occupied
territories. It is quite evident and very gratifying that you and your
organization are looking after our interests successfully and we
appreciate your efforts on our behalf. I am glad to hear that the
outside plants are beginning to operate, as it is the only way for
rehabilitation to take place, and after all there are many people
financially interested in these properties besides ourselves.
Anything that can be done constructively to keep these plants in
operation will be a great help for the future.”
These comments raise several haunting questions. Knowing how Ford facilities would be
used, and keeping in line with the official Ford policy of not supplying belligerent powers, why
was there no protest over returning these factories to active duty serving the Nazi war machine?
Less than six months before, Ford Motor Company absolutely refused to supply the British, an
ally of the United States, with aircraft engines. How could Ford explain directly supplying a
different belligerent, Germany? Taken at his word that he was aware of the situation, Edsel Ford
must have been cognizant of developments in Ford’s European business that not only violated
135
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company policy but also went directly against the strategic interests of the United States. In spite
of that, rather than divest and lose profits, Ford Motor Company instead opted to stay and reap
the benefits of rearming a belligerent regime. However, even with this in mind, it remains hard
to fathom why Ford was willing to make such risky business decisions for the small profits that
they could not even get out of Germany. Even the profit motive lacks enough explanatory power
for the strange behavior of Ford Dearborn during these years.
It is entirely conceivable that Edsel Ford was kept up to date on European affairs, right up
until the United States entered the war. In total, between 1938 and 1941, over 180 letters were
exchanged between Dearborn and Cologne.136 In earlier years, more substantial letters about the
state of affairs were exchanged, and in later years the communication became more skeletal.
Ford Motor Company claims that following the outbreak of war in 1939, communications
became more restricted. Albert wrote in September 1939 that new government laws prohibited
“giving information to foreigners, even if and when they belong to the organization of the
company as members of the board or as shareholders…we practically have to confine ourselves
to the most important items of the balance sheet.”137 However, as late as 1940 or 1941, Ford
manager Erhard Vitger from Ford-Werke was still holding meetings with English, Danish, and
Swedish Ford officials in neutral Sweden. The complexities of the conflict had pitted FordWerke against Ford Britain, but both could still openly communicate with Dearborn at this time.
At the meeting, Vitger recalled, a souvenir photograph was taken of the group, in which the men
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“jokingly raised their arms in a Heil Hitler salute.” When the American authorities saw the
picture after the war, Vitger had some “awkward questions to answer.”138
Albert’s claim about “restricting communication to the balance sheet” does not appear to
be entirely correct, and throughout 1940 and 1941, letters arrived in Dearborn about less pressing
issues. In May 1940, Albert wrote to Edsel that he wanted to extend Ford-Werke’s board
membership to some new German industrial leaders, so that the German company could be
“prepared for all emergencies.” He continued, stressing that this matter “certainly can wait”
pending further correspondence with Dearborn.139 This hardly seemed like an urgent matter.
Similarly, in July 1940, Albert wrote to Edsel Ford asking for permission to hire his son to work
at Cologne.140 In a lengthy letter from April 1941, Albert explained that a new agreement that
had been reached with the authorities in which Ford Dearborn’s dividends could be used for an
increase of capitalization at Ford-Werke. The agreement also called for the authorities to get a
larger portion of raw materials which Dearborn was still supplying to its subsidiary. Such an
agreement, Albert assured Dearborn, was in the interests of FMC Detroit.141 In short, it seemed
as though information, while somewhat restricted, still passed freely between Cologne and
Dearborn.

“The Best of Difficult Circumstances”
Even if direct U.S.-German contact was limited (and it remains open to question whether
this was truly the case) Ford Dearborn was still regularly updated by its French subsidiary, which
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was headquartered in neutral Vichy France. Manager Maurice Dollfuss was a personal friend of
Edsel Ford and the two men had vacationed together in the past. It comes as little surprise, then,
that the communication between the two is more open than might even be expected. The letters
sent by Dollfuss to Dearborn are not only of a personal nature – inquiring about families and the
like – but also discussed business matters in great detail. Since the outbreak of the war in 1939,
French Ford (hereafter Ford SAF) had been producing vehicles for the French army. Following
the fall of France in 1940, the French subsidiary now came under the influence of Ford-Werke in
Germany, and Ford-Werke sought to integrate the French operation into the single Ford unit
planned by Schmidt. Dollfuss resisted this control and persuaded the German authorities to
allow the French firm to remain independent. Following the fall of France, Dollfuss revealed
that “the importance of the French Ford enterprise became obvious,” and that the firm’s
reputation was even higher than before the war began. The correspondence between Dollfuss
and Dearborn paints a picture of a subsidiary that was making handsome profits by supplying the
German military, and a parent company supportive the entire time.
Dollfuss sent a 10-page report to Dearborn on July 19, 1940 about the status of the
French company under the occupation, only a month after Henry Ford’s refusal to produce the
Rolls-Royce engines. Profits were “brilliant” and “we have delivered considerable quantities of
spare parts to the German Authorities…we have delivered quite a number of trucks and
passenger cars…from which we have received bonds.”142 Mindful of official censorship,
Dollfuss cleverly relayed to Dearborn that special treatment was afforded to Ford SAF: “We
shall have the best protection that can be obtained for a purely French concern…we will benefit
from the main fact of being a member of the Ford family which entitles us to better treatment
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from our German colleagues…the damage for us is hence much smaller than in any other
company.”143 Later, Dollfuss would confirm that compared with other French manufacturers
Renault and Citroen, Ford SAF was prospering because of its connections. Those firms only had
sales of 20 percent of what they had been before the war, and the advantage of being a member
of the “Ford family” was a tangible benefit that was encouraging sales.144 Upon hearing this
news, Edsel Ford was most congratulatory towards Dollfuss for his efforts: “I think this is a
remarkable achievement in view of the difficulties that are present at this time. I also appreciate
your great effort to keep the organizations intact and desire to produce something…You are
doing a fine job in cooperating with the other companies…”145 Ford of France was encouraged
to cooperate with other European operations to fill the orders of Hitler, while Ford Dearborn
refused to cooperate with its own subsidiaries to fill an order for the British.
Ford SAF was highly regarded by German military and political officials. Dollfuss was
personally invited to Berlin in August 1940 to meet with General Von Schell, who managed the
German auto industry; he was “the first Frenchman to visit Berlin.”146 Apparently Dollfuss
requested the meeting, “in order to safeguard our interests…I have been to Berlin and seen
General Von Schell himself, who is the highest executive responsible for the motor industry both
from the military and civilian points of view.” His meeting was fruitful, as he reported to Edsel
Ford that Ford SAF had been granted the authority to send an emissary from France to meet with
executives in Dearborn, so that business matters could be discussed in greater detail than was
allowed by correspondence. Moreover, Ford SAF was given permission to introduce a new 4143

NARA, RG 131, Entry 247, Box 131, Foreign Funds Control Memo by J. John Lawler, U.S. Treasury
Department, 1943, p. 23.
144
NARA, RG 131, Entry 247, Box 131, Foreign Funds Control Memo by J. John Lawler, U.S. Treasury
Department, 1943, p. 31.
145
NARA, RG 131, Entry 247, Box 131, Foreign Funds Control Memo by J. John Lawler, U.S. Treasury
Department, 1943, p. 30.
146
NARA, RG 131, Entry 247, Box 131, Foreign Funds Control Memo by J. John Lawler, U.S. Treasury
Department, 1943, p. 27.

122
cylinder model in France, and that “we will be the only ones permitted to get ready with a new
model.” Perhaps most noteworthy about this communication, however, was that Dollfuss
provided a subtle indication that Henry Ford’s policy of “neutrality” was producing tangible
financial benefits for the French firm (and its majority stakeholder, Dearborn): “My interview
with him has been by all means satisfactory, and that the attitude you have taken together with
your father of strict neutrality has been an invaluable asset for the protection of your companies
in Europe.”147 This was reiterated in a personal letter addressed to Edsel Ford that arrived with
Dollfuss’ assistant, Georges Lesto, in November 1940, when he was sent to brief the American
company about the situation in France. “At this stage I would like to outline the importance
attached by high officials to respect the desires and maintain the good will of “Ford” – and by
“Ford,” I mean your father, yourself, and the Ford Motor Company, Dearborn.”148 It seems quite
clear that Ford SAF enjoyed a level of independence unheard of in Nazi Germany, let alone the
Nazi-occupied zones.
Dollfuss was hardly exaggerating the growing profitability when he mentioned the
“brilliant” profits. Ford SAF’s business was prospering and supplying the needs of the German
military proved to be a valuable income stream. In August 1940, Dollfuss wrote to Edsel Ford
that the situation was progressing positively, and production was expected to hit twenty trucks
per day, which was better than “our less fortunate French competitors are doing. The reason is
that our trucks are in very large demand by the German authorities and I believe that as long as
the war goes on and at least for some period of time all that we shall produce will be taken by the
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German authorities.”149 Edsel Ford was directly informed that the French subsidiary was not
only supplying but profiting from working with the German authorities and supplying a
belligerent nation – exactly what Ford Dearborn had so loudly refused to do only two months
earlier. Yet, not one word of disapproval came from Dearborn. By the first of August 1940,
Ford France had accrued a profit of 1,600,000 francs – or about $64,000.150 The following
months would prove even more lucrative. In November of 1940, a detailed financial statement
for Ford SAF arrived in Dearborn, and the report was explicit in its content. By October 1940,
total vehicle deliveries to the German authorities were 5,645. Total business thus far had
amounted to 34,000,000 francs ($1,360,000).151 There seems to be quite a bit of disagreement
between profit figures and credit balances to the American company. Numbers cited by
company officials, U.S. Government investigators, and Ford account books do not match. Some
of this has been attributed to accounting irregularities and exchange rate errors. Part can also be
explained by the deliberate attempt by Dollfuss to minimize the appearance of profitability, so
that the company would pay less tax. Knowing the exact amount is not necessary, but it is worth
noting that profits were indeed soaring under German occupation, and Dearborn was well aware
of that fact.
Dearborn’s responses to Dollfuss’ numerous updates are quite telling in company
attitudes about the business being done there. If Ford Dearborn was truly fully informed about
the nature of sales, it might be expected that it would raise objections to supplying the German
military as it did with Britain. However, as was the case with Germany, there is no evidence that
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any objections were voiced. In fact, Dearborn was even more congratulatory towards Ford SAF,
applauding the progress being made. In its first documented response to Dollfuss’ report since
the beginning of occupation, Dearborn acknowledged receiving his report. Charles Sorensen
wrote that “we are pleased to learn from your letter of July 18th, which we received and read very
carefully, that our organization is going along, and the victors are so tolerant in their treatment.
It looks as though we still might have a business that we can carry on in spite of all the
difficulties.”152 Six months later, Edsel penned a note to Dollfuss which was sent back with
Dollfuss’ assistant, Georges Lesto: “We are very proud of the record that you and your associates
have made in building the company up to its first great position under such circumstances.”153
The archival record is brimming with examples of such responses on behalf of Dearborn. Pride
seems like a strange response to an open violation of company policy.
Ford Dearborn’s relationship with its French subsidiary took on special importance
during the height of the war. While it is technically outside of the scope of this thesis, a cursory
mention of what prompted the “Lawler Report” is worth mentioning. In the Spring of 1943,
Department of Justice investigators arrived in Dearborn unannounced, demanding to review
Ford’s correspondence with its French subsidiary since the outbreak of war. Much of the
seventy page report included the correspondence mentioned above, but it also examined
communication since the entrance of the U.S. in the war. In blatant violation of the Trading with
the Enemy Act, Dearborn had secretly been communicating, via neutral Vichy France, with
Dollfuss at Ford headquarters in occupied France. As late as July 1942, eight months after the
U.S. declared war on Germany, Edsel Ford replied to one of Dollfuss’ letters that “I have shown
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your letter to my father and to Mr. Sorensen, and they both join me in sending best wishes for
you and your staff, and the hope that you will continue to carry on the good work that you are
doing.”154 Was this the good work of using Ford vehicles to transport German troops to the front
lines against Allied troops?
It was also discovered that Ford Dearborn was advised of Ford SAF’s final sales numbers
for 1941, which totaled 58,000,000 francs ($2,320,000). In light of these stratospheric profits
from France alone (not even including the business of Ford-Werke in Cologne), it almost makes
sense from a business standpoint why Henry Ford would turn down the British engine contract,
but this explanation does not hold up under scrutiny. The engine deal which was undoubtedly
worth millions, combined with the good will that supplying a U.S. ally would have generated;
why would Ford choose instead to solicit good will from the Nazi authorities, who still had every
cent of Ford’s profit locked in block accounts? Edsel Ford wrote that he was “gratified to hear
of the financial results, which seems to me an excellent showing considering the
circumstances.”155 No charges were ever formally levied by the Justice Department against
Ford, most notably because of Edsel Ford’s untimely death in 1943 and because most of the
communication had been before December 1941. Upon his death, it was also quickly realized
that bringing Ford Motor Company to trial would be impossible due to lack of evidence.156
The investigation and subsequent report outlining the case against Edsel Ford and the
violation of the Trading With the Enemy Act was led by Treasury Department investigator John
Lawler. The “Lawler Report,” as it became known, crossed the desks of many people in the
intelligence community and in the legislative and executive branches of government. The report
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was read by Henry Morgenthau, U.S. Treasury Secretary, and even Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
While it was never made public, the Justice Department was ready to bring a case against Edsel
Ford. Morgenthau called the report “amazing and shocking” when he forwarded it along to the
president.157 This bombshell of a report was all but ignored in Research Findings, and Simon
Reich and his team offer no explanation why Edsel Ford should not have been charged with and
convicted of breaking a law on par with treason.
There are some striking similarities between Dearborn’s communications with FordWerke and Ford SAF. In both cases, efforts to cooperate were applauded and encouraged. Not
one hint of resistance can be found in the lengthy correspondence between Ford Dearborn and
either of its two main continental European subsidiaries. Ford Dearborn maintained that it had
an accurate and detailed impression of business operations for both of them. This means that it is
certain that Ford Dearborn was aware of the fact that its continental European subsidiaries were
supplying Hitler in one form or another and that they were realizing massive profits from
working with the regime. While it is true that Edsel Ford’s cordial approval of the way business
was being conducted might be dismissed as a formal show of politeness, it seems as though there
were meanings behind those words. While each letter in isolation was vague and ambiguous
enough to escape detection, when taken as an aggregate, the body of communication between
Dearborn and its foreign subsidiaries constituted a genuine endorsement of activities. Had there
been any instance of resistance or disapproval, it is quite possible that these letters could in fact
be dismissed as innocuous. The absence of resistance, however, is quite damning for the case
against Ford’s complicity in assisting the Nazi war effort. It hardly seems, as Simon Reich
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concludes, that Dearborn “was often ill-informed” about activities in Germany.158 While this
could plausibly extend to include the secret munitions operations instituted by Schmidt and
Albert, at least in a general business sense, Ford Dearborn had full knowledge up until the end of
1941, and even after, of its subsidiaries’ performance.
This is an appropriate point to bring up another problematic flaw in Research Findings,
namely, that it was based only on available documents. A major caveat to its claims about what
Ford knew, of course, is that there are only 180 examples of surviving letters, cables, etc.,
remaining in the Ford archives which can be used to ascertain knowledge. Determining how
much of the wartime communication is actually missing is not possible. Moreover, it is wellknown that Ford often destroyed internal company documents. For example, most of the
documents related to the Dearborn Independent, Henry Ford’s personal newspaper that he used
to disseminate anti-Semitic propaganda, have been destroyed (or “missing,” in official company
language). Former Chrysler chairman Lee Iacocca, who was responsible for sales successes such
as the 1965 Ford Mustang, remembered in his autobiography that document destruction was a
common occurrence at Ford: “Henry [Henry Ford II] used to boast that he never kept any files.
Every now and then he would burn his papers. He told me, ‘That stuff can only hurt you. Some
day you could be crucified for keeping all that stuff.”159 It’s entirely plausible that some of the
more incriminating communications have been lost forever.

Henry Ford’s Reward: War Profits
The question of wartime profits was at the heart of Research Findings. In order to clear
its name and reputation, and to prove to the world that Ford Motor Company did not profit from
slave labor, a lengthy and comprehensive analysis of Ford Motor Company and Ford-Werke
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financial records was completed. Ford Motor Company employed the services of
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, a respected accounting firm, to analyze this data. Research Findings
indicates that
“Financial records analyzed by PriceWaterhouseCoopers suggest
little evidence that Ford-Werke made profits during the war. The
analysis reveals that modest profit figures were recorded during the
first few years of the war, but these were wiped out by enormous
losses in the last two years. Indeed, the actions of the Nazi
government, a postwar claims commission, and the Congress of
the U.S. government all provide evidence to support the view that
there were significant damages inflicted upon Ford-Werke. Each of
these bodies awarded modest compensation to Ford or FordWerke, representing a small fraction of Ford’s claims.”160
Unfortunately, even that reputable name of PriceWaterhouseCoopers does not get Ford off the
hook. A closer look at the report and the financial data shows that war profits were indeed
earned by Ford-Werke and Ford Motor Company.
In its appendices, Research Findings provides year by year income figures for the
company. As expected, the early years of the war were quite profitable for the firm. Between
1939 and 1943, Ford-Werke reaped a healthy net profit of 9,605,519 RM (or about $3,626,207).
In the last full year of the war, Ford-Werke lost a substantial amount due to supply interruptions
and German government inefficiency – the one year loss for 1944 was 2,731,689 RM
($1,092,675).161 This is where Ford manipulates the math to its own advantage. Reich and his
team conclude that substantial losses in the last two years of the war completely cancel out the
profits achieved early on. While this is true, some qualification of this argument is necessary.
Ford-Werke was only under Nazi rule for the first two months of 1945. In March, Allied troops
liberated Cologne and began utilizing Ford-Werke for the production and repair of their own
vehicles. When Ford-Werke’s main source of income, the German government, was defeated, it
160
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would naturally be expected that Ford-Werke would incur some financial setbacks. But
technically, its 1945 loss should only be a pro-rated amount of the total for that year. In other
words, only losses incurred while the Nazis were in power can fairly be applied to the total
profit/loss figure for Ford-Werke operations under the Nazis. Taken for two months, total losses
for 1945 should be calculated at 3,433,091 RM/12 months (x two months) which equals about
572,182 RM ($228,872.73). With this in consideration, Ford-Werke’s total wartime profit is an
impressive 6,301,648 RM ($2,520,659). Even considering the total loss of 1945, the number is
still substantial, at 3,440,739 RM ($1,376,295). Perhaps understandably, these numbers are
wholly absent from Research Findings. They allude to an unpleasant truth, namely that FordWerke made money supplying an enemy of the United States.
This manipulation of profit figures could possibly be dismissed as semantics. After all,
Ford was unable to extract its profits from its subsidiary during the war. However, this would be
an oversimplification of the issue at hand. These profits enabled Ford-Werke to declare
dividends from 1939 to 1943, the total amount of which owed to parent company Ford
represented about $600,000. Bureaucratic blockage and organizational difficulties prevented
Ford from receiving these funds until six years after the war, in 1951. By then, the old
Reichsmark had been replaced by the Deutschemark, and was accordingly devalued 90 percent.
That devaluation saw Ford’s dividend shrink to about $60,000 in 1951 dollars. That did not
deter Ford, however, and it put the funds to good use. Ford claimed these dividends and used
them to buy back I.G. Farben’s remaining shares in Ford-Werke, as the company was being
liquidated after the war. Rather than see Farben’s share in the company be lost to the public or
another corporation outside of Ford’s control, Ford opted to use these profits it realized on Nazi
war orders to strengthen its own ownership of the firm. Ford could have, for example,
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distributed that tainted money to former slave laborers or American war veterans, both
appropriate causes considering the circumstances. However, Ford managers feared that those
shares might have been distributed by I.G. Farben’s liquidators in a way contrary to the wishes of
Dearborn. Despite their small monetary value, they are worth millions of dollars today. This
incident raises an urgent question: How can Ford cleanse itself of responsibility for its German
subsidiary’s wartime actions when it, in fact, became a direct beneficiary of them?
Even Ford’s own historians confirm that Ford’s other European subsidiaries did
remarkably well during the war by teaming up with the Nazis. As Mira Wilkins notes in her
account of Ford’s operations in Europe during World War II, “The European companies operated
at a handsome profit in all years except 1943, when they showed a loss of $1,780,000, chiefly
due to the impending collapse of Germany. Their blocked dividends did not come…until after
the war. The net paper profit for the war years was $10,978,000.”162 Yet, any mention of the
European operation’s profitability is conspicuously lacking in Research Findings. As critics of
Research Findings have indicated, this figure has broad implications for the claims made by
Reich and his team. In compiling their report, researchers were asked to determine the profits
realized by doing business with Nazi Germany in Germany alone. They seemed to have
“deliberately ignored the big picture” by neglecting the rest of European operations.163
Profits were also realized in more indirect ways as well. During the war, plant capacity
was greatly expanded and the facilities at Cologne upgraded. A look at the company’s total
value during the war years shows a company that, in spite of huge losses at war’s end, still
maintained and even increased in total asset value. In 1939, the company’s total assets were
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valued at 60,470,956 RM; by 1945, this had increased to 68,859,397 RM.164 Thus, during the
war, Ford-Werke actually grew by 14 percent. It becomes clear that the pure profit numbers hide
a more complete picture of the company’s business during wartime. This growth poised FordWerke to take advantage of a smoldering Europe that desperately needed vehicles for rebuilding.
Indeed, the capital gains of doing business with the Nazis prepared the company well for
a post-war world. The Ford-Werke plant at Cologne was relatively undamaged (despite
company claims for damage compensation to the contrary). Before his association with
Research Findings, Simon Reich wrote of Ford-Werke’s war damages that “the buildings badly
damaged or destroyed were the receiving department, the recreation hall, a wooden office
building…none essential to the running of the company. Greatest losses were in merchandise
stored at depots; the firm’s infrastructure remained intact.165 In fact, Ford-Werke was the only
functioning truck production facility in the British zone of Germany, and Opel was the only other
company producing trucks in 1948.166 Reich is absolutely correct in his assessment that FordWerke “did not suffer as much direct war damage as did other automotive producers and made a
rapid recovery. It therefore appeared remarkably well placed to take advantage of increased
demand in 1945.”167 With this in mind, Ford’s competitive advantage in the German auto
industry can be directly attributed to the activities and expansion while the company was
producing vehicles for Hitler. Today, Cologne is the head of Ford’s entire European operation –
it eventually overtook even Dagenham and Great Britain – a testament to Ford-Werke’s success
after the war.
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Cologne’s relative strength and undamaged facilities were a major boon for the company.
Company executives admitted openly that the main production facilities at Ford-Werke were
intact, but Ford Motor Company still thought it deserved war compensation. Many American
companies filed claims with the U.S. government for damage sustained to their facilities in
occupied Europe during the war. Ford submitted a request for compensation for $7,050,052 in
1965 for losses sustained in Austria and Germany during the war. The Commission responsible
for awards reviewed Ford’s claim and concluded that Ford only deserved “$522,526 (after
deducting tax benefits resulting from the losses) on grounds that some of the claims or claim
amounts listed by Ford were not compensable under the terms and conditions of the law.”168
Ford called for a review of the decision and after a drawn out appeal, the amount was increased
to $785,321. Simon Reich perhaps inadvertently reveals a clue as to why Ford’s award was so
small. Before his association with Ford, he wrote that Ford’s claims on the basis of “direct
damages” were small in comparison with “losses in trade due to war.”169 Maybe the government
commission was at least superficially aware of how much Ford profited from its operations and,
cognizant of those direct and indirect benefits, sought to send Ford a message that its behavior
was unacceptable.
It is curious that Ford even had the basis for a claim at all, considering that actual
damages to the production capacity of the German factory were quite minimal. As soon as the
Allies occupied Cologne the factory was put back to work. Ford claims that the extremely
limited compensation package somehow proves that it did not realize war profits. Strangely,
Research Findings, in all of its 98,000 pages of accompanying documentation, was unable to
produce any documents about whether the 1965 award was ever paid. However, Research
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Findings postulates that at the time of the award’s offering, the fund contained enough money to
distribute 80 to 90 percent of the funds to all claimants, leaving it entirely unclear if such
payments were ever dispersed. Based on this information, it seems highly likely that the money
was indeed distributed to Ford. Why would Ford Motor Company fail to retain a paper trail of
its reimbursements for war damages, amounting to three-quarters of a million dollars?
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Conclusion
“I hope a great many people read the story about the Ford plants in
Germany, published in one of our newspapers the other day, with
its record of the actions permitted to these foreign plants by the
majority stockholders in this country. Although the story dealt
only with the Ford empire, there are many other great industrial
concerns in the United States whose plants function in many
countries throughout the world. I recall hearing, after France fell
and after we went into the war, that the heads of a big industry in
this country cabled congratulations to their managers in France
because the latter were keeping the plant going—although they
were keeping it going by making what the Germans asked them to
make...In the carefully documented case of the Ford German
plants, it was quite evident that Hitler and the Nazis profited by the
attitude of the stockowners in this country.”1

In her daily column, Eleanor Roosevelt chose to highlight the Ford story not because of a
personal vendetta against Henry Ford on behalf of her deceased husband, but because its lessons
deserved further scrutiny. Nonetheless, in spite of a national spotlight on its actions, Ford Motor
Company managed to escape blame for its actions for more than fifty years. In the postwar
period, Americans cared less about the behavior of corporations and more about returning to a
normal life after the interruption of two World Wars. Franklin Roosevelt’s death, and the
departure of many of his more hawkish cabinet members, such as Henry Morgenthau, meant that
corporations like Ford and General Motors escaped official sanction for their wartime activities.
Besides, both companies had been so instrumental in producing tanks, trucks, and airplanes for
the war effort once the United States became involved in the conflict that to question their
patriotism seemed ungrateful and disrespectful.
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The fundamental topic that this thesis addresses is the issue of culpability. The behavior
of Ford managers on both sides of the Atlantic in the years prior to the war was reprehensible.
Ford managers displayed questionable judgment for almost a decade with regard to Germany.
Year after year, they took huge risks hardly worth the minimal gains. This raises the question
why these Ford managers so passively accepted a state of affairs that was quite clearly not in
their best interest or that of the United States. Even more importantly, the modern-day
management of Ford Motor Company has committed an error almost as egregious by refusing to
recognize the wrongdoings of the past. So, in order to come to some solid and truthful
conclusions, something Research Findings so roundly failed to do, I will answer the real
question at stake here. Why would Ford voluntarily supply the Nazis?
The first and perhaps most obvious answer is simple inertia. Once it opened its factory at
Cologne in 1931, despite the souring economic conditions, Ford was in essence committed for
the long haul. Divestment was not a realistic possibility. The company could not have picked a
worse time to increase its investment in Germany. Had Ford waited even another year or two, it
would not have been so quick to invest heavily in the form of a state-of-the-art manufacturing
and production facility in Germany. As construction was completed on the Cologne plant, the
German economy collapsed, sparking a tidal wave of nationalism that brought Adolf Hitler and
the Nazis to power. Ford invested millions of dollars in its new factory. To merely abandon that
huge outlay of capital seemed impossible. So, Ford hoped to make the best of the situation and
continue operations in Germany. Ford could not justify to its shareholders at home spending
millions to open a brand new facility and turning around, admitting defeat, and leaving. Some of
this pride was surely the result of the competition between Ford and General Motors. To leave
Germany would have admitted defeat to Ford’s biggest rival in the United States. Ford
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managers, however, chose instead to slog it out in Germany even though General Motors
(through its Opel subsidiary) continued to dominate the German auto market, beating Ford in
market share year after year. Ford seemed altogether oblivious to the fact that it had already
been defeated, and instead set out to prove that it too could compete in the German market, and
to that end, took all of the steps necessary to promote the success of its subsidiary.
Initially, these steps were not so great in magnitude, nor did they demand much
modification of Ford policy. Changing the way a bolt was measured and complying
perfunctorily with Nazi standardization demands was fully acceptable, as long as the products
produced in Germany could still be used elsewhere in the world (and they could be). The
company enjoyed a degree of manufacturing independence and benefits unheard of elsewhere in
German industry. Alternatively, the company was harassed for not doing enough for the country
when it suited the needs of the regime. This happened with increasing frequency as the outbreak
of World War II drew nearer. The regime leaned heavily on Ford-Werke to provide raw
materials, military equipment, and other goods for the war effort. Ford did negotiate in the
standardization arena, but ultimately gave in to a substantial portion of Nazi demands, especially
afterwards. Following the standardization episode, it became much easier to just say yes to Nazi
demands. Business was booming, and especially after Ford-Werke was awarded lucrative
military contracts, the cost-benefit analysis seemed to indicate that this was a worthwhile
investment. Even when the Nazis openly exploited the Ford Motor Company, it did not seem to
mind. It was just nodded its head in approval. What remains unclear, however, is why Ford
tried to negotiate when its relative position in Germany was weak, like it was during the
standardization struggle – and years later, when its value was apparent to Nazi officials and its
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bargaining position that much stronger, it simply capitulated and gave in to increasingly steep
Nazi demands.
This is a compelling argument for why Ford would have acted the way it did. However,
it would be incomplete without a look at the profit motive. Ultimately, businesses care most
about earnings. During the 1930s, Ford-Werke and the European subsidiaries which fell under
its influence, were at least modestly profitable entities. Losses in the early part of the decade
were quickly erased as rearmament reached a fever pace in Germany and the rest of Europe.
Even though the majority of Ford’s profits were locked in Germany, the European subsidiaries’
profits certainly were accessible. Moreover, Ford’s profits were not lost, merely set aside in a
special account to be claimed later. The world greatly underestimated Hitler, and most corporate
executives expected that once Germany returned to economic prosperity, currency controls
would be loosened and they could extract their profits. In the unlikely event of a war – and most
American executives doubted that a war would ever take place – it would hopefully be quick and
relatively painless. America, in their opinion, would not even have to get involved, but instead
could watch from the sidelines. Meanwhile, American business interests would prosper as their
European auxiliaries supplied the warring factions. Ford subscribed wholly to this mentality.
Moreover, neither set of Ford managers ever contemplated opposing a politically
extremist regime, and Ford officials did not directly approve or disapprove of Hitler. The
company believed that it could remain neutral in German politics. Nowhere in the lengthy
correspondence of Albert, Perry, Sorensen, or Edsel Ford are there any references of support or
opposition to Nazi policies. Thus, it becomes easy to see that without any strong negative
feelings toward the regime and the devastating financial loss of pulling out completely, the
company made the decision to stay on seemingly sound economic grounds. Should Ford have
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actively opposed the regime’s policies, its facilities surely would have been taken over and
everything would have been lost completely. But Henry Ford would never have allowed such
resistance.
Henry Ford is really the wild card in all of this. The man is still regarded as a hero to
anti-Semitic groups all over the world, ranging from the KKK to Al-Qaeda. Over the years,
there has been much (unsubstantiated) speculation based on hearsay that Ford funded Hitler from
a very early stage. Ford’s own admiration of Hitler was well-documented, and the feeling was
undoubtedly reciprocal. Indeed, some parts of Mein Kampf were directly lifted from Henry
Ford’s own anti-Semitic work, The International Jew. No internal company documents would
ever support the claim that it was because of Henry Ford that the company tolerated the situation
in Germany, and Research Findings would never raise such a self-indicting possibility. The
irrationality of so many of the business decisions made in Germany, however, naturally begs the
question. Was Ford Motor Company willing to tolerate conditions that were less than ideal, to
put it mildly, because of the very fact that it was Germany and Hitler? Ford never would have
tolerated these circumstances anywhere else in the world. It is unfortunate that there were no
microphone bugs tape-recording conversations in Henry Ford’s office during the 1930s, because
there is a strong possibility that they would have revealed damning remarks.
Additionally, the behavior of the Nazis towards Ford certainly demonstrates that some
degree of favoritism existed. Maybe the Nazis’ harassment of Ford-Werke was just a matter of
course, for the sake of appearing consistent in their nationalistic, anti-American rhetoric and
policy positions. Before the war, Ford-Werke was never pressured to its breaking point, like so
many other foreign firms doing business in Germany during the time, and it was granted unique
exemptions. During the war, Ford-Werke was spared the worst of the foreign property
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reorganization, and was left in the care of the original Dearborn-appointed managers. Why
would such an inconsequential firm be treated with such respect, when the Nazis could pretty
much have done whatever they wanted with the company?
There was no record of the company’s response to Hitler, but was there any record of
Dearborn managers regretful of their decisions? Unsurprisingly, there is almost none. Percival
Perry voiced concerns when Dearborn proposed to assign Cologne export markets that were
formerly the domain of the British company, although he was eventually placated. Charles
Sorensen voiced concern about German interference in Ford’s business very early on, when the
Germans first imposed standardization on the company. However, his concerns were assuaged
sufficiently by Albert to win him over and he became, with the possible exception of Edsel Ford,
Ford-Werke’s leading advocate and contact-man in Dearborn. In his own autobiography,
Sorensen never expresses regret for how business was conducted, or comments on his own role
in facilitating the supply of material to the Nazis. However, V.Y. Tallberg recalled a
conversation with Robert Schmidt, in which he learned that Sorensen was uncomfortable with
the French plant situation: “When I came back from Europe, he was very much worried about
something…I can go just by one thing that Schmidt once said…He said Mr. Sorensen hasn’t got
such a clear conscience in regard to the French plant.”2

Contextualizing Ford’s Operations
Ford does not deserve all of the blame for acting as an American company in Germany
supplying the Nazis. General Motors-owned Opel, like Ford-Werke, profited greatly from its
operations before and during the war. Opel’s business of providing airplane engines, trucks, and
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munitions was extremely profitable before and during the war years. Like Ford’s, Opel’s
wartime management diligently placed all of the company’s dividends in an escrow account, to
be received by General Motors following the conclusion of the war. GM took delivery of the
blocked funds in 1951, just as Ford did. They did not amount to much ($261,061), which as
Opel historian Henry Turner concludes, can help explain why the decision was made to acquire
them by lower ranking GM officials: “the money involved, which amounted to only a twentieth
of one percent of GM’s net income for that year, seemed too paltry to merit attention at the
highest level of management.”3 This is not a compelling excuse, however. Both Ford and GM
deserve blame for laying claim to money they should have dismissed as tainted. Aside from the
war profits, however, the stories of the two firms are quite different.
A brief examination of Opel’s history under Hitler brings many of the claims of Simon
Reich and Research Findings into sharp relief. Reich singles out Opel’s involvement in
Germany to lessen the weight of the accusations levied against Ford. He concludes that “FordWerke was consistently treated much worse than General Motors’ Opel subsidiary. FordWerke’s small size made it relatively unimportant in terms of Nazi strategic thinking and thus it
was far more disposable.”4 This thesis has already refuted the claim that Ford-Werke was
disposable in the eyes of Nazi strategic planners; however, it is quite clear that Reich is mistaken
in his claim that GM was treated much better. It is easy to see why, from a superficial
standpoint, Reich makes his conclusion. However, these claims do not hold up under scrutiny.
At least initially, Ford-Werke balked at meeting standardization regulations and filling
orders for the German government. Dearborn stalled, believing that no government had the right
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to dictate how it did business in any country, Germany included. Because of that philosophy,
Ford resisted regulations from the moment they were introduced, but Opel cooperated with
automotive regulations from a very early stage. An American consul noted that meeting
standardization helped Opel’s business within Germany, but handicapped the company in the
export market, which was so crucial in the Nazi economy.5 The vital point, however, is that
Opel neither requested nor was granted special standardization exemptions for their parts. It was
this attitude that was favored by the authorities. Indeed, in his appeal to Dearborn to allow
Cologne to standardize more fully, Heinrich Albert wrote to Sorensen that Opel was the
measuring stick against which Ford was measured. Ford’s perceived lack of cooperation angered
regime officials, and Albert bemoaned the fact that “Opel had always been on good terms with
the Government and the Party organization.”6 Also unlike Ford, which hesitated at filling
government orders early on, Opel was producing trucks for the regime as early as 1935. The
famous Opel Blitz truck was produced and sold to the German military, and alongside the Ford
truck the Blitz became one of the most commonly used trucks in the German armed forces. If
Reich’s argument were true, it should have been Opel, and not Ford, that was extended special
treatment, lest its business be lost. Instead, “disposable” Ford-Werke was singled out for
exemptions.
The collaboration was also evident in Opel’s smaller vehicle program. Its sprawling
Rüsselheim plant and established reputation positioned the GM subsidiary to make a viable bid
for producing Hitler’s “people’s car.” Opel was also active in Hitler’s plans to develop the
Volkswagen, actively helping to fulfill his goal to bring cheap transportation to the German
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public. Opel’s huge production capacity afforded it the ability to make its smallest model, called
the P4, available for a mere 1650 RM, and later, the price would drop to 1450 RM. Opel’s
offering was the cheapest car available in Germany during the 1930s.7 As a result of its
participation in the Volkswagen project, even though it did not receive the final contract, it did
receive a consolation prize in the way of a new truck factory, as well as orders for trucks, at
Brandenburg.
Despite some initial resistance to Nazi ideology, Hitler and his party could count on Opel
(and by default, GM) management to support his policies, at least passively. Graeme Howard,
GM’s general manager of overseas operations, was as vocal in his support of Hitler as Henry
Ford. Howard told colleagues of German progress, “Germany to a man and woman is behind
Hitler and his objectives of quality and peace.”8 Before Hitler’s invasion of Poland, Howard
continued to publicly defend Hitler and the right to “regain for his people the things they lost” at
Versailles.9 James Mooney, president of General Motors overseas operations, was much more
business-minded and refused to let ideology or morals cloud his estimation of doing business in
Germany. He placed his trust in Hitler as a stabilizing force and looked at German markets as a
lucrative source of profit. Indeed, in 1938 Mooney received an Order of Merit of the German
Eagle Award from Adolf Hitler.10 Opel historian Henry Turner classifies Mooney as an
“economic appeaser” and writes of him that he “was incapable of registering the mounting
evidence that Hitler was a megalomaniac outlaw who could never be deterred from his pursuit of
sweeping conquests by mere adjustments in the terms of international trade.”11 The public
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rhetoric coming from Ford Dearborn was hardly this enthusiastic about Hitler and certainly never
came out to defend his right to re-arm. Ford might have remained silent, which in some respects
is equally egregious on a moral level, but the public positions of GM executives were far more
vocal in support of the regime.
Thus, it seems that Opel would enjoy a greater degree of cooperation from German
officials because of all of these factors. However, the opposite was true. In spite of all these
instances of cooperation, General Motors actually faced incredible difficulties in controlling its
German subsidiary. As early as 1937, the automotive giant was fending off attacks from local
Nazi officials bent on requisitioning the company into government hands. Jakob Sprenger, an
upstart Nazi regional governor of Hesse (where Opel was headquartered), was irritated that the
largest manufacturing enterprise in his realm was in American hands; he welcomed the
possibility of bringing it under the control of Germans.12 It was only through complicated
politicking, in which GM managers pitted German officials and government offices against one
another, that GM was able to retain tenuous control. In contrast, Ford-Werke never faced such
difficulties. While it might have faced official prejudice, the level of interference in its affairs
never reached such a crisis point. At no point during its time in Germany did Ford-Werke ever
face a very real threat of the Nazis taking over the facilities, and it was inexplicably shielded
from the animosity aimed at Opel. Even during the war, Dearborn-selected men were in charge,
conducting business to the best of their abilities but conducting it on Ford’s behalf nonetheless.
Additionally, Opel was far more subject to political and ideological domination from the
regime. Opel factories were plastered “with posters of the worst political type. Although this
was an American owned plant, many of these posters which had to be put up were directly aimed
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at American political figures…which did not meet with Nazi approval.”13 The in-house
newspaper was censored, re-edited, and “quickly degenerated into a Party rather than a plant
organ.”14 Even as Ford-Werke’s in-house newspaper took on a more pro-Nazi tone, and FordWerke managers became more outspoken in their support of the regime, all of the evidence
seems to indicate that this was not a result of official censorship but rather a voluntary and selfguided course (which possibly makes the behavior even more reprehensibe). The autonomy
preserved by Ford-Werke, especially in the last years of the 1930s, is really an anomaly.
Further proof that Ford-Werke was afforded special treatment can be seen in how it fared
following the outbreak of war in 1939. Jakob Sprenger had tremendous influence as the regional
party leader, or Gauleiter. He mandated policy for Opel’s internal factory management, and
forced indoctrination of factory workers and the integration of ideology into plant life. These
interferences seemed mild compared to the attacks levied against Opel during the war from
higher Party officials. Following the United States’ entry into the war, General Motors wrote off
Opel as a total loss, in accordance with common corporate practice of the time for firms with
operations in Nazi Germany. Upon learning this, and in order to maximize the firm’s usefulness
to the regime, the Reich War Ministry sought to “liquidate” or expropriate the company into
German hands. Opel lost effective managerial control of its day-to-day operations and
production was coordinated by central authorities. Opel’s subsidiaries in the rest of Europe were
similarly taken over by the Nazis. An enemy property custodian who was an outsider was
appointed by the government. Ford, on the other hand, retained its own manager, Robert
Schmidt, in that position. Orders for the rest of Ford’s European subsidiaries were administered
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not from a central agency but through Cologne.15 Indeed, this was the case throughout the war
for Ford. Nazi officials were not running the firm. Dearborn-appointed and approved managers
were. Even when they lost direct contact with their parent company, Ford-Werke enjoyed a
freedom of management that was unheard of among other German firms, such as Daimler-Benz.
Ford Dearborn could count on a strong degree of protection, even during the war.
Even Daimler-Benz, the auto manufacturer most visibly associated with Adolf Hitler and
the Nazi party, faced difficulties in its dealings with the regime. Benz executives were highly
skeptical of the standardization program imposed on the auto industry by the regime in the midto-late 1930s. Especially following the second round of “rationalization,” which called for a
deep reduction in the number and types of vehicles a firm produced, the firm thought it was
unfair and benefited certain manufacturers more than others.16 Executives at Benz, like those at
Ford, thought that any war would be short and hesitated (at least initially) to convert to a full war
footing or implement any other changes in production methods that would “disadvantage a rapid
reconversion to peacetime production.”17 Despite personal interventions from Daimler-Benz’s
chairman, Jakob Werlin, a personal friend of Hitler, the company was forced to halt production
of its popular 1.7L model and realize a full wartime production schedule. Of course, attitudes at
Daimler-Benz were overwhelmingly in support of the regime and its policies, and these minor
quarrels the company had with the regime hardly impacted overall company policy toward
working with Hitler. The point is, however, that even firms that were firmly in the good graces
of the regime (or at least as firmly as was possible when dealing with Hitler) were challenged by
regulations imposed on them by the German government.
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Simon Reich makes an inappropriate leap between the size of a firm (in this case, Opel)
and how well it was treated by the Nazi regime. Perhaps this was mere oversight on behalf of his
research team. As I have shown above, it would not be too difficult to arrive at the conclusion
that Opel was treated better than Ford-Werke. Factually, however, this is an untenable position,
and the report fails to provide a convincing explanation for why Ford-Werke retained such a high
level of independence. While it was true that Opel was favorably regarded by the regime, it was
actually subject to more hostility than its counterpart in Cologne. Moreover, “favor” had little
practical value in the unpredictable Nazi state. Opel historian Henry Turner puts it best: “In the
Third Reich, governmental decisions turned on the whims of a dictator for whom the doublecross
was standard procedure.”18
In light of these revelations, it becomes apparent that portraying Ford-Werke as a victim
of the Nazi regime is at best a wide-eyed delusion and at worst an open denial of a damning
truth. Relatively, Ford-Werke was treated quite well in Germany, and the entire European
operation enjoyed profitability throughout the war. “Ford men” retained control of the company,
and as despicable as their actions were, they remained responsible for the everyday operation of
the company under the Nazis.
In light of the framework of corporate accountability established in the introduction of
this thesis, it is quite clear that, upon a closer review of the evidence, the Ford Motor Company
skirted its duty to own up to the actions of the past. Of course, the past cannot be undone, and
the best that Ford could have done was produce a straightforward and honest document which
chronicled its activities. However, Research Findings’ deceptive construction and vague
references downplay the huge scale of its involvement in Nazi Germany. Statements like those
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made by Ford Chief of Staff John Rintamaki like “it was a process we could not influence or
control” are just short of bold-faced lies.19
Following the publication of Research Findings, Simon Reich told reporters at a press
conference that “there is a big difference in my own mind between if you were actively involved
in the manufacture of chemicals for gas chambers or if you were actively involved in the
manufacture of trucks.”20 Such statements are not only ignorant of the truth but extremely
offensive. Reich conveniently forgets that a major shareholder in Ford-Werke before and
throughout the war was I.G. Farben, whose Zyklon-B gas was responsible for the deaths of
millions. Ford trucks were quite literally the vehicle of lebensraum; the company trumpeted its
contributions to the war on both the Eastern and Western fronts. It was Ford trucks that carried
German troops east, where they committed atrocities against Jews, Gypsies, and other peoples
who were not Aryan.
Sixty years after her column on Ford was first published, the prescription offered by
Eleanor Roosevelt is still valid. Businesses should critically evaluate their behavior and openly
admit when they have erred.
“I imagine that each one of us thinks we are honestly trying to
look at any given situation not only from the point of view of our
own individual interests, but from the point of view of the good of
the people as a whole. Just because this is the case, it is important
that every now and then we stop and examine what we have done
and what resulted from our actions.”21
Ford should listen to these recommendations and revisit its report from seven years ago.
Humanity has the capacity to forgive, and Ford should not be so dismissive of this fact. The time
is always right for apology.
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